Models for morality: Temporal semantics for deontic logic
| dc.contributor.advisor | Grandy, Richard E. | en_US |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | Brody, Baruch A. | en_US |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | Sistare, Christine | en_US |
| dc.creator | Hess, Stephen Andrew | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-12-18T21:34:21Z | en_US |
| dc.date.available | 2018-12-18T21:34:21Z | en_US |
| dc.date.issued | 1985 | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | This work addresses several topics in the semantics of deontic logic. In Chapter One I introduce a standard branching temporal model to serve as the basis for deontic logics and I define three tense operators. I argue that none of the three corresponds to a popular view of the 'will* operator, that the 'will' operator cannot be defined on the model provided, and finally, that the truth conditions for will are exactly those of must.1 In Chapter Two I introduce the monadic and dyadic operators ’O' and ’(-/-)' and review arguments for taking the dyadic as primitive. I show that those arguments do not prove that a dyadic operator is necessary, and that the considerations which led to its introduction are better served by defining conditional obligations with a tense operator 'will always' and the standard truth-functional connectives. I also argue that the 'set of morally acceptable worlds' which deontic semantics use should be construed as a set in which some particular agent fulfills all her obligations. In the third chapter I demonstrate how temporal semantics enable deontic logicians to choose among several formulations of the principles that what is necessary is obligatory and that what is obligatory is possible. I review arguments for rejecting the former as a principle of logic and note a problem which arises when it is rejected. In Chapter Four I demonstrate that an attempt by Richmond Thomason to relate 'dutiful' choices to morally perfect worlds on the temporal model cannot succeed. Finally, I conclude the thesis by investigating the broader implications of the results from the first four chapters. | en_US |
| dc.format.digitalOrigin | reformatted digital | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 92 pp | en_US |
| dc.identifier.callno | Thesis Phil. 1985 Hess | en_US |
| dc.identifier.citation | Hess, Stephen Andrew. "Models for morality: Temporal semantics for deontic logic." (1985) Master’s Thesis, Rice University. <a href="https://hdl.handle.net/1911/104886">https://hdl.handle.net/1911/104886</a>. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.digital | RICE2533 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1911/104886 | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
| dc.rights | Copyright is held by the author, unless otherwise indicated. Permission to reuse, publish, or reproduce the work beyond the bounds of fair use or other exemptions to copyright law must be obtained from the copyright holder. | en_US |
| dc.title | Models for morality: Temporal semantics for deontic logic | en_US |
| dc.type | Thesis | en_US |
| dc.type.material | Text | en_US |
| thesis.degree.department | Philosophy | en_US |
| thesis.degree.discipline | Humanities | en_US |
| thesis.degree.grantor | Rice University | en_US |
| thesis.degree.level | Masters | en_US |
| thesis.degree.name | Master of Arts | en_US |
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