Preference Discovery in University Admissions: The Case for Dynamic Multioffer Mechanisms

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dc.citation.issueNumber6en_US
dc.citation.journalTitleJournal of Political Economyen_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber130en_US
dc.contributor.authorGrenet, Julienen_US
dc.contributor.authorHe, YingHuaen_US
dc.contributor.authorKübler, Dorotheaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2022-07-25T17:06:25Zen_US
dc.date.available2022-07-25T17:06:25Zen_US
dc.date.issued2022en_US
dc.description.abstractWe document quasi-experimental evidence against the common assumption in the matching literature that agents have full information on their own preferences. In Germany’s university admissions, the first stages of the Gale-Shapley algorithm are implemented in real time, allowing for multiple offers per student. We demonstrate that nonexploding early offers are accepted more often than later offers, despite not being more desirable. These results, together with survey evidence and a theoretical model, are consistent with students’ costly discovery of preferences. A novel dynamic multioffer mechanism that batches early offers improves matching efficiency by informing students of offer availability before preference discovery.en_US
dc.identifier.citationGrenet, Julien, He, YingHua and Kübler, Dorothea. "Preference Discovery in University Admissions: The Case for Dynamic Multioffer Mechanisms." <i>Journal of Political Economy,</i> 130, no. 6 (2022) The University of Chicago Press: https://doi.org/10.1086/718983.en_US
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1086/718983en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/112913en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherThe University of Chicago Pressen_US
dc.rightsThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0), which permits non-commercial reuse of the work with attribution.en_US
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/en_US
dc.titlePreference Discovery in University Admissions: The Case for Dynamic Multioffer Mechanismsen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.type.dcmiTexten_US
dc.type.publicationpublisher versionen_US
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