R-3 Repository :: Browsing by Author "Hamm, Keith E."

Browsing by Author "Hamm, Keith E."

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Assessing Group Incentives, Independent Spending, and Campaign Finance Law by Comparing the States
(Mary Ann Liebert, Inc., 2020) Hunt, Charles R.; Kettler, Jaclyn J.; Malbin, Michael J.; Glavin, Brendan; Hamm, Keith E.
Independent expenditures (IEs) in U.S. elections have increased substantially at nearly all levels of government over the past decade, but judicial decisions are only a partial explanation for this growth. Using a descriptive difference-in-differences approach, we show that the growth has been uneven across types of elections and spenders under different legal regimes. This finding highlights the importance of disaggregating spenders, elections, and laws in order to explain IEs more fully. This article analyzes IEs in state gubernatorial and legislative elections from 2006 through 2018 across states with differing campaign finance laws and political contexts. It uses an original and detailed classification of spenders, along with data on IEs from the National Institute on Money in Politics, the Campaign Finance Institute's historical database of state campaign finance laws, and other sources. The legal variations on which the article focuses are the various states' laws limiting contributions to candidates and political parties. It concentrates on these because of an oft-stated expectation that removing contribution limits will sharply reduce the level of IEs. In addition to contribution limits, we also assess partisan competition as a primary explanation for the level of IEs in various states, and across the sectors of spenders. We find, using multi-variate analysis, that increased partisan competition (at both the candidate level and chamber level) is in most cases a significant driver of IEs. In contrast, the associations between IEs and contribution limits are inconsistent and generally not significant. Importantly for ongoing policy debates, ideological and issue-driven spending appears to have weak association (or none) with contribution limits. Therefore, if the recent increase in IEs is in fact a normative problem, the solution may be more elusive than once thought.
Cartelization in U.S. State Legislatures
(2012-07) Spiegelman, Andrew; Stevenson, Randolph T.; Hamm, Keith E.; Martin, Lanny; Soligo, Ronald
Cartel Theory research exclusively focuses on national legislatures, which has led to empirical uniformity among the studies. By only examining national legislatures, researchers have only observed chambers where there is a strong connection between party reputation and legislator reelection. This project examines legislatures where the connections between party reputation and legislator reelection vary widely. National legislatures generally have legislative rules enabling agenda control and therefore tend to have low majority roll rates. The variation in majority roll rates this project finds among U.S. state legislatures is due to the variance in legislative rules among these chambers. While most other Cartel Theory research implicitly assumes a connection between legislative rules and majority roll rates, this project verifies it empirically. This project further seeks to determine what causes legislative cartelization. In order to determine causal factors, the project examines cases where there is variation in legislative cartelization and the connection between party reputation and legislator reelection. U.S. state legislatures display substantial variation in both of these variables and are, therefore, ideal candidates for observation. With these motivations in mind, this project’s primary two research questions test unverified assumptions made in the Cartel Theory literature: 1. How strong is the relationship between legislative cartelization and the connection between party reputation and legislator reelection probability? 2. Are low majority roll rates indicative of chambers having institutionalized rules enabling agenda control? The answer to the first is that, among U.S. state legislatures, there is not a consistently strong relationship between majority roll rates and the connection between party reputation and legislator reelection, though there is a strong relationship between agenda control-enabling legislative rules and this connection. These two findings suggest that we need alternative measures of cartelization. More broadly, the findings suggest that Cartel Theory may not be as universally applicable as it once seemed. The answer to the second question is that there is a strong connection between low majority roll rates and legislative rules enabling agenda control but that this relationship is variable and alternative measures of cartelization are necessary for future Cartel Theory research.
Delegation, Agency and Competitive Representation
(2015-08-12) Atanasov, Iliya; Stevenson, Randolph T.; Hamm, Keith E.; Dobelman, John; Martin, Lanny; Tang, Xun
Traditional agency models focus on the conceptual line of delegation running from principal to agent. The more information about agents’ preferences and actions, the better able the principals to use selection and sanctioning to achieve desirable outcomes. Following this conventional wisdom, institutional transparency is viewed as an unequivocal good and representative democracy as built on delegation and control. However, this is an incomplete picture at best. Game-theoretic and case analysis shows that the elevation of the elected European Parliament as a legislative chamber coequal to the intergovernmental Council of the European Union may be a ruse to undermine lobbyist influence by diluting formal responsibility. Less transparency in decision-making may help align EU policy closer to broader societal objectives. The Commission, perhaps most heavily influenced by special interests, and not Council has lost clout in the legislative process as a result of the changes. In several generalized noncooperative formal settings with information asymmetries, delegation can work for principals only if the set of potential agents is diverse. Not only does selection dominate sanctioning as a control mechanism, but the very existence of compliance equilibria is contingent upon the a priori arrangement of candidate agents’ policy preferences relative to one another and to the principals’. The principal–agent relationship is dependent on and may be only secondary to between-agent competition. This insight has far-reaching implications for a number of research programs within political science. Schumpeter viewed modern democracy as a system where elites compete for the support of the masses. This conceptualization suggests a new path towards sustainable democratization. Building elite capacity in undemocratic conditions through institutionalized, if unfair, competition may be a more effective approach than parachuting fully democratic institutions in an unreceptive environment. Empirical analysis of over two hundred years of data shows that states with competitive political institutions, regardless of whether those are democratic, are most likely to develop and sustain full-fledged democracy.
Electoral competition and the structure of state legislatures: Organizational complexity and party building
(1997) Anderson, Robert Bruce; Hamm, Keith E.
A new examination of the linkages between electoral competition and the development of partisan organizations with their relationship to roll-call voting is generated. The study found a close association between variable electoral contestation, competition and success of minority parties in formerly one-party state house legislative chambers and the development of both minority and majority party organizations in these chambers. The model linked the features of increasing electoral competition to the development of greater chamber competition, greater proportional representation on substantive committees for the minority party, and the development of caucus organizations. These features of party organization, in turn, were linked to increasing intra-party cohesion and decreasing partisan conflict in roll-call voting in the chambers. The study is a comparative cross-state cross-time study of chambers which have formerly been one-party dominant.
Latino Descriptive Representation in Municipal Government: An Analysis of Latino Mayors
(2013-06-05) Cuellar, Carlos; Marschall, Melissa J.; Hamm, Keith E.; Stein, Robert M.; Emerson, Michael O.
Various questions regarding Latinos’ descriptive representation in the mayoralty are examined in this dissertation including: Where and why are Latino mayors elected? Why do Latino mayoral candidates emerge and win? And, is there is a link between Latino ethnicity and electoral outcomes in municipal elections? The empirical results of a cross-sectional analysis of U.S. cities from 1981-2006 suggest that institutions such as term limits and mayor-council governments influence the representation of Latinos in the mayoralty. These effects, however, are conditioned by Latinos’ numerical strength in a city – which suggests that Latino descriptive representation in the mayoralty is largely a function of population size. Despite the prominence of this factor, the results further reveal that Latinos need to swell the ranks of the city council to provide a steady supply of qualified Latino candidates to ultimately win the mayoralty. An analysis of 648 mayoral elections in 113 cities in the Southwest further tests theories of Latino candidate emergence and success based on city-level factors – that supply elections with Latino candidates – as well as strategic factors in elections – that influence Latino candidates’ cost-benefit decision calculus. The results reveal a combined effect of supply and strategy on candidate emergence and success. For example, in cities where Latinos are sizeable (+40 percent) and the electoral context is more competitive (i.e., where turnout is high, more candidates are on the ballot, and when incumbents are not vying for reelection), Latino candidates are more likely to emerge. A similar pattern occurs with regard to the success of Latino candidates except that the individual candidate’s previous political experience is particularly influential in improving their chances of winning. Given the theoretical expectation regarding the impact of ethnicity on electoral outcomes in municipal elections, I also examine whether Latino ethnicity shapes turnout rates and the margin of victory. Latino ethnicity is not statistically associated with these outcomes. However, other factors such as the election timing and the type of election (i.e., runoff election, open seat) seem to be more influential. In sum, the research here examines various aspects of Latino representation in the mayoralty that is the most comprehensive to date.
Legislative organization in the American states: The role of executive reorganizations
(2004) Delgado, Laura L.; Hamm, Keith E.
Reorganizations occur in all institutions, whether political or business or personal. Sometimes the reorganizations happen so slowly that they are almost indiscernible over time. At other times, the effects of the reorganization are immediately apparent. The consensus regarding political institutions, at least, is that change occurs slowly, when it occurs at all. This research focuses primarily on legislative change at the state level, and examines one particular reason for legislative change: change in the executive branch. The theory posits that one reason for state legislatures to reorganize their institutions is preceding executive branch reorganization. Legislatures should reorganize concomitant to executive branch reorganization and should do so in a way that brings their structure more closely into alignment with the structure of the executive branch. Legislatures possess compelling reasons to attempt to match the structures of their institutions with those of the executive branch. Doing so facilitates better oversight and helps to reduce information and power asymmetries. The results demonstrate that while legislative change by itself is sufficient to increase the degree to which legislative structure is congruent with that of the executive branch, the increase in congruence is maximized when a legislative reorganization follows an executive reorganization.
Minority Voices: The Representational Roles of African American and Latino Legislators during State Legislative Deliberations
(2013-09-16) Miller, Renita; Hamm, Keith E.; Jones, Mark P.; Marschall, Melissa J.; Byrd, Alexander; Meier, Kenneth
In this dissertation I systematically examine African-American and Latino legislator behavior in a legislative setting. The project specifically examines whether and how minority legislators represent and influence African American and Latino policy interests during the legislative process. I perform an analysis of minority legislator participation rates on bills and develop an original measure of substantive representation using patterns in legislative speech of state representatives’ language during committee hearings. I build on existing theory in the representation literature and offer new hypotheses for expanding the scope of how substantive representation is defined and investigated, namely through an empirical investigation of the link between deliberation and descriptive representation. Second, I collect an original data set and develop an original measure of substantive representation to test these hypotheses with participation rates and a linguistic frame based content analysis approach of minority and non-minority representatives’ language on bills for racial perspectives during state legislative committee hearings on several policy issue areas including, but not limited to education, healthcare, and immigration. Third, I offer a critical test of hypotheses to test whether African American and Latino representatives’ (1) participate more when the legislation is deemed minority interest in comparison to their non-minority counterparts? (2) their behavior (or deliberation style) is different from non-minority legislators? (3) impact the deliberation style of non-minority legislators? The analysis draws on original data collected through committee hearing tapes and online video archives of Texas committee hearings in multiple policy areas, and the findings indicate that minority legislators do indeed provide a voice for minority constituents, providing more minority interest language on minority interest bills in comparison to their non-minority colleagues, especially when the legislation is threatening to minority populations. These results support the argument that minority legislators do indeed substantively represent minority constituents at levels greater than non-minority representatives during the legislative process.
The role of political campaigns in state legislative elections
(1998) Hogan, Robert Edward; Hamm, Keith E.
Campaigns are an important but under-studied component of legislative elections. How candidates allocate their financial and material resources during the course of a political campaign has implications not only for election outcomes but also for representation within legislative institutions. This analysis begins an exploration of state legislative campaigns by first examining their basic features--the organizational structure, reliance on professional consultants and party operatives for assistance, and the strategies and techniques used for contacting voters. Next, the analysis examines factors related to the candidate, financial capability, and district conditions that influence the type of campaign which is waged. Finally, the analysis considers the impact of campaign activity on the vote margins won by candidates. Information obtained from survey responses along with campaign finance data collected on candidates running in seven states in 1994 is used in the analysis (Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, and Wyoming). Results show that financial resources play prominently in affecting the type of campaign which is waged, but not always in ways we might expect. Candidates with higher levels of funding are likely to utilize more modern techniques, but they are also likely to have strong campaign organizations which make grass-roots contact possible. District conditions such as total population, population density, and media market congruence affect the choice of voter contact strategies. The results also indicate that some forms of electioneering have a greater influence than others. Overall, these findings lend support to the idea that the campaign process has implications for election outcomes as well as for representation in legislative institutions.
The use of statutory control by U.S. state legislators: One step closer to a more complete understanding of legislative control of bureaucrats
(2009) Goodman, David; Hamm, Keith E.
Legislative scholars examining the use of statutory control to oversee and control bureaucrats have consistently found that the political environment influences the amount of policy-making discretion provided to bureaucrats in legislation. These studies however, have focused predominantly on statutory control decisions made by the U.S. Congress, an institutionally static legislature, or by U.S. state legislators in general legislation over a discrete period of time. These research designs severely limit our understanding of statutory control strategies in addition to the factors other than partisanship that influence legislative decisions. This study builds upon the prevailing research by examining a new dataset of statutory control decisions by state legislators in both general legislation and appropriations bills over six legislative sessions (1997-2007). More specifically, using enacted legislation pertaining to the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) from 1997-1998 through 2007-2008 across all 50 states, I examine how the political and institutional arrangements that vary across states influences statutory control decisions made by legislators, as well as further explore the substantive content of CHIP legislation to bring the discipline one step closer to a more complete understanding of statutory control of bureaucrats.
Theories of legislative organization and the development of United States state legislative committee systems
(2002) Martorano, Nancy A.; Hamm, Keith E.
Over the course of the twentieth century, the committee systems of U.S. state legislatures have undergone major transformations in their structure and procedure. The purpose of this dissertation will be to assess these changes using three well-known theories concerning the role of the committee system in the U.S. Congress. These theories are the distributive (Shepsle 1986; Weingast and Marshall 1988; Baron and Ferejohn 1989), informational (Maas 1983; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, 1989, 1990; Krehbiel 1991) and partisan theories (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Cox and McCubbins 1993). Specifically, this dissertation delineates and empirically tests expectations about the adoption of and changes in committee system procedures based upon the distributive, informational and partisan theories of legislative organization. The analysis concludes that none of the theories are able to account generally for the adoption of committee related state legislative rules of procedure nor can they account generally for changes in them.

Browsing by Author "Hamm, Keith E."

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