How do targeted governments respond to economic sanctions? This dissertation contributes to the literature on sanctions effectiveness and, more specifically, on target governments’ strategies for mitigating the costs of sanctions. I argue that once sanctions are imposed, the target government becomes inward-looking and focuses on adapting its domestic and foreign policies to survive sanctions. Each chapter examines specific policies designed to address potential losses in the financing, international standing and engagement, and domestic political support for the regime. The main findings suggest that target governments change their spending and borrowing patterns as they face a drop in revenue associated with economic restrictions. Furthermore, they tend to engage more actively with international organizations to maintain their international standing as part of their foreign policy. Finally, target governments intensify state propaganda to ensure their political survival, and the official narrative may be immune to counterpropaganda from sanction senders and other foreign actors. Together, these findings show that target states change their policies to restore core aspects of the pre-sanctions status quo, and senders should pay attention to these complex processes.