Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms

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dc.citation.articleNumber105422en_US
dc.citation.journalTitleJournal of Economic Theoryen_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber201en_US
dc.contributor.authorChen, Yi-Chunen_US
dc.contributor.authorMueller-Frank, Manuelen_US
dc.contributor.authorPai, Mallesh M.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2022-04-22T16:46:03Zen_US
dc.date.available2022-04-22T16:46:03Zen_US
dc.date.issued2022en_US
dc.description.abstractWe investigate how a principal's knowledge of agents' higher-order beliefs impacts their ability to robustly implement a given social choice function. We adapt a formulation of Oury and Tercieux (2012): a social choice function is continuously implementable if it is partially implementable for types in an initial model and “nearby” types. We characterize when a social choice function is truthfully continuously implementable, i.e., using game forms corresponding to direct revelation mechanisms for the initial model. Our characterization hinges on how our formalization of the notion of nearby preserves agents' higher order beliefs. If nearby types have similar higher order beliefs, truthful continuous implementation is roughly equivalent to requiring that the social choice function is implementable in strict equilibrium in the initial model, a very permissive solution concept. If they do not, then our notion is equivalent to requiring that the social choice function is implementable in unique rationalizable strategies in the initial model. Truthful continuous implementation is thus very demanding without non-trivial knowledge of agents' higher order beliefs.en_US
dc.identifier.citationChen, Yi-Chun, Mueller-Frank, Manuel and Pai, Mallesh M.. "Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms." <i>Journal of Economic Theory,</i> 201, (2022) Elsevier: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105422.en_US
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105422en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/112117en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.rightsThis is an author's peer-reviewed final manuscript, as accepted by the publisher. The published article is copyrighted by Elsevier.en_US
dc.subject.keywordContinuous implementationen_US
dc.subject.keywordRobust implementationen_US
dc.subject.keywordContagionen_US
dc.subject.keywordHigher-order beliefsen_US
dc.titleContinuous implementation with direct revelation mechanismsen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.type.dcmiTexten_US
dc.type.publicationpost-printen_US
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