Implementation of Economic Sanctions

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dc.contributor.advisorMorgan, T. Cliftonen_US
dc.contributor.committeeMemberLeeds, Brett Ashleyen_US
dc.contributor.committeeMemberStevenson, Randolph T.en_US
dc.contributor.committeeMemberSickles, Robinen_US
dc.creatorKobayashi, Yoshiharuen_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-09-16T15:17:39Zen_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-09-16T15:17:42Zen_US
dc.date.available2013-09-16T15:17:39Zen_US
dc.date.available2013-09-16T15:17:42Zen_US
dc.date.created2013-05en_US
dc.date.issued2013-09-16en_US
dc.date.submittedMay 2013en_US
dc.date.updated2013-09-16T15:17:42Zen_US
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation investigates implementation problems in economic sanctions and how a state's concerns about policy implementation affect its decisions and the outcomes of sanctions. This study builds on the premise that sanctions are carried out by firms within a sanctioning state, not the state itself. First, using a game-theoretical model, I show that firms' non-compliance with sanction policies not only undermines the effectiveness of unilateral sanctions, but also has a counter-intuitive effect on a sanctioning state's decision to impose sanctions. The model suggests that a state is more likely to impose sanctions when it anticipates firms' non-compliance. A number of empirical implications are derived from the model and corroborated with data. Second, this study also investigates a sanctioning state's decision to sanction multilaterally or unilaterally, and how its expectations about the enforcement of sanctions influence this decision. When the enforcement of unilateral sanctions is expected to be difficult, the state is more likely to sanction multilaterally, but only when it has enough resources and the bureaucratic capability to help other states enforce their sanctions. The empirical evidence also buttresses these theoretical results. This study highlights the importance of incorporating expectations about enforcement into a full understanding of the sanctions processes. The conclusion is that states' ability to influence firms' decisions at home as well as abroad is a crucial determinant of whether they impose, how they design, and the effectiveness of sanctions.en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_US
dc.identifier.citationKobayashi, Yoshiharu. "Implementation of Economic Sanctions." (2013) Diss., Rice University. <a href="https://hdl.handle.net/1911/71975">https://hdl.handle.net/1911/71975</a>.en_US
dc.identifier.slug123456789/ETD-2013-05-511en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/71975en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.rightsCopyright is held by the author, unless otherwise indicated. Permission to reuse, publish, or reproduce the work beyond the bounds of fair use or other exemptions to copyright law must be obtained from the copyright holder.en_US
dc.subjectEconomic sanctionsen_US
dc.subjectFirmsen_US
dc.subjectEnforcementen_US
dc.subjectForeign policyen_US
dc.subjectMultilateralismen_US
dc.subjectInternational tradeen_US
dc.subjectInternational relationsen_US
dc.titleImplementation of Economic Sanctionsen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.type.materialTexten_US
thesis.degree.departmentPolitical Scienceen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineSocial Sciencesen_US
thesis.degree.grantorRice Universityen_US
thesis.degree.levelDoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophyen_US
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