The Spirit of Asilomar and the Future of Biotechnology

Permanent URI for this community

https://hdl.handle.net/1911/118545

Browse

Now showing 1 - 20 of 27

1.1 Towards frameworks for evaluation and governance of Biotechnologies Beyond Conventional Containment
(Rice University, 2025) Marken, John
At the Spirit of Asilomar meeting, one working group met to discuss whether a consistent framework for categorizing and providing guidance for the use of Biotechnologies Beyond Conventional Containment (BBCCs), similar to how the Biosafety Level framework operates for the laboratory use of biological agents, could be developed. This document presents some of the major conclusions from these discussions, outlines the general structure of what a framework might look like, and states some open questions that still need to be addressed to develop any concrete implmeentation of such a framework.
1.2 Risk-benefit analysis worksheet for biotechnology beyond conventional containment
(Rice University, 2025) Abbott, Zack; Flores, Alonso; Murray, Richard
This report presents a structured risk-benefit analysis framework developed through discussions at the Spirit of Asilomar summit under the Biotechnologies Beyond Conventional Containment (BBCC) theme. As biotechnologies increasingly move beyond traditional laboratory and industrial confinement into open environmental applications, novel risks, ethical considerations, and societal implications arise. Recognizing the limitations of defining universal "safe design guidelines”, this report focuses instead on creating a practical, context-sensitive worksheet to guide scientists in early-stage project development. The worksheet prompts users to evaluate potential benefits—environmental, health, economic, and societal—against biological, ecological, health, regulatory, and security risks, while acknowledging the inevitability of residual risks. It encourages interdisciplinary consultation, highlighting the importance of engaging with experts and stakeholders to ensure responsible innovation. Serving as a preliminary self-assessment tool, the worksheet is designed to complement, not replace, formal regulatory processes. It aims to foster more thoughtful and transparent biotechnology design decisions and to evolve over time through broader community input.
1.3 Public Infrastructure for Analyzing and Assessing Beyond Biocontainment Biotechnologies
(Rice University, 2025) Zimmerman, Elise H.; Palmer, Xavier-Lewis; Frow, Emma; Johnson, Alicia; Hodgson, Andrea; Voight, Chris; Elcock, Leon B. III
Arising from the Biotechnologies Beyond Conventional Containment (BBCC) theme of the 2025 Spirit of Asilomar Summit, this report proposes and outlines four integrated pillars of public infrastructure for testing organisms prior to possible release into open environments. The proposed infrastructure comprises physical, digital, human and stewardship elements. It would facilitate controlled and phased experiments in a manner similar to clinical trials, allowing for the development of predictive models regarding organism dispersal, persistence, gene flow, ecological impacts and more, across various environmental scenarios. Tiered access and governance mechanisms would ideally structure testing in relation to different risk categories, and promote transparent reporting of outcomes. Such infrastructure could transform how we assess the safety and value of releasing engineered living organisms into the environment, combining real-world data and computer models to improve informed choices based on solid evidence, responsible environmental care, and public input.
1.4 Nature Conservation in the Age of Bioengineering
(Rice University, 2025) Moronta-Barrios, Felix; Freemont, Paul; Kiattisewee, Cholpisit; Lindner, Ariel B.; Novak, Ben; Redford, Kent; Seah, Adeline
This entreaty explores the promising role of bioengineering in constructively supporting conservation efforts through responsible innovation and interdisciplinary collaboration. It outlines eight concise statement points that reflect shared principles and opportunities for action.
1.5 Identifying and Addressing the Risk of the Environmental Release of Organisms — Engineered or Natural
(Rice University, 2025) Chemla, Yonatan; Alexanian, Tessa; Barrios, Felix Moronta; Demirer, Gozde; Flores, Alonso; Karthikeyan, Smruthi; Lindner, Ariel B.; Mackelprang, Becky; Marken, John; Mitra, Aishwarya Sparky; Molla, Kutubuddin A.; Rudenko, Larisa; Syberg-Olsen, Mitchell J.; Wu, Felicia; Silberg, Jonathan (Joff); Voigt, Christopher A.
The environmental release of both engineered and non-engineered organisms for Biotechnologies Beyond Conventional Containment (BBCC) offers unique solutions to pressing global challenges, including the prevention of soil degradation, the attenuation of nitrogen pollution, the replacement of harmful pesticides and herbicides, the remediation of anthropogenic contaminants and ‘forever chemicals’ mitigation. An evaluation of impacts, both positive and negative, rather than arbitrary prohibitions, is crucial for advancing the responsible use of organisms intentionally released into the environment. The history of biological interventions demonstrates that organisms have successfully contributed to agriculture, pollution remediation, ecosystem restoration, waste upcycling, and pest control, yet their full potential remains constrained by regulatory hurdles that do not fully account for modern scientific advancements. At the same time, some releases serve as cautionary tales, having caused harm due to a lack of regulation and monitoring. Unlike chemicals released to the environment, organisms — particularly those designed or selected for specific functions — can be managed with built-in safeguards, ranging from physical and genetic containment strategies to controlled ecological interactions to mitigate risks while maximizing benefits. Advancements in precision engineering, computational modeling, and real-time monitoring technologies now allow for unprecedented accuracy in tracking, assessing, and controlling the environmental impact of released organisms — capabilities inaccessible when recombinant DNA technology first emerged 50 years ago. Many regulatory structures were developed decades before today’s explosion of biological knowledge and insight was even imaginable. This resulted in our current policies that have become restrictive, limiting the deployment of innovative and promising biological solutions. A new approach to risk analysis is now needed that accounts for changes in science, and in society, which assesses the environmental release of natural, evolved, and engineered organisms based on their functions rather than their origin or how they were developed. By modernizing these frameworks to emphasize continuous assessment, real-world data collection, and adaptive risk assessment and management, stakeholders can create a regulatory pathway for the sustainable, responsible, and evidence-based integration of environmental biological technologies.
1.6 Identifying intersections between BBCC and ecology and conservation
(Rice University, 2025) Kiattisewee, Cholpisit Ice; Seah, Adeline; George, Dalton R.; Barnhill, S. Kathleen; Barrios, Felix Moronta
This Entreaty summarizes the key discussion points identified from a “Identifying intersections between BBCC and ecology/conservation” working group as one of the technical sessions under the “Biotechnologies Beyond Conventional Containment (BBCC)” theme at the Spirit of Asilomar and The future of Biotechnology summit. The session aimed to explore the intersection of biotechnology application in the environmental set-up for ecology and conservation purposes.
2.1 Condemning & Making Obsolete Biological Weapons
(Rice University, 2025) Weber, Andy; Parthemore, Christine; Wentzel, Josh
This entreaty from the 2025 Asilomar conference condemns the development, stockpiling, and use of biological weapons. It is a call to the global community to recognize risks, capabilities, and our responsibilities, as modern biology and emerging technologies underpin both the security and betterment of our shared future. The Biological Weapons Convention enshrines the norm against malicious uses of biology, while robust detection, attribution, and response are the capabilities to erode the operational effectiveness of bioweapons and render them ultimately obsolete. Achieving this goal depends on these capabilities being resourced, deployed, and broadly accessible alongside support for rapid design and manufacturing of countermeasures and for the scientific advances that can positively shape the world. This entreaty also represents the view of Asilomar participants that a world free of biological weapons is an international pursuit.
2.2 The Importance of Redlines in the Life Sciences
(Rice University, 2025) Relman, David A.
This Entreaty recognizes that there are experiments and experimental goals that should not be undertaken or pursued because the risks, as best they are understood, far outweigh the possible benefits. These experiments and goals should be defined by “redlines” that practitioners of science will not violate.
3.1 Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Biotechnology
(Rice University, 2025) Bromberg, Yana; Altman, Russ; Imperiale, Michael; Horvitz, Eric; Dus, Monica; Townshend, Raphael; Yao, Vicky; Treangen, Todd; Alexanian, Tessa; Szymanski, Erika; Yassif, Jaime; Anta, Rafael; Lindner, Ariel B.; Schmidt, Markus; Diggans, James; Esvelt, Kevin M.; Molla, Kutubuddin A.; Phelan, Ryan; Wang, Mengdi; Wu, Felicia; de Carvalho Bittencourt, Daniela Matias
Integration of artificial intelligence (AI) and biotechnology (AIxBio) creates revolutionary opportunities for progress in advancing the bioeconomy and addressing health concerns. AI advances promise to greatly accelerate beneficial biological discoveries and innovation and will undoubtedly be one of the deepest contributions of AI to people and society. However, AI methods can also increase risks of accidents and enable malevolent activities aimed at deliberately harmful applications such as bioweapons development. Effective AIxBio governance requires frameworks that enable the great rewards expected from AI in biosciences but that also consider more costly outcomes made possible by AI advances. Recent literature on AIxBio risk management highlights strategies that include tiered access controls, AI auditing mechanisms, and mandatory biological molecule synthesis screening and monitoring. However, many of these potential guardrails have yet to be developed and/or adequately evaluated. In addition to developing practical, technical solutions, it will also be important to develop guidelines and regulations, as well as incentives to follow these, to drive broad implementation of effective risk reduction solutions at the national and international level. Such policies can address significant gaps in national and global governance, but it will also be important to harmonize these approaches to address any regulatory divergence and inconsistencies in risk management across key world players.
4.1 Safeguarding the Benefits of Synthetic Cell Engineering
(Rice University, 2025) Smith, James A.; Wagstaff, James; Glass, John; de C. Bittencourt, Daniela Matias; Mitra, Aishwarya Sparky; Chitayat, Liyam; Adamala, Katarzyna P.
The report outlines the transformative potential of synthetic cells in addressing global challenges through innovation in fields like medicine, energy, and education, while emphasizing their role as safe, accessible models for biological research. It advocates for responsible development through global collaboration, inclusive education, open science practices, and harmonized international governance to ensure equitable and secure deployment.
4.2 Synthetic Human Chromosomes – a call for global discussion
(Rice University, 2025) Tan, Cheemeng; Freemont, Paul; Cai, Patrick; Smith, Robert
4.3 Synthetic Cells for Environmental Release
(Rice University, 2025) Abbott, Zack; Adelman, Zach N.; Elani, Yuval; Freemont, Paul; Kiattisewee, Cholpisit Ice; Molla, Kutubuddin A.; Murray, Richard M.; Rudenko, Larisa
This report summarizes discussions about the intersection of synthetic cells and beyond-containment biotechnologies, highlighting the need to differentiate between replicating/evolving and non-replicating/non-evolving synthetic cells due to their varying risk profiles and containment challenges. It emphasizes the potential of non-replicating synthetic cells as a safer, more controllable platform with minimized genetic instability and enhanced biosafety features, while still acknowledging the potential for DNA transfer to environmental organisms. The report calls for developing methods to characterize risks associated with synthetic cell deployment, establishing a classification framework based on potential harms, and fostering public trust through proactive engagement, transparency, and appropriate regulatory guidelines.
4.4 Risks from Mirror Life
(Rice University, 2025)
5.1 Biotechnology for a Sustainable & Equitable Global Bioeconomy
(Rice University, 2025) Chang, Matthew Wook; Anta, Rafael; de Carvalho Bittencourt, Daniela Matias; Carlson, Rob; Chieza, Natsai Audrey; Federici, Fernán; Freemont, Paul; Haileselassie, Teklehaimanot; Kantola, Jukka; Karembu, Margaret; Khan, Faisal; Kong, David S.; Matsuo, Makiko; Maxon, Mary; Mizunashi, Wataru; Molloy, Jennifer C.; Mwambingu, Bupe; Park, Buhm Soon; Roca, Maria Mercedes; Speight, Robert; Tesfaye, Kassahun; Wu, Chen
Biotechnology is key to a sustainable, equitable global future. This entreaty calls for international cooperation, inclusive capacity-building, responsible governance, and resilient financing to unlock its full potential. By valuing biodiversity, aligning global standards, and promoting ethical innovation, biotechnology can foster shared prosperity, environmental stewardship, and long-term economic resilience across all regions.
5.2 Solidarity Bioeconomy
(Rice University, 2025) Elcock, Leon B. III; Perez, Rolando; Chappell, Callie R.; Lardner, Casey; Camenares, Devin; Thaweechuen, Jirapat; Munoz, Diego
5.3 Broadening Science Education within Existing Structures
(Rice University, 2025) Zimmerman, Elise H.; Johnson, Alicia; Elcock, Leon B. III; George, Dalton R.; Kiattisewee, Cholpisit Ice; Lardner, Casey; Palmer, Xavier-Lewis; Seah, Adeline; Silberg, Jonathan J.
The social, ethical, and political problems we are facing are not merely an interdisciplinary exercise, but a fundamental component of biotechnology. Scientists are increasingly needed to also act in roles as policy advisors, advocates, participants in diverse conversations, and active community members. Expanding science education to meaningfully incorporate the knowledge and skills needed to effectively engage in these roles is necessary. This entreaty serves as a concrete, non-exhaustive list of some examples, resources, evaluations, and ideas for implementing interdisciplinary learning and equity-minded science into existing science education structures. This document includes five categories of educational structures with an introduction, examples, pros, cons, and ideas to expand for each category. We hope it acts as a resource for people to begin implementing interdisciplinary education at their own institutions.
5.4 Letter to our relatives, ancestors, and future generations: A call to establish Indigenous Biotechnology
(Rice University, 2025) Flores, WarīNkwī; Astolfi, Maria C.T.; Perez, Rolando; Elcock, Leon B. III; Bonilla, Janeth; Rhyans, Steven; Kong, David
At the 50th anniversary of the Asilomar Summit, the Indigenous Biotechnology Working Group share this letter as a collective call to establish Indigenous Biotechnology as a distinct and self-determined field. Grounded in Indigenous Knowledge Systems, this emerging field reimagines biotechnology through the values of reciprocity, sovereignty, stewardship, and kinship with all life. In response to centuries of extractive science and ongoing colonialism, Indigenous Biotechnology centers the rights of Peoples and the rights of Nature in the design, governance, and development of biotechnology. This letter highlights foundations of the field, calls for global alliances, and invites to build the Principles of Indigenous Biotechnology by 2026. We write to our ancestors, relatives, and future generations to shape a future in which biotechnology safeguards the biodiversity, cultures, and Peoples that sustain our scientific innovations.
5.5 The Future of Biotechnology: A Show of Good Faith
(Rice University, 2025) Camenares, Devin; López, Andrea Isabel; Jannah, Roudlotul; Jibriel, Mohammed; Anjum, Bushra E.
Religion and biotechnology are often seen as being in conflict, but this narrow view can deepen divisions and alienate communities. Building biotechnology’s future requires learning from the past and understanding its cultural and religious contexts. We urge scientists to engage with other disciplines to grasp broader social issues and improve communication across divides. Envisioning responsible innovation means honoring history, fostering dialogue, and recognizing the diverse traditions that shape how biotechnology is received and applied.
6.1 Establishing the Global Network for Organisms and Multi-disciplinary Exchange (GNOME)
(Rice University, 2025) Seah, Adeline; Flores, WariNkwi; Perez, Rolando; Palmer, Xavier-Lewis; Elcock, Leon; George, Dalton; Johnson, Alicia; Kiattisewee, Cholpisit Ice; Chappell, Callie R.; Vigar, Justin R.J.; Almeida, Catarina; Jannah, Roudlotul; Molla, Kutubuddin
This entreaty focuses on the necessary elements to broaden and diversify engagement beyond the Spirit of Asilomar conference community through the creation of a Global Network for Organisms and Multi-disciplinary Exchange (GNOME). The network would build a broader coalition of expertise, experience, perspectives and cultural knowledge to decide on how to use biotechnology to address the biodiversity crisis, and foster collaborative decision-making on the ethical, legal, cultural, and social implications of emerging biotechnologies, especially engaging South-South and South-North stakeholders in connections. GNOME has three key goals - the first is to build and strengthen trust — the most important takeaway from the Spirit of Asilomar meeting — between communities, biotechnologists, conservationists, ecologists, ethicists, and other stakeholders, particularly with the Global South. The second goal is to foster the exchange of technical, cultural values, and local knowledge and perspectives to inform/evolve existing decision-making and operational frameworks for the use of biotech in conservation and the environment. Our final goal is to build responsible and accountable biotech innovation reaffirming local community values, priority needs, the right to withhold consent, self-determination, and the rights of nature. We invite you to join our efforts to design the network, its structure, governance and activities.
6.2 Accessible Biotech Education
(Rice University, 2025) Kiattisewee, Cholpisit Ice; do Nascimento, Cibele Zolnier Sousa; Elcock, Leon B. III; Seah, Adeline; Mitra, Aishwarya Sparky; Neira, Diego Muñoz; Kato, Sebunya Emmanuel; Lindner, Ariel; Thaweechuen, Jirapat; Vigar, Justin R.J.; Kong, David
This Entreaty is developed in response to the discussion in “Essential education for the Biotechnologists of 2075” as part of “Framing Biotechnology’s Future” theme at the Spirit of Asilomar conference. This session is the only technical session with “Education” keyword ties to the secession name with 1 hour budgeted time. Even though the topic appeared much less frequent in the program, conversations centered on education had been touched as much as other topics during the meeting.

Browse

Browsing The Spirit of Asilomar and the Future of Biotechnology by Title

Results Per Page

Sort Options