Optimal contracts for trade restrictions

dc.contributor.advisorDudey, Marcen_US
dc.creatorParedes, Esperanzaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-06-04T00:18:25Zen_US
dc.date.available2009-06-04T00:18:25Zen_US
dc.date.issued1993en_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper addresses the question of how the government should elicit cost information from a high or low domestic industry to determine socially optimal levels of imports. The results are shown to depend on whether firms in the domestic industry are represented by a trade organization. When firms act independently the optimal contract is costless for the government and two different types of incentive constraints are used to determine it. One of these applies when the costs announced by firms coincide. The other applies when one firm reveals a cost structure and its competitor reveals the opposite cost structure. If a contract to elicit cost information is used and trade organizations are the channel of communication between industry and government only one type of incentive constraint is necessary.en_US
dc.format.extent18 p.en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_US
dc.identifier.callnoThesis Econ. 1993 Paredesen_US
dc.identifier.citationParedes, Esperanza. "Optimal contracts for trade restrictions." (1993) Master’s Thesis, Rice University. <a href="https://hdl.handle.net/1911/13769">https://hdl.handle.net/1911/13769</a>.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/13769en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.rightsCopyright is held by the author, unless otherwise indicated. Permission to reuse, publish, or reproduce the work beyond the bounds of fair use or other exemptions to copyright law must be obtained from the copyright holder.en_US
dc.subjectEconomic theoryen_US
dc.titleOptimal contracts for trade restrictionsen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.type.materialTexten_US
thesis.degree.departmentEconomicsen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineSocial Sciencesen_US
thesis.degree.grantorRice Universityen_US
thesis.degree.levelMastersen_US
thesis.degree.nameMaster of Artsen_US
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