Political Science Publications

Permanent URI for this collection

https://hdl.handle.net/1911/69911

Browse

Now showing 1 - 20 of 54

A comment on McCaleb's “The size principle and collective-consumption payoffs to political coalitions”
(Springer, 1975) Stoll, Richard J.
Let the Researcher Beware: The Use of the Richardson Equations to Estimate the Parameters of a Dyadic Arms Acquisition Process
(Midwest Political Science Association, 1982-02) Stoll, Richard J.
Most attempts to untangle the factors accounting for arms acquisition by nation states rely implicitly or explicitly on the work of Lewis Richardson. However, very few findings from these investigations are durable;one study finds a particular nation state dyad to be involved in an arms race,while the next concludes that this same pair of nations is driven by factors internal to each. The question asked in this paper is: how likely is the true model of a dyadic arms acquisition process to emerge when the Richardson equations are used? This question is investigated by constructing two data sets representing the military capability of a pair of nations-one when an arms race is present and the other when each nation's acquisition of capability is driven by internal factors. These data are then used to estimate the Richardson equations. The conclusion is that in many situations, estimation of the Richardson equations may not uncover the true parameters of the process and may well lead to different conclusions about the same dyadic arms acquisition process.
Major Power Interstate Conflict in the Post-World War II Era: An Increase, a Decrease, or No Change?
(University of Utah, 1982-12) Stoll, Richard J.
The second World War is often regarded as a watershed in world history. Observers have pointed to a number of changes in the global system that occurred after its conclusion: the emergence of bipolar system structure, along with new contenders for international leadership; the invention (and subsequent proliferation)of weapons of extreme power; and the explosion of new nation-states has created a truly global system. But have these changes been accompanied by changes in behavior between nation states? This paper will investigate one aspect of interstate behavior--military conflict involving the major powers--and ascertain whether the time period 1946-1976 was marked by a sharp change in the amount of this conflict, as compared to the period 1816-1945.
Nations at the Brink: A Computer Simulation of Governmental Behavior During Serious Disputes
(Sage, 1983-06) Stoll, Richard J.
During the period 1816-1975, major powers engaged in approximately 225 serious disputes (situations in which military force was threatened or actually used), but only about 12% of these disputes ended in war (Singer, 1979). What model can explain the governmental decision-making that goes on during disputes and account for the rather small percentage of these situations that end in large scale violence? The purpose of this article is to build and test a computer simulation of basic calculations made by governments during serious disputes, and to predict the individual threats and uses of force that they will undertake, including the ultimate act of going to war. To test the simulation, the actions of both Russia and Japan during a of disputes from 1~~~ to 1904 will be predicted. I begin by discussing the concept and operationalizations of the serious dispute and then turn to a description of the simulation. Finally, the disputes themselves, the modelﾒs predictions, and the fit of these predictions to the observed actions of the Russian and Japanese governments will be considered.
Bloc Concentration and the Balance of Power: The European Major Powers, 1824-1914
(Sage, 1984-03) Stoll, Richard J.
This article argues that a better trace of the operation of a balance of power system can be obtained if two dimensions, alliances and capabilities, are combined into a single measure of bloc concentration. After reviewing the basic features of a balance of power system to show why this is the case, such an index is constructed. Several patterns of bloc concentration consistent with the operation of a balance of power system are derived and examined, using data for the European major powers from 1824 through 1914, and for all the major powers from 1919 through 1965. The findings are consistent with the existence of a balance of power system in the earlier era and with a form of balancing behavior in the post-World War I era.
The Guns of November: Presidential Reelections and the Use of Force, 1947-1982
(Sage, 1984-06) Stoll, Richard J.
A number of recent studies have investigated relationships between the presidential election cycle and the implementation of various policies. This article falls in this tradition, and asks whether a link exists between the reelection efforts of presidents, and the visible use of military force by the United States. After outlining why, and under what conditions, such a connection can be expected, a multivariate statistical model is tested for the time period 1947-1982. Despite the presence of several control variables, the results indicate that there is a connection, with fewer visible uses of force associated with presidential reelections in peacetime, and a slight increase in uses of force associated with presidential reelections during wartime.
The Fiscal Impact of the U. S. Military Assistance Program, 1967-1976
(University of Utah, 1985-03) Stein, Robert M.; Ishimatsu, Mark; Stoll, Richard J.
The study of U.S. arms transfers and their impact on the fiscal decisions of aid recipients has been the subject of various interpretations and competing explanations. Absent in this literature has been a systematic testing of propositions derived from a general theory of aid impacts. A larger and somewhat related body of research has examined the political (Chaudhuri 1972; Hughes 1967; Gutteridge 1967) and general economic effects of domestic military spending (Deger and Smith 1983; Smith 1977, 1980; Benoit 1978; Kennedy 1974; Whynes 1979). These studies, however, have not examined the fiscal impact of foreign military assistance. To date only a few researchers have studied this issue in any systematic fashion (McGuire 1979, 1982; Wolf 1971). In this study we seek to fill this gap by applying grant economics theory (Pigou 1932; Oates 1972) to study the fiscal impact of U.S. military arms transfers on foreign nations. Drawing on the domestic aid literature (Oates 1972; Gramlich 1972), we identify a set of propositions concerning the expenditure decisions of domestic aid recipients, and test these propositions against the fiscal behavior of Military Assistance Program (MAP) recipients between 1967-1976. In addition to the substantive import of this question and its bearing on the implementation of U.S. foreign policy, this research provides a unique opportunity to test the applicability of domestic aid theory to the study of foreign aid policy.
Negotiating Strategic Arms Control, 1969-1979 : Modeling the Bargaining Process
(Sage, 1986-06) Stoll, Richard J.; McAndrew, William
Using data collected by Jensen (1984), we investigate whether cooperative and inverse reciprocity can successfully predict U.S. and Soviet actions during the 23 rounds of strategic arms negotiation during the 1969-1979 period. Each type of reciprocity gives rise to three models of bargaining behavior, which we implement as computer routines. In our analysis, we find that the cooperative reciprocity models fit more often than inverse reciprocity models
System and State in International Politics: A Computer Simulation of Balancing in an Anarchic World
(International Studies Association, 1987) Stoll, Richard J.
The relationship between state behavior and system behavior has occupied the attention of scholars and practitioners of international politics for hundreds of years. The predominant assumption of state behavior is that states act in their self-interest; this is their best guarantee of survival in an anarchic world. But most observers feel that system equilibrium is not possible in a world of such states; some additional element is necessary to preserve the main characteristics of the system. In this paper, a computer simulation is used to investigate (a) whether in a world of self-interested states, system-level behavior that acts to preserve or restore equilibrium will emerge, and (b) whether this is sufficient to preserve most of the actors in the system.
The Sound of the Guns: Is There a Congressional Rally Effect after U.S. Military Action?
(Sage, 1987-04) Stoll, Richard J.
This article examines whether, during the 1946-1982 time period, presidents achieve more success in Congress on important international issues in the wake of dramatic military operations. The analysis shows that, at least for a short period of time after visible uses of U.S. military force, a president will generally have a greater chance of congressional support on key international issues.
The Russians Are Coming! A Computer Simulation
(Sage, 1990) Stoll, Richard J.
Aside from defending the homeland, no defense commitment in the post-World War II era has been more important to U.S. decision makers than the defense of Western Europe against a Soviet/Warsaw Pact attack. But from the very beginning of the NATO alliance in 1949, the Alliance's ability to stop a Pact invasion without resort to nuclear weapons has been in doubt. Concern about NATO's conventional defense has increased as U.S. strategic nuclear superiority has declined and was brought to the forefront during the debate on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. But before we can come to grips with NATO's problems, we need the tools to evaluate the deficiencies and strengths of the Alliance in war against the Pact. This paper presents one such tool, a simple computer model of a blitzkrieg, and uses it to examine scenarios of a war in Europe.
Adaptation, State Survival and System Endurance: A Simulation Study
(Sage, 1990) Cusack, Thomas R.; Stoll, Richard J.
This paper reports on a study using the EARTH (Exploring Alternative Realpolitik Theses) Simulation Model. The model is an abstract representation of an anarchic multistate system wherein states employ Realists' principles in guiding their choices on questions dealing with war and peace. The present study examines the systemic and state level consequences that arise in the presence or absence of the ability of states to adapt or change the fundamental decision rules that they employ.
Steaming in the Dark? : Rules, Rivals, and the British Navy, 1860-1913
(Sage, 1992-06) Stoll, Richard J.
The empirical literature on arms races has often failed to find strong evidence of the existence of arms races among "obvious" dyads. In this article it is argued that if we assume that decision makers use simple rules and concentrate on the weapons stock of their rivals, we can produce highly accurate models. These premises arc tested by examining the size of the British navy from 1860 to 1913. The results offer support for this line of argument.
Collective Security and State Survival in the Interstate System
(Wiley, 1994-03) Cusack, Thomas R.; Stoll, Richard J.
For hundreds of years realists have debated idealists about the nature of the interstate system and the most effective means to promote the endurance of the system and the survival of individual states. This paper uses a computer simulation called EARTH (Exploring Alternative Realpolitik Theses) to explore the viability of collective security in a realist world. The results of our experiments indicate that the practice of collective security promotes the endurance of the entire system. Our results also show that states that practice collective security principles are more likely to survive in a realist world than states that operate according to realist principles
The Arms Acquisition Process : The Effect of Internal and External Constraints on Arms Race Dynamics
(Sage, 2000-10) Bolks, Sean; Stoll, Richard J.
A new approach to address oversights in the traditional arms race literature is presented. It involves five factors that have not been previously applied to arms races. The focus of military capability is not expenditures but weapons counts. The entire set of major powers is modeled as a system. A factor controlling for the level of environmental threat faced by each state is included. Domestic factors are included in the decision-making calculus of the state. It is assumed that states use simple decision rules rather than a complex set of calculations to make their decisions. The authors usc this approach to test a system of equations that model the number of capital ships of the major powers from 1860 to 1986 in different time periods. Results indicate that the overall approach has a good deal of validity.
The Liberal Peace and Conflictive Interactions: The Onset of Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1950-78
(Sage, 2002) Jungblut, Bernadette M.; Stoll, Richard J.
Over the past few years, there has been an increasing focus on the connection at the dyadic level between democracy, interdependence, and international conflict. This has led to some contention, with scholars taking different positions on both substantive and methodological matters. This article seeks to advance this literature by building explicitly on the work of Oneal & Russett. It adds an additional facet to this literature: exploring the impact of conflictive interactions on the chances of a dyad experiencing conflict. A conflictive interaction is the presence of a conflict below the level at which military force is used. The question is whether the issue at stake in a conflictive interaction influences the chances of the dyad experiencing a militarized interstate dispute (MID). The scope of the research is all dyads from 1950 to 1978, with observations at the quarter-year. Results are generally consistent with Oneal & Russett. However, there are several differences. First, the effect of joint democracy, while negative, is not statistically significant (this may be an artifact of our research design). Second, the coefficient for the higher trade-to-GDP ratio, while positive as in their work, is statistically significant here. But trade does reduce conflict (as embodied in the lower trade-to-GDP ratio) even when including the ‘peaceyears’ correction for temporal dependence. As for the impact of issue area, conflictive interactions involving issues of ‘high politics’ increase the chances of a dispute. Thus, elements of both ‘high politics’ and the liberal peace have independent impacts on the chances of an MID outbreak.
Examining Conflict Escalation Within the Civilizations Context
(Sage, 2003) Bolks, Sean; Stoll, Richard J.
Samuel Huntington's article and book on the clash of civilizations has created a great deal of controversy and interest. The focus of this is in his assertion that in the post-Cold War era, there will be significant conflict between states from Western civilization and states from Islamic civilization. This assertion has been the subject of a number of systematic empirical studies (Henderson, 1997, 1998; Henderson and Tucker, 2001; Russett, Oneal and Cox, 2000; Chiozza, 2002). These studies share two things in common. First, they all use the dyad year as the case and predict to the onset of conflict. Second, none found any support for Huntington's thesis. In our paper, we ask a different question: Given the engagement of a dyad in militarized interstate dispute (MIDs), is there a relationship between the civilizational status of the dyad and the chances of the dispute escalating to war? Using the MID data, we conduct a two-stage estimation to identify the mixed civilization effect on the probability of dispute and then on the probability of the escalation to war. In the pre-Cold war era, there is a greater probability for mixed civilization dyads and for Islamic-Western dyads to engage in disputes and for these disputes to escalate to war. These findings contradict Huntingtonﾒs argument that the clash of civilization thesis applies only to the post-Cold War era. The post-Cold War era does not offer complete empirical support Huntingtonﾒs expectations either. Mixed civilization dyads do not appear to be as likely to engage in dispute or escalate to war. Islamic-Western dyads do appear to be more apt to engage in dispute during this period, but not to escalate.
Representing Defense : Democratic Control of the Defense Budget in the United States and Western Europe
(Sage, 2003-08) Eichenberg, Richard C.; Stoll, Richard J.
There is now substantial evidence that defense spending decisions in the United States are influenced by citizen preferences. However, there is little time-series evidence for countries other than the United States. Regression models of citizen responsiveness and opinion representation in the politics of defense spending in five democracies are estimated. Results show that public opinion in all five countries is systematically responsive to recent changes in defense spending, and the form of the responses across countries uniformly resembles the “thermostat” metaphor developed by Wlezien and the more general theory of opinion dynamics developed by Stimson. Findings show also that defense budgeting is representative: public support for defense spending is the most consistently significant influence on defense budgeting change in four countries; thus, a parsimonious theory of comparative policy representation is potentially within reach. The implications of the results for defense spending in the NATO alliance and the European Union are discussed.
Civil Reality? Simulation Experiments on the Impact of Civil War in a Realist World
(Taylor & Francis, 2005) Stoll, Richard J.
The most widely used theoretical framework in international relations is realism. Realism takes many forms, and there have been hundreds of writings on the topic. In the United States, the two most popular exemplars of realism are Morgenthau (Morgenthau & Thompson, 1985; original 1948) and Waltz (1979). There is no systematic attempt to incorporate civil wars into the realist framework. In this paper, we use a computer simulation to explore the impact of a state's civil war experience on its interstate war experience. The results suggest that a state's civil war experience can have an impact on its interstate war experience.
War President : The Approval Ratings of George W. Bush
(Sage, 2006-12) Eichenberg, Richard C.; Stoll, Richard J.; Lebo, Matthew
The authors estimate a model of the job approval ratings of President George W. Bush that includes five sets of variables: a “honeymoon” effect, an autoregressive function that tracks a decline in approval, measures of economic performance, measures of important “rally events,” and a measure of the costs of war—in this case, the U.S. death toll in the Iraq War. Several significant effects are found, including the rally that followed the attacks of September 11, 2001; the commencement of the war in Iraq; and the capture of Baghdad in April 2003. Since the beginning of the war in Iraq, however, the casualties of war have had a significant negative impact on Bush’s approval ratings. Although the effects of additional battle deaths in Iraq will decrease approval only marginally, results suggest that there is also little prospect for sustained improvement so long as casualties continue to accumulate.

Browse

Browsing Political Science Publications by Issue Date

Results Per Page

Sort Options