Unobserved Heterogeneity in Matching Games

dc.citation.firstpage1339en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber4en_US
dc.citation.journalTitleJournal of Political Economyen_US
dc.citation.lastpage1373en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber126en_US
dc.contributor.authorFox, Jeremy T.en_US
dc.contributor.authorYang, Chenyuen_US
dc.contributor.authorHsu, David H.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-11-01T19:40:03Zen_US
dc.date.available2018-11-01T19:40:03Zen_US
dc.date.issued2018en_US
dc.description.abstractAgents in two-sided matching games vary in characteristics that are unobservable in typical data on matching markets. We investigate the identification of the distribution of unobserved characteristics using data on who matches with whom. In full generality, we consider many-to-many matching and matching with trades. The distribution of match-specific unobservables cannot be fully recovered without information on unmatched agents, but the distribution of a combination of unobservables, which we call unobserved complementarities, can be identified. Using data on unmatched agents restores identification.en_US
dc.identifier.citationFox, Jeremy T., Yang, Chenyu and Hsu, David H.. "Unobserved Heterogeneity in Matching Games." <i>Journal of Political Economy,</i> 126, no. 4 (2018) The University of Chicago Press: 1339-1373. https://doi.org/10.1086/697740.en_US
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1086/697740en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/103279en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherThe University of Chicago Pressen_US
dc.rightsArticle is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.en_US
dc.titleUnobserved Heterogeneity in Matching Gamesen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.type.dcmiTexten_US
dc.type.publicationpublisher versionen_US
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