A modern democracy is essentially a representative democracy. However, representation does not occur in the vacuum. Representation, as research has extensively showed, is shaped by the design of institutions, and politicians are those who design institutions. Nevertheless, until recently, research has paid little attention to the sources of institutional choice. This problem is of particular importance for the consolidation of democracy in developing nations: institutions have been much more fluid in younger democracies than in consolidated ones. Since institutions have strong partisan consequences, the chance of a reform creates incentives for strategic manipulation. How do local elites shape institutions in federal countries? Second-level authorities concentrate a large amount of power in federal countries, but their ability to shape the electoral rules in their districts have not received considerable attention. This project analyses the reform of electoral rules in in Argentine provinces, and it provides an explanation to the adoption of these reforms. How does party organization shape preference over institutions? Parties are not monolithic actors and their organizations differ considerably. This project exploits more than 5,400 face-to-face interviews conducted to Latin American lower house members in 17 countries to analyze individual preferences over important aspects of the institutional design, such as electoral rules and the power of the executive office. How do governors set the second-level electoral calendar? Finally, this project analyses how governors strategically decide whether provincial elections are concurrent with the renovation of national authorities. Governors fear the potential effects of the national elections in their districts, and they separate the province-level elections when an uncertain national election threatens their dominant position over the provincial race.