Essays on Fair Division and Monopoly Pricing

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dc.contributor.advisorDudey, Marcen_US
dc.contributor.committeeMemberTang, Xunen_US
dc.contributor.committeeMemberVeech, Williamen_US
dc.creatorLi, Jinen_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-01-25T15:22:32Zen_US
dc.date.available2016-01-25T15:22:32Zen_US
dc.date.created2015-12en_US
dc.date.issued2015-11-10en_US
dc.date.submittedDecember 2015en_US
dc.date.updated2016-01-25T15:22:32Zen_US
dc.description.abstractThe first chapter is based on a paper with Jingyi Xue in fair division problems. In this chapter, we consider the problem of fairly dividing a finite number of divisible goods among agents with the generalized Leontief preferences. We propose and characterize the class of generalized egalitarian rules which satisfy efficiency, group strategy-proofness, anonymity, resource monotonicity, population monotonicity, envy-freeness and consistency. On the Leontief domain, our rules generalize the egalitarian-equivalent rules with reference bundles. We also extend our rules to agent-specific and endowment-specific egalitarian rules. The former is a larger class of rules satisfying all the previous properties except anonymity and envy-freeness. The latter is a class of efficient, group strategy-proof, anonymous and individually rational rules when the resources are assumed to be privately owned. The second chapter is about monopoly pricing with social learning. In this chapter, we consider a two-period monopolistic model in which the consumers who purchase in the first period would reveal the unknown quality of the product through their experiences to the consumers in the second period. Due to this effect, some consumers would strategically choose to delay to the second period in order to take this informational free-ride. We show that there always exists a unique symmetric equilibrium of consumers for each price set by the monopolist. Then we further investigate the seller’s optimization pricing problem. In a range of moderate patience, the seller would be likely to induce the consumers to effectively transmit information. We also discuss the impact of information disclosure on the monopolistic profit.en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_US
dc.identifier.citationLi, Jin. "Essays on Fair Division and Monopoly Pricing." (2015) Diss., Rice University. <a href="https://hdl.handle.net/1911/88086">https://hdl.handle.net/1911/88086</a>.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/88086en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.rightsCopyright is held by the author, unless otherwise indicated. Permission to reuse, publish, or reproduce the work beyond the bounds of fair use or other exemptions to copyright law must be obtained from the copyright holder.en_US
dc.subjectFair Divisionen_US
dc.subjectEgalitarian Rulesen_US
dc.subjectLeontief Preferencesen_US
dc.subjectSocial Choiceen_US
dc.subjectExchange Economiesen_US
dc.subjectIndustrial Organizationen_US
dc.subjectMonopolyen_US
dc.subjectSocial Learningen_US
dc.subjectIncomplete Informationen_US
dc.titleEssays on Fair Division and Monopoly Pricingen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.type.materialTexten_US
thesis.degree.departmentEconomicsen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineSocial Sciencesen_US
thesis.degree.grantorRice Universityen_US
thesis.degree.levelDoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophyen_US
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