Essays in strategic cost sharing

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dc.contributor.advisorMoulin, Herveen_US
dc.creatorJuarez, Rubenen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-06-03T19:56:14Zen_US
dc.date.available2009-06-03T19:56:14Zen_US
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.description.abstractA mechanism elicits the monetary valuations from the agents for getting a unit of good (or service), allocates some goods to some agents and charge some money only to the agents who are served. We study welfare and incentive compatibility properties of these mechanisms. We compare two familiar mechanisms in an economy with increasing marginal cost, random priority (RP) and average cost (AC). We find that RP unambiguously performs better than AC using the worst-absolute surplus loss measure. In similar economies, we characterize the mechanisms that, are immune to coordinated misreports of any group of agents and provide optimal mechanisms for different shapes of cost functions using the worst absolute surplus loss.en_US
dc.format.extent139 p.en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_US
dc.identifier.callnoTHESIS ECON. 2008 JUAREZen_US
dc.identifier.citationJuarez, Ruben. "Essays in strategic cost sharing." (2008) Diss., Rice University. <a href="https://hdl.handle.net/1911/22268">https://hdl.handle.net/1911/22268</a>.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/22268en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.rightsCopyright is held by the author, unless otherwise indicated. Permission to reuse, publish, or reproduce the work beyond the bounds of fair use or other exemptions to copyright law must be obtained from the copyright holder.en_US
dc.subjectEconomic theoryen_US
dc.titleEssays in strategic cost sharingen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.type.materialTexten_US
thesis.degree.departmentEconomicsen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineSocial Sciencesen_US
thesis.degree.grantorRice Universityen_US
thesis.degree.levelDoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophyen_US
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