Legislative scholars examining the use of statutory control to oversee and control bureaucrats have consistently found that the political environment influences the amount of policy-making discretion provided to bureaucrats in legislation. These studies however, have focused predominantly on statutory control decisions made by the U.S. Congress, an institutionally static legislature, or by U.S. state legislators in general legislation over a discrete period of time. These research designs severely limit our understanding of statutory control strategies in addition to the factors other than partisanship that influence legislative decisions. This study builds upon the prevailing research by examining a new dataset of statutory control decisions by state legislators in both general legislation and appropriations bills over six legislative sessions (1997-2007). More specifically, using enacted legislation pertaining to the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) from 1997-1998 through 2007-2008 across all 50 states, I examine how the political and institutional arrangements that vary across states influences statutory control decisions made by legislators, as well as further explore the substantive content of CHIP legislation to bring the discipline one step closer to a more complete understanding of statutory control of bureaucrats.