An Economic Theory of Pro-Government Militias

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dc.contributor.advisorMorgan, T. Cliftonen_US
dc.creatorSosa Norena, Santiagoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2019-03-20T15:09:21Zen_US
dc.date.available2019-03-20T15:09:21Zen_US
dc.date.created2018-12en_US
dc.date.issued2018-11-27en_US
dc.date.submittedDecember 2018en_US
dc.date.updated2019-03-20T15:09:21Zen_US
dc.description.abstractThroughout the world, states delegate various and sundry security tasks to armed groups outside their regular forces. The main arguments in the literature are that governments use militias because of their logistic advantages (autonomy, informational advantages, and cheap deployment) and to provide the government with plausible deniability for human rights violations. However, not all militias victimize civilians and when they do the government usually does as well. Why, then, would states use militias at all? Moreover, why, despite the risks of side-switching, agency loss, and excessive use of force inherent to them, do states use armed groups outside their regular forces rather than spending more on the latter? This study develops a general framework to analyze the use of militias. It presents a formal model of the state's decision to spend on regular and irregular forces as if it was a firm producing a good: security. However, these forces also produce liabilities to the state, and so it is in balancing security and liability that the state optimizes its expenditures. The theory leads us to expect that militias are more likely to be used, all else equal, the greater the budget available is, the more cost-effective they are relative to the regular forces, the lower the risk of using them, and the more a state values security over liability. Likewise, there is substitutability between armed forces: that to spend on one force the state must necessarily spend less on the other one. Thus, all else equal, the more a state uses militias, the less it will use its regular forces, and vice-versa. I test some of these expectations with two studies. The first uses cross-national data on militias, judicial independence and civil wars between 1981 and 2007. I find that militias are more likely to be used in states that have a weak judiciary. The second is a case-study of Colombia's most recent civil war. Using municipality-level data between 2000 and 2006, I find that the Colombian armed forces decreased their activity against rebels in areas where the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia were active.en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_US
dc.identifier.citationSosa Norena, Santiago. "An Economic Theory of Pro-Government Militias." (2018) Diss., Rice University. <a href="https://hdl.handle.net/1911/105251">https://hdl.handle.net/1911/105251</a>.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/105251en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.rightsCopyright is held by the author, unless otherwise indicated. Permission to reuse, publish, or reproduce the work beyond the bounds of fair use or other exemptions to copyright law must be obtained from the copyright holder.en_US
dc.subjectPro-Government Militiasen_US
dc.subjectParamilitariesen_US
dc.subjectCivil Waren_US
dc.subjectJudicial Independenceen_US
dc.subjectPolicy Substitutabilityen_US
dc.titleAn Economic Theory of Pro-Government Militiasen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.type.materialTexten_US
thesis.degree.departmentPolitical Scienceen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineSocial Sciencesen_US
thesis.degree.grantorRice Universityen_US
thesis.degree.levelDoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophyen_US
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