A Timing Channel Spyware Robust to MAC Random Back-off

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dc.contributor.authorAlkabani, Yousraen_US
dc.contributor.authorColeman, Todden_US
dc.contributor.authorKiyavash, Negaren_US
dc.contributor.authorKoushanfar, Farinazen_US
dc.date.accessioned2017-08-02T22:03:08Zen_US
dc.date.available2017-08-02T22:03:08Zen_US
dc.date.issued2010-03-02en_US
dc.date.noteMarch 2, 2010en_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents the design and implementation of spyware communication circuits built into the widely used Carrier Sense Multiple Access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) protocol. The spyware components are embedded within the sequential and combinational communication circuit structure during synthesis, rendering the distinction or dissociation of the spyware from the original circuit impossible. We take advantage of the timing channel resulting from transmission of packets to implement a new practical coding scheme that covertly transfers the spied data. Our codes are robust against the CSMA/CA’s random retransmission time for collision avoidance and in fact take advantage of it to disguise the covert communication. The data snooping may be sporadically triggered, either externally or internally. The occasional trigger and the real-time traffic’s variability make the spyware timing covert channel detection a challenge. The spyware is implemented and tested on a widely used open-source wireless CSMA/CA radio platform. We identify the following performance metrics and evaluate them on our architecture: 1) efficiency of implementation of the encoder; 2) robustness of the communication scheme to heterogeneous CSMA/CA effects; and 3) difficulty of covert channel detection. We evaluate criterion 1) completely theoretically. Criterion 2) is evaluated by simulating a wireless CSMA/CA architecture and testing the robustness of the decoder in different heterogeneous wireless conditions. Criterion 3) is confirmed experimentally using the state-of-the-art covert timing channel detection methods.en_US
dc.format.extent22 ppen_US
dc.identifier.citationAlkabani, Yousra, Coleman, Todd, Kiyavash, Negar, et al.. "A Timing Channel Spyware Robust to MAC Random Back-off." (2010) https://hdl.handle.net/1911/96385.en_US
dc.identifier.digitalTR10-04en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/96385en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.rightsYou are granted permission for the noncommercial reproduction, distribution, display, and performance of this technical report in any format, but this permission is only for a period of forty-five (45) days from the most recent time that you verified that this technical report is still available from the Computer Science Department of Rice University under terms that include this permission. All other rights are reserved by the author(s).en_US
dc.titleA Timing Channel Spyware Robust to MAC Random Back-offen_US
dc.typeTechnical reporten_US
dc.type.dcmiTexten_US
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