Preference Discovery in University Admissions: The Case for Dynamic Multioffer Mechanisms

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dc.citation.issueNumber6
dc.citation.journalTitleJournal of Political Economy
dc.citation.volumeNumber130
dc.contributor.authorGrenet, Julien
dc.contributor.authorHe, YingHua
dc.contributor.authorKübler, Dorothea
dc.date.accessioned2022-07-25T17:06:25Z
dc.date.available2022-07-25T17:06:25Z
dc.date.issued2022
dc.description.abstractWe document quasi-experimental evidence against the common assumption in the matching literature that agents have full information on their own preferences. In Germany’s university admissions, the first stages of the Gale-Shapley algorithm are implemented in real time, allowing for multiple offers per student. We demonstrate that nonexploding early offers are accepted more often than later offers, despite not being more desirable. These results, together with survey evidence and a theoretical model, are consistent with students’ costly discovery of preferences. A novel dynamic multioffer mechanism that batches early offers improves matching efficiency by informing students of offer availability before preference discovery.
dc.identifier.citationGrenet, Julien, He, YingHua and Kübler, Dorothea. "Preference Discovery in University Admissions: The Case for Dynamic Multioffer Mechanisms." <i>Journal of Political Economy,</i> 130, no. 6 (2022) The University of Chicago Press: https://doi.org/10.1086/718983.
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1086/718983
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/112913
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherThe University of Chicago Press
dc.rightsThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC 4.0), which permits non-commercial reuse of the work with attribution.
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
dc.titlePreference Discovery in University Admissions: The Case for Dynamic Multioffer Mechanisms
dc.typeJournal article
dc.type.dcmiText
dc.type.publicationpublisher version
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