Wireless channels are vulnerable to eavesdroppers due to their broadcast nature. One approach to thwart an eavesdropper (Eve) is to decrease her SNR, e.g., by reducing the signal in her direction. Unfortunately, such methods are vulnerable to (1) a highly directional Eve that can increase her received signal strength and (2) Eve that is close to the receiver, Bob, or close to the transmitter, Alice. In this paper, we design and experimentally evaluate Multipath Multicarrier Misinformation to Adversaries (M3A), a system for Alice to send data to Bob while simultaneously sending misinformation to Eve. Our approach does not require knowledge of Eve’s channel or location and, with multipath channels, randomly transforms Eve’s symbols even if Eve is located one wavelength-scale distance from Bob (approximately 10 cm) or if Eve is located between Alice and Bob in their direct path (Eve is approximately 1/3 closer to Alice). In particular, our approach is to move each of Eve’s received symbols (over time and across subcarriers), to an independently random transformation as compared to Bob, without Alice or Bob knowing Eve’s location or channel. We realize this by modulating Alice’s per-subcarrier beamforming weights with an i.i.d. random binary sequence, as if Alice had a separate antenna array for each subcarrier, and could randomly turn antennas in each array on and off. We implement M3A on a real-time Massive MIMO testbed, and show that M3A increases Eve’s bit error rate up to more than two hundredfold compared to beamforming, even if she is positioned approximately a wavelength away, whether above, below, or beside Bob. Finally, to ensure reliability at Bob, we show that with M3A, Bob’s bit error rate is approximately an order of magnitude lower than achieved with prior work.