The Intentional Structure of Moods

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dc.citation.firstpage1en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber49en_US
dc.citation.journalTitlePhilosophers' Imprinten_US
dc.citation.lastpage19en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber19en_US
dc.contributor.authorKriegel, Uriahen_US
dc.date.accessioned2021-07-09T14:29:03Zen_US
dc.date.available2021-07-09T14:29:03Zen_US
dc.date.issued2019en_US
dc.description.abstractMoods are sometimes claimed to constitute an exception to the rule that mental phenomena are intentional (in the sense of representing something). In reaction, some philosophers have argued that moods are in fact intentional, but exhibit a special and unusual kind of intentionality: They represent the world as a whole, or everything indiscriminately, rather than some more specific object(s). In this paper, I present a problem for extant versions of this idea, then propose a revision that solves the problem but also entrains an important change in our understanding of the nature of moods—and indeed of the nature of mind. What emerges is an intentionalist account that emphasizes the role of attitude rather than content in determining the character of moods.en_US
dc.identifier.citationKriegel, Uriah. "The Intentional Structure of Moods." <i>Philosophers' Imprint,</i> 19, no. 49 (2019) Michigan Publishing: 1-19. <a href="https://hdl.handle.net/1911/111009">https://hdl.handle.net/1911/111009</a>.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/111009en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMichigan Publishingen_US
dc.relation.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0019.049en_US
dc.rightsThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 Licenseen_US
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/en_US
dc.titleThe Intentional Structure of Moodsen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.type.dcmiTexten_US
dc.type.publicationpublisher versionen_US
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