Indelible Physical Randomness for Security: Silicon, Bisignals, Biometrics

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dc.contributor.advisorKoushanfar, Farinazen_US
dc.contributor.committeeMemberWallach, Dan Sen_US
dc.contributor.committeeMemberKnightly, Edwarden_US
dc.contributor.committeeMemberJuels, Arien_US
dc.creatorRostami, Masouden_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-01-25T21:34:21Zen_US
dc.date.available2016-01-25T21:34:21Zen_US
dc.date.created2014-12en_US
dc.date.issued2014-11-11en_US
dc.date.submittedDecember 2014en_US
dc.date.updated2016-01-25T21:34:21Zen_US
dc.description.abstractIn this thesis, I investigate the nature and properties of several indelible physical randomness phenomena. I leverage these indelible statistical properties to design robust and efficient security systems. Three different phenomena are discussed in this thesis: randomness in biosignals, silicon chips, and biometrics. In the first part, I present a system to authenticate external medical device programmers to Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs).IMDs have now built-in radio communication to facilitate non-invasive reprogramming, but lack well-designed authentication mechanisms, exposing patients to the risks of over-the-air attacks and physical harm. Our protocol uses biosignals for authentication mechanism, ensuring access only by a medical instrument in physical contact with an IMD-bearing patient. Based on statistical analysis of real-world data, I propose and analyze new techniques for extracting time-varying randomness from biosignals and introduce a novel cryptographic device pairing protocol that uses this randomness to protect against attacks by active adversaries, while meeting the practical challenges of lightweight implementation and noise tolerance in biosignals readings. In the second part, unavoidable physical randomness of transistors is investigated, and novel robust and low-overhead authentication, bit-commitment, and key exchange protocols are proposed. It will be meticulously shown that these protocols can achieve resiliency against reverse-engineering and replay attacks without a costly secure channel. The attack analysis guides us in tuning the parameters of the protocols for an efficient and secure implementation. In the third part, the statistical properties of fingerprint minutiae points are analyzed and a distributed security protocol will be proposed to safeguard biometric fingerprint databases based on the developed statistical models of fingerprint biometric.en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_US
dc.identifier.citationRostami, Masoud. "Indelible Physical Randomness for Security: Silicon, Bisignals, Biometrics." (2014) Diss., Rice University. <a href="https://hdl.handle.net/1911/88120">https://hdl.handle.net/1911/88120</a>.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/88120en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.rightsCopyright is held by the author, unless otherwise indicated. Permission to reuse, publish, or reproduce the work beyond the bounds of fair use or other exemptions to copyright law must be obtained from the copyright holder.en_US
dc.subjectIMDsen_US
dc.subjectHardware Securityen_US
dc.titleIndelible Physical Randomness for Security: Silicon, Bisignals, Biometricsen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.type.materialTexten_US
thesis.degree.departmentElectrical and Computer Engineeringen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineEngineeringen_US
thesis.degree.grantorRice Universityen_US
thesis.degree.levelDoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophyen_US
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