Parties, Incumbents and the Reform of Electoral Rules in Latin American Democracies

Simple item page
dc.contributor.advisorJones, Mark P.
dc.creatorAlles, Santiago
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-17T13:29:49Z
dc.date.available2019-05-17T13:29:49Z
dc.date.created2017-12
dc.date.issued2017-11-30
dc.date.submittedDecember 2017
dc.date.updated2019-05-17T13:29:49Z
dc.description.abstractA modern democracy is essentially a representative democracy. However, representation does not occur in the vacuum. Representation, as research has extensively showed, is shaped by the design of institutions, and politicians are those who design institutions. Nevertheless, until recently, research has paid little attention to the sources of institutional choice. This problem is of particular importance for the consolidation of democracy in developing nations: institutions have been much more fluid in younger democracies than in consolidated ones. Since institutions have strong partisan consequences, the chance of a reform creates incentives for strategic manipulation. How do local elites shape institutions in federal countries? Second-level authorities concentrate a large amount of power in federal countries, but their ability to shape the electoral rules in their districts have not received considerable attention. This project analyses the reform of electoral rules in in Argentine provinces, and it provides an explanation to the adoption of these reforms. How does party organization shape preference over institutions? Parties are not monolithic actors and their organizations differ considerably. This project exploits more than 5,400 face-to-face interviews conducted to Latin American lower house members in 17 countries to analyze individual preferences over important aspects of the institutional design, such as electoral rules and the power of the executive office. How do governors set the second-level electoral calendar? Finally, this project analyses how governors strategically decide whether provincial elections are concurrent with the renovation of national authorities. Governors fear the potential effects of the national elections in their districts, and they separate the province-level elections when an uncertain national election threatens their dominant position over the provincial race.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.citationAlles, Santiago. "Parties, Incumbents and the Reform of Electoral Rules in Latin American Democracies." (2017) Diss., Rice University. <a href="https://hdl.handle.net/1911/105602">https://hdl.handle.net/1911/105602</a>.
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/105602
dc.language.isoeng
dc.rightsCopyright is held by the author, unless otherwise indicated. Permission to reuse, publish, or reproduce the work beyond the bounds of fair use or other exemptions to copyright law must be obtained from the copyright holder.
dc.subjectComparative political institutions
dc.subjectInstitutional reform
dc.subjectElectoral rules
dc.subjectLatin America
dc.subjectArgentina
dc.titleParties, Incumbents and the Reform of Electoral Rules in Latin American Democracies
dc.typeThesis
dc.type.materialText
thesis.degree.departmentPolitical Science
thesis.degree.disciplineSocial Sciences
thesis.degree.grantorRice University
thesis.degree.levelDoctoral
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophy
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
ALLES-DOCUMENT-2017.pdf
Size:
5.45 MB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Download
License bundle
Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
PROQUEST_LICENSE.txt
Size:
5.84 KB
Format:
Plain Text
Description:
Download
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
LICENSE.txt
Size:
2.61 KB
Format:
Plain Text
Description:
Download
Collections
Rice University Electronic Theses and Dissertations