Economic sanctions and corporate compliance: A game-theoretic model

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dc.contributor.advisorMorgan, T. Cliftonen_US
dc.creatorLosey, Paula Elaineen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-06-04T08:22:24Zen_US
dc.date.available2009-06-04T08:22:24Zen_US
dc.date.issued1999en_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the question of when economic sanctions will be effectively instituted by states by looking at the role of the multinational corporation in the sanctioning process. Although governments have resources at their disposal with which to enforce their policies, the amount of resources that they are willing to devote to this enforcement are a function of their own cost/benefit calculations. They are also influenced by their predictions of the level of compliance of their private firms that conduct business in the target state. A game-theoretic model of the interaction between a sanctioning government and a private firm is offered and used to derive hypotheses on the conditions affecting a government's willingness to expend monitoring costs to enforce a sanctions policy. These hypotheses are then applied to the cases of the South African and Rhodesian oil embargoes.en_US
dc.format.extent55 p.en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_US
dc.identifier.callnoTHESIS POL.SCI. 1999 LOSEYen_US
dc.identifier.citationLosey, Paula Elaine. "Economic sanctions and corporate compliance: A game-theoretic model." (1999) Master’s Thesis, Rice University. <a href="https://hdl.handle.net/1911/17279">https://hdl.handle.net/1911/17279</a>.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/17279en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.rightsCopyright is held by the author, unless otherwise indicated. Permission to reuse, publish, or reproduce the work beyond the bounds of fair use or other exemptions to copyright law must be obtained from the copyright holder.en_US
dc.subjectAfrican historyen_US
dc.subjectPolitical scienceen_US
dc.subjectInternational relationsen_US
dc.subjectInternational lawen_US
dc.titleEconomic sanctions and corporate compliance: A game-theoretic modelen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.type.materialTexten_US
thesis.degree.departmentPolitical Scienceen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineSocial Sciencesen_US
thesis.degree.grantorRice Universityen_US
thesis.degree.levelMastersen_US
thesis.degree.nameMaster of Artsen_US
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