Three Essays on CEO Severance Pay

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dc.contributor.advisorZhang, Yanen_US
dc.creatorCallahan, Conor Johnen_US
dc.date.accessioned2019-08-12T14:27:30Zen_US
dc.date.available2019-08-12T14:27:30Zen_US
dc.date.created2019-08en_US
dc.date.issued2019-08-09en_US
dc.date.submittedAugust 2019en_US
dc.date.updated2019-08-12T14:27:30Zen_US
dc.description.abstractThe majority of CEOs at U.S. public companies are promised severance pay in their compensation packages, yet researchers have thus far rarely considered the importance of these arrangements. This dissertation consists of three essays on CEO severance pay. My first essay draws upon agency theory to empirically demonstrate that a greater proportion of severance pay can offset employment risk for newly appointed executives, leading to firm strategies with greater distinctiveness. I also find that this relationship is amplified when CEOs receive a greater proportion of stock option payment in their initial package but attenuated when CEOs have appointed a greater proportion of directors on the board. Findings from my second essay present empirical evidence as to which incoming CEOs have a greater proportion of severance pay in their initial employment agreement. Specifically, I find general support for my theoretical argument that factors associated with the employment risk of incoming CEOs are also antecedents to the proportion of severance pay awarded to CEOs. The third essay of my dissertation is conceptual, and considers the ex-post impact of severance payments to dismissed CEOs. In this essay I develop our understanding of the outcomes impacting firms which award such payments. This dissertation can contribute to strategy research by highlighting the importance of CEO severance pay as a form of executive compensation.en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_US
dc.identifier.citationCallahan, Conor John. "Three Essays on CEO Severance Pay." (2019) Diss., Rice University. <a href="https://hdl.handle.net/1911/106200">https://hdl.handle.net/1911/106200</a>.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/106200en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.rightsCopyright is held by the author, unless otherwise indicated. Permission to reuse, publish, or reproduce the work beyond the bounds of fair use or other exemptions to copyright law must be obtained from the copyright holder.en_US
dc.subjectCEO severanceen_US
dc.subjectrisken_US
dc.titleThree Essays on CEO Severance Payen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.type.materialTexten_US
thesis.degree.departmentBusinessen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineBusinessen_US
thesis.degree.grantorRice Universityen_US
thesis.degree.levelDoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.majorStrategy and Environmenten_US
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophyen_US
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