Have a cake and eat it too? Using auction design to balance multiple goals in the energy sector

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dc.contributor.advisorHartley, Peteren_US
dc.creatorHernandez, Igoren_US
dc.date.accessioned2022-09-26T15:36:27Zen_US
dc.date.available2022-09-26T15:36:27Zen_US
dc.date.created2022-05en_US
dc.date.issued2022-04-21en_US
dc.date.submittedMay 2022en_US
dc.date.updated2022-09-26T15:36:27Zen_US
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation provides empirical results related to scoring auctions used in the oil and gas sector, and how policymakers design auctions and contracts to balance multiple objectives. Scoring auctions summarize multiple bidding variables into a single index, and the bidder with the highest score wins the auction. I focus initially on the problem of multiple objectives for auctioneers when designing these auctions and some results from the literature. Next, I will discuss the case of onshore marginal leases in Mexico, in which I explore how changes in the scoring rule affect the selection of bidders and the execution of projects. Third, I explore the case of Brazil, in which I compare two commonly used contracts for the oil sector, how they affect bidders’ valuation of a project, their bidding strategies and investment behavior and ultimately government revenues. Finally, I draw lessons to policymakers from these cases.en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_US
dc.identifier.citationHernandez, Igor. "Have a cake and eat it too? Using auction design to balance multiple goals in the energy sector." (2022) Diss., Rice University. <a href="https://hdl.handle.net/1911/113366">https://hdl.handle.net/1911/113366</a>.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/113366en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.rightsCopyright is held by the author, unless otherwise indicated. Permission to reuse, publish, or reproduce the work beyond the bounds of fair use or other exemptions to copyright law must be obtained from the copyright holder.en_US
dc.subjectScoring Auctionsen_US
dc.subjectOilen_US
dc.subjectEnergyen_US
dc.subjectFiscal Designen_US
dc.subjectInvestmenten_US
dc.titleHave a cake and eat it too? Using auction design to balance multiple goals in the energy sectoren_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.type.materialTexten_US
thesis.degree.departmentEconomicsen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineSocial Sciencesen_US
thesis.degree.grantorRice Universityen_US
thesis.degree.levelDoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophyen_US
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