Unobserved Heterogeneity in Matching Games

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dc.citation.firstpage1339
dc.citation.issueNumber4
dc.citation.journalTitleJournal of Political Economy
dc.citation.lastpage1373
dc.citation.volumeNumber126
dc.contributor.authorFox, Jeremy T.
dc.contributor.authorYang, Chenyu
dc.contributor.authorHsu, David H.
dc.date.accessioned2018-11-01T19:40:03Z
dc.date.available2018-11-01T19:40:03Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.description.abstractAgents in two-sided matching games vary in characteristics that are unobservable in typical data on matching markets. We investigate the identification of the distribution of unobserved characteristics using data on who matches with whom. In full generality, we consider many-to-many matching and matching with trades. The distribution of match-specific unobservables cannot be fully recovered without information on unmatched agents, but the distribution of a combination of unobservables, which we call unobserved complementarities, can be identified. Using data on unmatched agents restores identification.
dc.identifier.citationFox, Jeremy T., Yang, Chenyu and Hsu, David H.. "Unobserved Heterogeneity in Matching Games." <i>Journal of Political Economy,</i> 126, no. 4 (2018) The University of Chicago Press: 1339-1373. https://doi.org/10.1086/697740.
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1086/697740
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/103279
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherThe University of Chicago Press
dc.rightsArticle is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
dc.titleUnobserved Heterogeneity in Matching Games
dc.typeJournal article
dc.type.dcmiText
dc.type.publicationpublisher version
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