This dissertation argues for the presence of a basic capacity for norm cognition in human psychology, and explores the possibility of norm cognition in non-human animals. A central aim of the dissertation is to challenge the view that norm cognition must involve the deployment of well-developed metarepresentational abilities, i.e., theory of mind (“ToM”). I argue on largely empirical grounds that this is false, thereby opening up the possibility of normative thought in non-human animals that lack ToM abilities.

The argument starts by motivating a picture of norm cognition that has been advanced by philosophers partly on the basis of findings in empirical moral psychology. This picture leaves it open whether norm cognition involves ToM. I offer further support for this model by (a) pointing to a broad consensus that norm cognition plays a role in explaining the emergence of large-scale cooperation, and (b) arguing that norm cognition is involved in pretend play during early childhood. I then argue directly on empirical grounds that norm cognition does not require ToM abilities.

Altogether, the evidence indicates that to think and guide one’s actions according to norms or normative attitudes needn’t be a matter of explicit self-reflection. However, the role hypothesized for norm cognition in securing large-scale cooperation among humans suggests that the ability to recognize norms is most likely to take hold as a robust, stable psychological trait only in populations whose members are capable of ToM at some stage of development. I close by exploring the possibility of norm cognition in non-human animals against this backdrop, and identify possible sources of relevant evidence.