Perceptual Links: Attention, Experience, and Demonstrative Thought

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dc.contributor.advisorO'Callaghan, Caseyen_US
dc.contributor.committeeMemberSiewert, Charlesen_US
dc.contributor.committeeMemberGrandy, Richarden_US
dc.contributor.committeeMemberZammito, Johnen_US
dc.creatorBarkasi, Michaelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-01-07T17:05:10Zen_US
dc.date.available2016-01-07T17:05:10Zen_US
dc.date.created2015-05en_US
dc.date.issued2015-04-22en_US
dc.date.submittedMay 2015en_US
dc.date.updated2016-01-07T17:05:10Zen_US
dc.description.abstractPerception is conscious: perceiving involves a first-person experience of what’s perceived. It’s widely held that these perceptual experiences are independent of what's perceived. Viewing two visually indiscriminable #2 pencils would involve the same experience, despite viewing different objects. It’s also widely held that conscious perception enables thinking about what's perceiving. When you see one of those pencils you can think, THAT is a pencil. Some philosophers, including John McDowell and John Campbell, have suggested that these two features engender a puzzle: how can perceptual experiences make perceived objects available for thought when they’re independent of those objects? This dissertation is a collection of four papers which address this question. The first (chapter 2) argues that, under two minimal assumptions, conscious perception makes objects available for thought only if experience is not object independent. The second (chapter 3) argues that conscious perception makes objects available for thought by enabling voluntarily attention to them. The third (chapter 4) integrates empirical work on multiple-object tracking and philosophical work on attention to argue that conscious perception isn’t mediated by the construction of representations within the visual system. The fourth (chapter 5) uses philosophical methods and neurophysiology to give an account of the role of experience itself in how perception makes objects available for thought. A concluding chapter combines and extends results from the previous chapters to give a naive realist (vs representationalist) account of perceptual experience. The questions about perceptual experience addressed in this dissertation (object dependent or independent? naive realist or representationalist?) are fundamental to our understanding of experience. Not only do they get at its basic nature, but their answers constrain how we might give scientifically respectable, or naturalistic, explanations of experience as well as how we might explain perceptual hallucinations and illusions.en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_US
dc.identifier.citationBarkasi, Michael. "Perceptual Links: Attention, Experience, and Demonstrative Thought." (2015) Diss., Rice University. <a href="https://hdl.handle.net/1911/87745">https://hdl.handle.net/1911/87745</a>.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/87745en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.rightsCopyright is held by the author, unless otherwise indicated. Permission to reuse, publish, or reproduce the work beyond the bounds of fair use or other exemptions to copyright law must be obtained from the copyright holder.en_US
dc.subjectperceptual experienceen_US
dc.subjectdemonstrative thoughten_US
dc.subjectnaive realismen_US
dc.subjectattentionen_US
dc.titlePerceptual Links: Attention, Experience, and Demonstrative Thoughten_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.type.materialTexten_US
thesis.degree.departmentPhilosophyen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineHumanitiesen_US
thesis.degree.grantorRice Universityen_US
thesis.degree.levelDoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophyen_US
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