The Intentional Structure of Moods

dc.citation.firstpage1
dc.citation.issueNumber49
dc.citation.journalTitlePhilosophers' Imprint
dc.citation.lastpage19
dc.citation.volumeNumber19
dc.contributor.authorKriegel, Uriah
dc.date.accessioned2021-07-09T14:29:03Z
dc.date.available2021-07-09T14:29:03Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.description.abstractMoods are sometimes claimed to constitute an exception to the rule that mental phenomena are intentional (in the sense of representing something). In reaction, some philosophers have argued that moods are in fact intentional, but exhibit a special and unusual kind of intentionality: They represent the world as a whole, or everything indiscriminately, rather than some more specific object(s). In this paper, I present a problem for extant versions of this idea, then propose a revision that solves the problem but also entrains an important change in our understanding of the nature of moods—and indeed of the nature of mind. What emerges is an intentionalist account that emphasizes the role of attitude rather than content in determining the character of moods.
dc.identifier.citationKriegel, Uriah. "The Intentional Structure of Moods." <i>Philosophers' Imprint,</i> 19, no. 49 (2019) Michigan Publishing: 1-19. <a href="https://hdl.handle.net/1911/111009">https://hdl.handle.net/1911/111009</a>.
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/111009
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherMichigan Publishing
dc.relation.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0019.049
dc.rightsThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
dc.titleThe Intentional Structure of Moods
dc.typeJournal article
dc.type.dcmiText
dc.type.publicationpublisher version
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