Social Capital, Institutional Rules, and Constitutional Amendment Rates

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dc.citation.firstpage1075
dc.citation.issueNumber2
dc.citation.journalTitleAmerican Political Science Review
dc.citation.lastpage1083
dc.citation.volumeNumber118
dc.contributor.authorBlake, William D.
dc.contributor.authorCozza, Joseph Francesco
dc.contributor.authorArmstrong, David A.
dc.contributor.authorFriesen, Amanda
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-25T20:55:18Z
dc.date.available2024-07-25T20:55:18Z
dc.date.issued2024
dc.description.abstractWhy are some constitutions amended more frequently than others? The literature provides few clear answers, as some scholars focus on institutional factors, whereas others emphasize amendment culture. We bridge this divide with new theoretical and empirical insights. Using data from democratic constitutions worldwide and U.S. state constitutions, we examine how social capital reduces the transaction costs imposed by amendment rules. The results indicate that constitutional rigidity decreases amendment frequency, but group membership, civic activism, and political trust can offset the effect of amendment rules. Our findings have important implications for scholars in public law, constitutional and democratic theory, and social movements.
dc.identifier.citationBlake, W. D., Cozza, J. F., Ii, D. a. A., & Friesen, A. (2024). Social Capital, Institutional Rules, and Constitutional Amendment Rates. American Political Science Review, 118(2), 1075–1083. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055423000606
dc.identifier.digitalsocial-capital-institutional
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055423000606
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/117529
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherCambridge University Press
dc.rightsExcept where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license.  Permission to reuse, publish, or reproduce the work beyond the terms of the license or beyond the bounds of fair use or other exemptions to copyright law must be obtained from the copyright holder.
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.titleSocial Capital, Institutional Rules, and Constitutional Amendment Rates
dc.typeJournal article
dc.type.dcmiText
dc.type.publicationpublisher version
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