The Electoral Strategy of Legislative Politics: Balancing Party and Member Reputation in Japan and Taiwan

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dc.contributor.advisorJones, Mark P.
dc.contributor.committeeMemberStevenson, Randolph T.
dc.contributor.committeeMemberMartin, Lanny
dc.contributor.committeeMemberCarroll, Royce A.
dc.contributor.committeeMemberLewis, Steven W.
dc.creatorMatsuo, Akitaka
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-06T00:08:28Z
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-06T00:08:30Z
dc.date.available2012-09-06T00:08:28Z
dc.date.available2012-09-06T00:08:30Z
dc.date.created2012-05
dc.date.issued2012-09-05
dc.date.submittedMay 2012
dc.date.updated2012-09-06T00:08:30Z
dc.description.abstractThis thesis explores how political parties coordinate competing objectives, such as winning elections and influencing public policy with demands from their legislators whose interests lie principally in re-election and policy distribution. Electoral and legislative institutions affect the prioritizing of these goals and the appropriate strategy by which to achieve them. Utilizing two East Asian democracies, Japan and Taiwan, my dissertation evaluates this argument via the econometric analysis of various aspects of legislative behavior and policy outcomes, such as committee assignments and deliberations, and intergovernmental fiscal transfers. In regard to committee activities, there exists a significant difference between governing and opposition parties in terms of the expected role of their members on legislative committees. In regard to fiscal transfers, governing parties distribute fiscal resources strategically to party strongholds.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.citationMatsuo, Akitaka. "The Electoral Strategy of Legislative Politics: Balancing Party and Member Reputation in Japan and Taiwan." (2012) Diss., Rice University. <a href="https://hdl.handle.net/1911/64640">https://hdl.handle.net/1911/64640</a>.
dc.identifier.slug123456789/ETD-2012-05-90
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/64640
dc.language.isoeng
dc.rightsCopyright is held by the author, unless otherwise indicated. Permission to reuse, publish, or reproduce the work beyond the bounds of fair use or other exemptions to copyright law must be obtained from the copyright holder.
dc.subjectLegislative behavior
dc.subjectParty politics
dc.subjectJapanese politics
dc.subjectPork barreling
dc.titleThe Electoral Strategy of Legislative Politics: Balancing Party and Member Reputation in Japan and Taiwan
dc.typeThesis
dc.type.materialText
thesis.degree.departmentPolitical Science
thesis.degree.disciplineSocial Sciences
thesis.degree.grantorRice University
thesis.degree.levelDoctoral
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophy
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