A Pseudo-Market Approach to Allocation with Priorities

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dc.citation.firstpage272
dc.citation.issueNumber3
dc.citation.journalTitleAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
dc.citation.lastpage314
dc.citation.volumeNumber10
dc.contributor.authorHe, Yinghua
dc.contributor.authorMiralles, Antonio
dc.contributor.authorPycia, Marek
dc.contributor.authorYan, Jianye
dc.date.accessioned2018-11-19T16:38:36Z
dc.date.available2018-11-19T16:38:36Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.description.abstractWe propose a pseudo-market mechanism for no-monetary-transfer allocation of indivisible objects based on priorities such as those in school choice. Agents are given token money, face priority-specific prices, and buy utility-maximizing random assignments. The mechanism is asymptotically incentive compatible, and the resulting assignments are fair and constrained Pareto efficient. Aanund Hylland & Richard Zeckhauser (1979)'s position-allocation problem is a special case of our framework, and our results on incentives and fairness are also new in their classical setting.
dc.identifier.citationHe, Yinghua, Miralles, Antonio, Pycia, Marek, et al.. "A Pseudo-Market Approach to Allocation with Priorities." <i>American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,</i> 10, no. 3 (2018) American Economic Association: 272-314. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20150259.
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20150259
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/103354
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherAmerican Economic Association
dc.rightsArticle is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use.
dc.titleA Pseudo-Market Approach to Allocation with Priorities
dc.typeJournal article
dc.type.dcmiText
dc.type.publicationpublisher version
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