Essays on Asset Pricing

dc.contributor.advisorBack, Kerry E.en_US
dc.contributor.committeeMemberXing, Yuhangen_US
dc.contributor.committeeMemberButler, Alexander W.en_US
dc.contributor.committeeMemberLoch-Temzelides, Ted P.en_US
dc.creatorLiu, Ruomengen_US
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-17T16:06:04Zen_US
dc.date.available2019-05-17T16:06:04Zen_US
dc.date.created2018-08en_US
dc.date.issued2018-08-01en_US
dc.date.submittedAugust 2018en_US
dc.date.updated2019-05-17T16:06:04Zen_US
dc.description.abstractThis dissertation studies asset pricing from three perspectives. The first chapter takes the view of a long-run buy-and-hold investor, and offers an an explanation to prominent cross-sectional return anomalies. A commonality shared by these anomalies is that their returns are negatively correlated with the market. I show that this negative covariance implicitly embeds the mispricing of the CAPM beta -- the first and one of the most robust asset pricing puzzles -- in these cross-sectional anomalies. Taking into account the exposure to the beta mispricing either attenuates or eliminates the economic and statistical significance of risk-adjusted returns to a large set of asset pricing puzzles. Given the presence of well-documented cross-sectional return anomalies, the second chapter examines whether and how institutional investors trade to profit, and thereby to mitigate these anomalies. Consistent with the literature, I find that institutions in aggregate do not trade to take advantage of most of these cross-sectional return predictabilities. However, I present evidence that institutions in fact correctly trade to capture the beta risk-premium when and only when it is present in the market. Findings support the view that institutions are the more rational set of investors that seem to capture and correct mispricing caused by opportunistic noise trading. The third chapter takes a closer look at one particular type of asset markets -- the over-the-counter (OTC) markets, and analyzes how trade disclosure impacts market participants' optimal game-strategic behaviors. My co-authors and I show that mandatory trade disclosure makes a market intermediary engage in costly signaling, which reduces transaction prices for investors and equivalently rent per transaction for the intermediary. Investors as a result benefit, and are more likely to trade. The intermediary, however, could benefit too if the increase in trading volume is sufficient to offset the reduction in rent per transaction.en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_US
dc.identifier.citationLiu, Ruomeng. "Essays on Asset Pricing." (2018) Diss., Rice University. <a href="https://hdl.handle.net/1911/105838">https://hdl.handle.net/1911/105838</a>.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1911/105838en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.rightsCopyright is held by the author, unless otherwise indicated. Permission to reuse, publish, or reproduce the work beyond the bounds of fair use or other exemptions to copyright law must be obtained from the copyright holder.en_US
dc.subjectAsset pricingen_US
dc.subjectcross-sectional returnsen_US
dc.subjectinstitutional tradingen_US
dc.subjectOTC marketsen_US
dc.titleEssays on Asset Pricingen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
dc.type.materialTexten_US
thesis.degree.departmentFinanceen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineBusinessen_US
thesis.degree.grantorRice Universityen_US
thesis.degree.levelDoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophyen_US
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