This dissertation explores organizational and investor responses to sexual scandals in U.S. firms from 1999 to 2019. The first essay investigates how competitors of scandal-stricken firms react, analyzing two types of responses: pro-women claims and female director appointments. It finds that firms increase both responses post-scandal, influenced by competitors' size similarity with the scandal firm, their ESG reputation, analyst coverage, and community liberalism. The second essay delves into the effects of internal versus external stakeholder pressures on these responses from the perspective of the scandalized firms. It reveals that internal pressures often lead to symbolic changes, such as pro-women claims, while external pressures are more likely to result in substantive changes, like female director appointments. The third essay examines investor reactions to female director appointments, showing that investors favor substantive appointments but respond negatively to appointments perceived as tokenistic or superficial. This research contributes to our understanding of how firms manage reputation and stakeholder expectations post-scandal and how these strategies are perceived by investors, enriching the literature on strategic management and organizational theory in scandal contexts.