Respecting all the evidence

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dc.citation.journalTitlePhilosophical Studiesen_US
dc.contributor.authorSliwa, Paulinaen_US
dc.contributor.authorHorowitz, Sophieen_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-02-11T15:45:10Z
dc.date.available2015-02-11T15:45:10Z
dc.date.issued2015en_US
dc.description.abstractPlausibly, you should believe what your total evidence supports. But cases of misleading higher-order evidence—evidence about what your evidence supports—present a challenge to this thought. In such cases, taking both first-order and higher-order evidence at face value leads to a seemingly irrational incoherence between one’s first-order and higher-order attitudes: you will believe P, but also believe that your evidence doesn’t support P. To avoid sanctioning tension between epistemic levels, some authors have abandoned the thought that both first-order and higher-order evidence have rational bearing. This sacrifice is both costly and unnecessary. We propose a principle, Evidential Calibration, which requires rational agents to accommodate first-order evidence correctly, while allowing rational uncertainty about what to believe. At the same time, it rules out irrational tensions between epistemic levels. We show that while there are serious problems for some views on which we can rationally believe, “P, but my evidence doesn’t support P”, Evidential Calibration avoids these problems. An important upshot of our discussion is a new way to think about the relationship between epistemic levels: why first-order and higher-order attitudes should generally be aligned, and why it is sometimes—though not always—problematic when they diverge.en_US
dc.identifier.citationSliwa, Paulina and Horowitz, Sophie. "Respecting all the evidence." <i>Philosophical Studies,</i> (2015) Springer: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0446-9.
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0446-9en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/79025
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherSpringer
dc.rightsThis is an author's peer-reviewed final manuscript, as accepted by the publisher. The published article is copyrighted by Springer.en_US
dc.subject.keywordhigher-order evidenceen_US
dc.subject.keywordrationalityen_US
dc.subject.keywordreliabilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordepistemic akrasiaen_US
dc.subject.keywordepistemic levelsen_US
dc.titleRespecting all the evidenceen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.type.dcmiTexten_US
dc.type.publicationpost-printen_US
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