A philosophical analysis of filial obligations

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dc.contributor.advisorBrody, Baruchen_US
dc.creatorBrakman, Sarah Vaughanen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-06-04T00:45:37Zen_US
dc.date.available2009-06-04T00:45:37Zen_US
dc.date.issued1994en_US
dc.description.abstractFilial obligations are moral requirements that adult children have for the well-being of their parents. These obligations are non-voluntary special obligations. An examination of selected cultural (classical Greek and imperial Chinese), religious (Judaic, Islamic and Christian) and philosophical (Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Hobbes and Locke) views concerning filial obligation is provided. Several candidates emerge for the basis of filial obligations. An analysis of the arguments for each of these candidates is provided. Personal identity is rejected as an inadequate basis for filial obligations because it relies on a fallacy. Friendship is rejected because (1) there are morally relevant features of the filial relationship that are not captured by this account and (2) the lack of equality of autonomy and the lack of independence make friendship between children and parents impossible. Reciprocity is rejected when it is shown (1) that the motive of parents for benefiting children is morally irrelevant on a reciprocity account and (2) that the requirement of the repayment of a debts is damaging to the parent-child relationship. Gratitude is supported as the basis of filial obligations because it does not fall prey to the inadequacies listed above. In addition, it addresses all features held to be important to the structure of the parent-child relationship. The argument defended is adult children whose parents have intentionally, voluntarily and benevolently benefitted them for their own sake, have an obligation to cultivate attitudes that are constitutive of the virtue of gratitude. The virtue of gratitude includes the dispositions of appreciation and goodwill. Filial obligations require that one act according to the possession of such attitudes. Application of the gratitude account of filial obligations to cases shows that the specific content of the obligation is context-dependent and cannot be determined across cases. This finding strengthens the argument for gratitude as the basis of filial obligations as it may be applied to our pluralistic society without undermining the values and customs for a particular community.en_US
dc.format.extent243 p.en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_US
dc.identifier.callnoTHESIS PHIL. 1994 BRAKMANen_US
dc.identifier.citationBrakman, Sarah Vaughan. "A philosophical analysis of filial obligations." (1994) Diss., Rice University. <a href="https://hdl.handle.net/1911/16706">https://hdl.handle.net/1911/16706</a>.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/16706en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.rightsCopyright is held by the author, unless otherwise indicated. Permission to reuse, publish, or reproduce the work beyond the bounds of fair use or other exemptions to copyright law must be obtained from the copyright holder.en_US
dc.subjectPhilosophyen_US
dc.subjectReligious historyen_US
dc.subjectSociologyen_US
dc.subjectIndividual & family studiesen_US
dc.titleA philosophical analysis of filial obligationsen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.type.materialTexten_US
thesis.degree.departmentPhilosophyen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineHumanitiesen_US
thesis.degree.grantorRice Universityen_US
thesis.degree.levelDoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophyen_US
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