The Role of Party: The Legislative Consequences of Partisan Electoral Competition

dc.citation.firstpage83en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber1en_US
dc.citation.journalTitleLegislative Studies Quarterlyen_US
dc.citation.lastpage109en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber38en_US
dc.contributor.authorCarroll, Royceen_US
dc.contributor.authorEichorst, Jasonen_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-03-06T18:54:03Z
dc.date.available2014-03-06T18:54:03Z
dc.date.issued2013en_US
dc.description.abstractWe examine the proposition that incentives for legislative organization can be explained by the nature of electoral competition. We argue that legislators in environments where parties are competitive for majority status are most likely to have delegated power to their leadership to constrain individualistic behavior within their party, which will in turn increase the spatial predictability of individual voting patterns. Using roll call votes and district-level electoral data from the U.S. state legislatures, we show empirically that increased statewide interparty competition corresponds to much more predictable voting behavior overall, while legislators from competitive districts have less predictable behavior.en_US
dc.identifier.citationCarroll, Royce and Eichorst, Jason. "The Role of Party: The Legislative Consequences of Partisan Electoral Competition." <i>Legislative Studies Quarterly,</i> 38, no. 1 (2013) John Wiley & Sons, Inc.: 83-109. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12004.
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/75545
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherJohn Wiley & Sons, Inc.
dc.rightsThis is an author's peer-reviewed final manuscript, as accepted by the publisher. The published article is copyrighted by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.en_US
dc.titleThe Role of Party: The Legislative Consequences of Partisan Electoral Competitionen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.type.dcmiTexten_US
dc.type.publicationpost-printen_US
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