Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms

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dc.citation.articleNumber105422
dc.citation.journalTitleJournal of Economic Theory
dc.citation.volumeNumber201
dc.contributor.authorChen, Yi-Chun
dc.contributor.authorMueller-Frank, Manuel
dc.contributor.authorPai, Mallesh M.
dc.date.accessioned2022-04-22T16:46:03Z
dc.date.available2022-04-22T16:46:03Z
dc.date.issued2022
dc.description.abstractWe investigate how a principal's knowledge of agents' higher-order beliefs impacts their ability to robustly implement a given social choice function. We adapt a formulation of Oury and Tercieux (2012): a social choice function is continuously implementable if it is partially implementable for types in an initial model and “nearby” types. We characterize when a social choice function is truthfully continuously implementable, i.e., using game forms corresponding to direct revelation mechanisms for the initial model. Our characterization hinges on how our formalization of the notion of nearby preserves agents' higher order beliefs. If nearby types have similar higher order beliefs, truthful continuous implementation is roughly equivalent to requiring that the social choice function is implementable in strict equilibrium in the initial model, a very permissive solution concept. If they do not, then our notion is equivalent to requiring that the social choice function is implementable in unique rationalizable strategies in the initial model. Truthful continuous implementation is thus very demanding without non-trivial knowledge of agents' higher order beliefs.
dc.identifier.citationChen, Yi-Chun, Mueller-Frank, Manuel and Pai, Mallesh M.. "Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms." <i>Journal of Economic Theory,</i> 201, (2022) Elsevier: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105422.
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105422
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/112117
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.rightsThis is an author's peer-reviewed final manuscript, as accepted by the publisher. The published article is copyrighted by Elsevier.
dc.subject.keywordContinuous implementation
dc.subject.keywordRobust implementation
dc.subject.keywordContagion
dc.subject.keywordHigher-order beliefs
dc.titleContinuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms
dc.typeJournal article
dc.type.dcmiText
dc.type.publicationpost-print
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