Electoral Incentives and Political Support for Anticorruption Reform: Evidence from Latin American Legislatures
| dc.contributor.advisor | Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie | en_US |
| dc.creator | Guajardo, Gustavo | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-05-29T19:31:05Z | en_US |
| dc.date.available | 2025-05-29T19:31:05Z | en_US |
| dc.date.created | 2025-05 | en_US |
| dc.date.issued | 2025-04-21 | en_US |
| dc.date.submitted | May 2025 | en_US |
| dc.date.updated | 2025-05-29T19:31:05Z | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | This dissertation examines the conditions under which politicians advance anticorruption policies. Anticorruption policies rarely receive widespread political support because they can be costly and risky for politicians. Yet, politicians still propose and advocate for these reforms. Why? In my three-paper dissertation, I argue (and show) that legislators are strategic when it comes to anticorruption, seeking to sponsor policies that will get them votes without jeopardizing their careers and rents. I leverage original data on anticorruption bills introduced to Latin American legislatures, natural experiments, survey experiments, and interviews with politicians and activists to document the role of electoral incentives. Overall, results show that 1) anticorruption reform is possible under the right conditions, 2) legislators are responsive to electoral incentives but will seek to minimize the potential consequences of anticorruption policies, and 3) voters evaluate anticorruption efforts favorably, but certain contextual features make some appeals more credible. Legislators are more likely to sponsor anticorruption initiatives after high-profile corruption scandals, when they are members of the opposition and when they are up for reelection. Furthermore, legislators are more likely to sponsor punitive policies, which they believe are more popular and less likely to become law than non-punitive policies. Finally, evidence from a survey experiment in Mexico suggests that there is a mismatch between what politicians believe will get them votes and what voters prefer. While voters are more likely to view opposition party legislators sponsoring anticorruption bills more favorably than incumbents, they are not more likely to prefer punitive over non-punitive action, and they evaluate anticorruption policies more highly if they are sponsored in the absence of a scandal. Together, these papers contribute to our understanding of anticorruption policies, politicians' incentives to advance them, and voters' evaluations of these efforts. | en_US |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1911/118412 | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
| dc.subject | Comparative politics, anticorruption, legislative behavior, Mexico | en_US |
| dc.title | Electoral Incentives and Political Support for Anticorruption Reform: Evidence from Latin American Legislatures | en_US |
| dc.type | Thesis | en_US |
| dc.type.material | Text | en_US |
| thesis.degree.department | Political Science | en_US |
| thesis.degree.discipline | Political Science | en_US |
| thesis.degree.grantor | Rice University | en_US |
| thesis.degree.level | Doctoral | en_US |
| thesis.degree.name | Doctor of Philosophy | en_US |
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