Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation

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dc.citation.firstpage293en_US
dc.citation.journalTitleEconomic Theoryen_US
dc.citation.lastpage327en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber74en_US
dc.contributor.authorChen, Yanen_US
dc.contributor.authorHe, YingHuaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2022-07-25T17:06:25Zen_US
dc.date.available2022-07-25T17:06:25Zen_US
dc.date.issued2022en_US
dc.description.abstractWhen participating in school choice, students may incur information acquisition costs to learn about school quality. This paper investigates how two popular school choice mechanisms, the (Boston) Immediate Acceptance and the Deferred Acceptance, incentivize students’ information acquisition. Specifically, we show that only the Immediate Acceptance mechanism incentivizes students to learn their own cardinal and others’ preferences. We demonstrate that information acquisition costs affect the efficiency of each mechanism and the welfare ranking between the two. In the case where everyone has the same ordinal preferences, we evaluate the welfare effects of various information provision policies by education authorities.en_US
dc.identifier.citationChen, Yan and He, YingHua. "Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation." <i>Economic Theory,</i> 74, (2022) Springer Nature: 293-327. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01376-3.en_US
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01376-3en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/112912en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherSpringer Natureen_US
dc.rightsThis article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.en_US
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/en_US
dc.titleInformation acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigationen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.type.dcmiTexten_US
dc.type.publicationpublisher versionen_US
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