Social Capital, Institutional Rules, and Constitutional Amendment Rates

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dc.citation.firstpage1075en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber2en_US
dc.citation.journalTitleAmerican Political Science Reviewen_US
dc.citation.lastpage1083en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber118en_US
dc.contributor.authorBlake, William D.en_US
dc.contributor.authorCozza, Joseph Francescoen_US
dc.contributor.authorArmstrong, David A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorFriesen, Amandaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-25T20:55:18Zen_US
dc.date.available2024-07-25T20:55:18Zen_US
dc.date.issued2024en_US
dc.description.abstractWhy are some constitutions amended more frequently than others? The literature provides few clear answers, as some scholars focus on institutional factors, whereas others emphasize amendment culture. We bridge this divide with new theoretical and empirical insights. Using data from democratic constitutions worldwide and U.S. state constitutions, we examine how social capital reduces the transaction costs imposed by amendment rules. The results indicate that constitutional rigidity decreases amendment frequency, but group membership, civic activism, and political trust can offset the effect of amendment rules. Our findings have important implications for scholars in public law, constitutional and democratic theory, and social movements.en_US
dc.identifier.citationBlake, W. D., Cozza, J. F., Ii, D. a. A., & Friesen, A. (2024). Social Capital, Institutional Rules, and Constitutional Amendment Rates. American Political Science Review, 118(2), 1075–1083. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055423000606en_US
dc.identifier.digitalsocial-capital-institutionalen_US
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055423000606en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/117529en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCambridge University Pressen_US
dc.rightsExcept where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license.  Permission to reuse, publish, or reproduce the work beyond the terms of the license or beyond the bounds of fair use or other exemptions to copyright law must be obtained from the copyright holder.en_US
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/en_US
dc.titleSocial Capital, Institutional Rules, and Constitutional Amendment Ratesen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.type.dcmiTexten_US
dc.type.publicationpublisher versionen_US
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