A Theory of Well-Being
| dc.contributor.advisor | Sher, George | en_US |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Siewert, Charles | en_US |
| dc.creator | Zuk, Peter David | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2019-12-04T15:09:45Z | en_US |
| dc.date.available | 2020-12-01T06:01:11Z | en_US |
| dc.date.created | 2019-12 | en_US |
| dc.date.issued | 2019-12-03 | en_US |
| dc.date.submitted | December 2019 | en_US |
| dc.date.updated | 2019-12-04T15:09:46Z | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | I defend the view that the value of every contribution to individual well-being is explained by affective experience, suitably defined. In Chapter 1, I set out a methodological approach centered on Rawlsian wide reflective equilibrium and offer considerations in favor of affective experience as a uniquely powerful explanation of contributions to well-being. The remaining three chapters employ affective experience as an explanation of the goodness of the goods proposed by three leading theories of wellbeing: hedonism, desired-based views, and objective list views. In Chapter 2, I offer arguments against attitudinal conceptions of pleasure and defend instead an affective conception of pleasure that provides a plausible way of unifying two major phenomenological conceptions of pleasure. In Chapter 3, I defend an affective conception of desire and offer arguments against motivational and cognitivist conceptions of desire. In Chapter 4, I provide an account of reasons for affective states and apply this account to several purportedly objective goods: love, friendship, virtue, and self-respect. The goodness of these goods for individuals, I argue, can be explained by appeal to affective experience in a way that does not depart from what is most important in subjective approaches to well-being. Having offered a deeper explanation of the goodness of the various goods proposed by these three leading theories of well-being, I conclude that my theory is preferable to them. | en_US |
| dc.embargo.terms | 2020-12-01 | en_US |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en_US |
| dc.identifier.citation | Zuk, Peter David. "A Theory of Well-Being." (2019) Diss., Rice University. <a href="https://hdl.handle.net/1911/107754">https://hdl.handle.net/1911/107754</a>. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1911/107754 | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
| dc.rights | Copyright is held by the author, unless otherwise indicated. Permission to reuse, publish, or reproduce the work beyond the bounds of fair use or other exemptions to copyright law must be obtained from the copyright holder. | en_US |
| dc.subject | well-being | en_US |
| dc.subject | value theory | en_US |
| dc.subject | affect | en_US |
| dc.subject | pleasure | en_US |
| dc.subject | desire | en_US |
| dc.title | A Theory of Well-Being | en_US |
| dc.type | Thesis | en_US |
| dc.type.material | Text | en_US |
| thesis.degree.department | Philosophy | en_US |
| thesis.degree.discipline | Humanities | en_US |
| thesis.degree.grantor | Rice University | en_US |
| thesis.degree.level | Doctoral | en_US |
| thesis.degree.name | Doctor of Philosophy | en_US |
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