Essays on strategyproofness in cooperative production

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dc.contributor.advisorMoulin, Herveen_US
dc.creatorLeroux, Justin Theodoreen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-06-04T06:51:30Zen_US
dc.date.available2009-06-04T06:51:30Zen_US
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.description.abstractWe study incentive compatible profit-sharing rules when output (or profit) is obtained via the joint use of a technology exhibiting decreasing marginal returns. The incentives compatibility criterion we adopt is that of strategy-proofness (SP), arguably the most robust and the most demanding incentives requirement. We first show that no strategy-proof mechanism is efficient. We then characterize the class of strategy-proof mechanisms in the two-agent case, and show that it is the union of the serial and reverse serial families of sharing rules. Moreover, SP and the requirement that no individual benefits from the presence of others (the familiar stand-alone test) characterize the class of rules known as fixed path methods (FPMs), which is a subset of the serial family. FPMs share marginal increments of input, and the corresponding increments of output, along a predetermined path. Finally, we consider a situation where a number of individuals form a partnership and contribute capital and labor to the enterprise. We propose a strategy-proof mechanism which improves upon autarky: the inverse marginal product proportions (IMPP) mechanism. At the margin, capital that would be left idle in autarky, but not under the efficient use of the total capital, is assigned to the agents with relatively low disutility of effort in proportion to the relative productivity of their own capital. The IMPP mechanism is effectively an FPM whose path is uniquely determined by the capital contributions of the partners. Thus, we establish a correspondence between the class of FPMs to manage a common property technology and the family of partnership problems. We discuss the appeal of the IMPP mechanism as an alternative to existing profit-sharing schemes in professional partnerships.en_US
dc.format.extent46 p.en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_US
dc.identifier.callnoTHESIS ECON. 2005 LEROUXen_US
dc.identifier.citationLeroux, Justin Theodore. "Essays on strategyproofness in cooperative production." (2005) Diss., Rice University. <a href="https://hdl.handle.net/1911/18852">https://hdl.handle.net/1911/18852</a>.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/18852en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.rightsCopyright is held by the author, unless otherwise indicated. Permission to reuse, publish, or reproduce the work beyond the bounds of fair use or other exemptions to copyright law must be obtained from the copyright holder.en_US
dc.subjectEconomic theoryen_US
dc.titleEssays on strategyproofness in cooperative productionen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.type.materialTexten_US
thesis.degree.departmentEconomicsen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineSocial Sciencesen_US
thesis.degree.grantorRice Universityen_US
thesis.degree.levelDoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophyen_US
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