Blame, Forgiveness, and Honor in Aristotle and Beyond

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dc.contributor.advisorMorrison, Donald
dc.contributor.committeeMemberSher, George
dc.creatorPhillips-Garrett, Carissa
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-16T20:22:29Z
dc.date.available2019-05-16T20:22:29Z
dc.date.created2017-08
dc.date.issued2017-08-10
dc.date.submittedAugust 2017
dc.date.updated2019-05-16T20:22:29Z
dc.description.abstractIn my dissertation, I defend an interpretation of Aristotle’s account of blame and moral responsibility as accountability. Through examining the neglected concept of sungnōmē, which forestalls blame, I conclude that Aristotelian blame is justified only on grounds of fairness. This conclusion is evidence that Aristotelian blame is not merely an instrumental or descriptive tool, but rather a way of holding agents morally accountable. Through examining the emphasis Aristotle places on the role of blame and its role in maintaining honor, I show that forgiveness is incompatible with Aristotle’s account because when the victim decides to forgive, she lets go of blame on grounds other than desert. For Aristotle, when she does so, she accepts less than she is worth, and so forgiving a wrongdoer undermines the victim’s honor. As a result, Aristotle rejects forgiveness as positively vicious. Contra Aristotle, I argue that cultivating the disposition to be forgiving is part of flourishing individual and communal life. The choice to let go what of one deserves, however, need not mean that honor is relinquished. Instead, I defend an alternative account of honor in which honor lies not in demanding what is deserved but instead in committing to the consistent pursuit of the good. On this account, honor is related to the ongoing commitment to a coherent and compelling identity rooted in seeing ethical values as central to the conception of one’s self, rather than outwardly-mediated Aristotelian honor. Honor is thus bound up in commitment to the good life generally, and does not rely on getting what one deserves. My account thus reconciles Aristotelian blame with forgiveness, demonstrates what is valuable about honor, and why it is still worth pursuing in our modern world.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.citationPhillips-Garrett, Carissa. "Blame, Forgiveness, and Honor in Aristotle and Beyond." (2017) Diss., Rice University. <a href="https://hdl.handle.net/1911/105506">https://hdl.handle.net/1911/105506</a>.
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/105506
dc.language.isoeng
dc.rightsCopyright is held by the author, unless otherwise indicated. Permission to reuse, publish, or reproduce the work beyond the bounds of fair use or other exemptions to copyright law must be obtained from the copyright holder.
dc.subjectAristotle
dc.subjectethics
dc.subjectblame
dc.subjectdesert
dc.subjectforgiveness
dc.subjecthonor
dc.subjectmoral responsibility
dc.subjectvirtue
dc.titleBlame, Forgiveness, and Honor in Aristotle and Beyond
dc.typeThesis
dc.type.materialText
thesis.degree.departmentPhilosophy
thesis.degree.disciplineHumanities
thesis.degree.grantorRice University
thesis.degree.levelDoctoral
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophy
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