"Falling to peaces": Conciliatory agreements and the durability of peace

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dc.contributor.advisorLeeds, Brett Ashleyen_US
dc.creatorMattes, Michaelaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-06-04T08:14:31Zen_US
dc.date.available2009-06-04T08:14:31Zen_US
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.description.abstractStates often experience disagreements such as competing territorial claims. Sometimes they attempt to address these differences by negotiating explicit, written settlements. Can these agreements help ensure a durable peace? I examine the effect of agreements that attempt to address differences after significant conflict has occurred, such as peace agreements, as well as agreements designed to manage competing claims before they reach the level of violence. I refer to these two sets of agreements together as 'conciliatory agreements'. Using the theoretical framework of the bargaining model of war, I argue that the provisions specified in conciliatory agreements make the existing peaceful equilibrium more robust against the potentially disruptive effect of environmental shocks, such as changes in relative capabilities or regime type. Furthermore, I argue that conciliatory agreements not only increase the likelihood that peace is maintained but also impact the kind of peace maintained. Specifically, competing states that experience disruptive changes may remain at peace either because they continue to accept the status quo or because they peacefully renegotiate a new settlement. I argue that varying agreement provisions can account for why, when conditions change, some states resort to force, while others peacefully renegotiate, and still others maintain their original agreement. In order to evaluate my propositions, I rely on an existing list of territorial claims from the Americas, the Middle East, and Europe between 1919 and 1995, provided by Huth and Allee's (2002) research. For each of these cases, I collect all conciliatory agreements between the claimants and use these to test my theoretical expectations about the impact of agreement provisions on the durability of peace and the occurrence of renegotiation.en_US
dc.format.extent168 p.en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_US
dc.identifier.callnoTHESIS POL.SCI. 2006 MATTESen_US
dc.identifier.citationMattes, Michaela. ""Falling to peaces": Conciliatory agreements and the durability of peace." (2006) Diss., Rice University. <a href="https://hdl.handle.net/1911/18946">https://hdl.handle.net/1911/18946</a>.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/18946en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.rightsCopyright is held by the author, unless otherwise indicated. Permission to reuse, publish, or reproduce the work beyond the bounds of fair use or other exemptions to copyright law must be obtained from the copyright holder.en_US
dc.subjectPolitical scienceen_US
dc.subjectInternational relationsen_US
dc.subjectInternational lawen_US
dc.title"Falling to peaces": Conciliatory agreements and the durability of peaceen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.type.materialTexten_US
thesis.degree.departmentPolitical Scienceen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineSocial Sciencesen_US
thesis.degree.grantorRice Universityen_US
thesis.degree.levelDoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophyen_US
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