R-3 Repository :: Browsing by Author "Wilson, Rick K."

Browsing by Author "Wilson, Rick K."

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Abraham Lincoln's Northwestern Approach to the Secession Crisis
(2013-09-16) Bischoff, Sarah; Boles, John B.; McDaniel, W. Caleb; Wilson, Rick K.; Walther, Eric H.
While the migration of Abraham Lincoln’s family to the Northwest has often been documented as a significant event of his youth, historians have neglected the powerful repercussions this family decision had on Lincoln’s assessment of the South and the secession crisis in 1860 and 1861. Lincoln’s years living and working in the Northwest from 1831 to 1861 exposed him to the anti–slave system ethos of that region’s southern-born migrants. Sensitive to the restraints they believed the social system of slavery placed upon their own liberties, these former southerners simultaneously despised the slave system, hated African Americans, and sympathized with white slaveholders and nonslaveholders who remained in the South. After building his initial sense of southern society from these migrants, Lincoln spent his years as a U.S. congressman learning the significance of the Northwest Ordinance in creating the free society in which they had thrived. Emphasizing Thomas Jefferson’s role in conceiving the Northwest Ordinance and utilizing statistical evidence to prove the superiority of free soil over slave, Lincoln’s colleagues further expanded Lincoln’s conception of the South. All these influences combined to produce Lincoln’s uniquely northwestern approach to slavery, the South, and the secession crisis. Believing that the self-interest of white nonslaveholding southerners naturally propelled them away from the South and toward free society, Lincoln perceived the slave South as a vastly unequal society controlled by a minority of aristocratic slaveholders who cajoled or chided their nonslaveholding neighbors into accepting a vision of the South’s proslavery, expansionist future. As president-elect, Lincoln therefore overestimated the Unionist sentiment of southerners before and during the secession crisis. He remained convinced that the majority of white nonslaveholders would not support a secessionist movement that he believed countered their own self-interest. With time, and through careful communications with the South, he remained convinced that he could settle secessionist passions and bring southerners to trust him and the Republican Party. This northwestern perception of the South therefore explains, in part, Lincoln’s silence and his refusal to compromise during the secession crisis.
Anger In Action: The Role of Emotions, Competition, and Threat on Mobilization
(2012-09-05) Phan, Ngoc; Wilson, Rick K.; Alford, John R.; Stein, Robert M.; George, Jennifer M.
Research Question: Anger is believed to be a powerful motivator of group mobilization. The objective of this dissertation is to examine the role of anger in assisting individuals to overcome the collective action problem. Theory: I utilize Intergroup Emotional Theory in order to build and test hypotheses on when and how anger will lead to mobilization. Methods: I test my hypotheses through four experiments. Experiment 1 examines how individual level anger impacts mobilization. In Experiment 2, I implement a test to induce anger towards an out-group. In Experiment 3, I then examine how anger towards an out-group impacts mobilization under the contexts of threat and competition. In Experiment 4, I look at different threatening contexts and how anger towards an out-group, limited information, and discrimination all work together to impact mobilization. Results: In Experiment 1, I found that when an angry subject is asked to take action in a task unrelated to that anger, the subject fails to mobilize. In Experiment 2, I built and tested two experimental manipulations of out-group anger and was successful in inducing anger directed towards an out-group. Having successfully induced out-group anger, Experiment 3 then demonstrated that out-group anger increases mobilization under competition, but not under threat. The mobilizing effects of out-group anger was limited under threat because subjects also felt angry towards their own in-group. Lastly, I reexamine different variations of threat on mobilization. I attempt to reduce increases in in-group anger by limiting information and discriminating against the angry group, but as I stack the deck against the angry group, they responded by mobilizing less. Conclusions: The potential for anger to mobilize may be contingent upon the level of out-group and in-group anger within a group. These findings collectively shed light on how out-group anger can either facilitate action or lead to inaction.
Can I Rely on You?
(MDPI, 2018) Aksoy, Billur; Eckel, Catherine C.; Wilson, Rick K.
This paper introduces a strategic element into the dictator game by allowing recipients to select their dictator. Recipients are presented with the photographs of two dictators and the envelopes containing their allocations, and are then asked to select which dictator’s gift they would like to receive. The recipient is paid the contents of the envelope they select. The photographs carry information about the gender and race/ethnicity of the dictators, and we ask an independent sample of raters to evaluate the photographs for other characteristics. While gender and ethnicity do not affect the recipient’s choice, one characteristic inferred from the photos makes them significantly more likely to be selected: Their perceived reliability.
Charity Begins at Home: A Lab-in-the-Field Experiment on Charitable Giving
(MDPI, 2018) Eckel, Catherine C.; Priday, Benjamin A.; Wilson, Rick K.
Charities operate at different levels: national, state, or local. We test the effect of the level of the organization on charitable giving in a sample of adults in two Texas communities. Subjects make four charitable giving “dictator game” decisions from a fixed amount of money provided by the experimenter. Three decisions target different charitable organizations, all of which have a disaster-relief mission, but differ in the level of operation. The fourth targets an individual recipient, identified by the local fire department as a victim of a fire. One of the four is selected randomly for payment. Giving is significantly higher to national and local organizations compared to state. We find a higher propensity to donate and larger amount donated to the individual relative to all organizations. Subsequent analysis compares a number of demographic and attitudinal covariates with donations to specific charities. In a second decision, subjects instead indicate which of their four prior decisions they would most prefer to implement. Here we see that a majority of subjects prefer the gift to the individual.
Coercion and residence: Modeling coproduction and its impact on neighborhood safety evaluations
(1985) McKean, Mike (Michael L.); Stein, Robert M.; Wilson, Rick K.; Mieszkowski, Peter
Diseconomies of scale and other constraints make it difficult for urban governments to provide adequately some public goods and services. One such service is community safety. But citizen coproduction, through such activities as crime patrols, can enhance supply. Proponents of urban decentralization suggest coproduction at the neighborhood level can lead to more efficient AND more equitable service delivery. But successful coproduction requires coercion and/or selective incentives for individuals to overcome the free-rider problem. The determinants of coercive capacity can be distributed in a decidedly inequitable fashion. This paper examines the case of Houston-area neighborhood associations and concludes such associations CAN effectively improve neighborhood safety through coproduction, but at the price of equity. Socio-economic status, home ownership, and length of neighborhood residence influence an association's coercive capacity. This capacity, in conjunction with residential location, influences perceptions of neighborhood safety, an indirect measure of coproductive output.
Confronting bias: How targets and allies can address prejudice against gay men in the workplace
(2012-09-05) Martinez, Larry; Hebl, Michelle R.; Beier, Margaret E.; Cornwell, John M.; Wilson, Rick K.
While many organizations have taken steps to protect minority individuals from the negative effects of prejudice and discrimination, such initiatives may be met with limited success. That is, prejudice and discrimination may remain major problems even with organizations who adopt organizational policies to enhance equity and reduce workplace discrimination. This dissertation examines the use of an individual-level strategy that individuals can enact in response to prejudice and/or discrimination, and that is the strategy of directly confronting the prejudice of their co-workers. This study examines the utility of confronting co-workers in the workplace with particular emphasis on the cognitions, attitudes, and behavioral intentions of third-party bystanders following witnessing a confrontation. I anticipated that the identity of the confronter (a member of the target group or an ally) and the level of conflict (high or low conflict) as well as the type of conflict (aggressive vs. calm, and personalized to the individual vs. generalized to society as a whole) in the confrontation would differentially impact outcome variables. Indeed, the results suggest that allies (versus targets) who confront elicit more positive behavioral intentions from observers to enact such strategies in the future; that high conflict (either aggressive or personalized) confrontations elicit more negative cognitions, attitudes, and behavioral intentions than do low conflict confrontations; and that targets and allies who confront have the most impact on third-party individuals if they utilize different strategies. Specifically, allies received particularly negative ratings when they confronted in an aggressive and personalized manner (compared to the other three strategies) and targets received relatively negative ratings only when confronting in an aggressive manner. These results held true in data obtained several weeks later. This research assesses the practicality of using confrontation as a prejudice-reduction tool and potentially informs future diversity management initiatives in organizations.
Does cronyism pay? Costly ingroup favoritism in the lab
(Wiley, 2022) Banuri,Sheheryar; Eckel, Catherine; Wilson, Rick K.
Cronyism in firms arises when favoritism toward an ingroup affects personnel decisions. Two main motives underlie cronyism: profit, if an ingroup employee works harder; or altruism, if used to transfer resources. In a lab-experiment trust game with naturally-occurring groups, an employer (proposer) faces an employee (responder) who is or is not an ingroup member. We see that both motives play a role. Cronyism is more likely from employers who are more altruistic to the ingroup in a dictator game; and even low-productivity (by design) ingroup members reciprocate trust generously. Cronyism pays for those who engage in it.
Dynamic Treatments of Heterogeneity
(2014-04-23) Dinh, Trang; Sickles, Robin C.; Diamond, John W.; Wilson, Rick K.
In this thesis we are interested in how unobserved heterogeneity of agents affects the predictions from several different classical dynamic models that are widely used in economics. First, we capture heterogeneity in users’ preferences in order to obtain a better prediction for their movie ratings as our solution for the Netflix Prize competition. Our method combines user-based and item (movie) based methods in a spatial regression framework. Next, we introduce heterogeneous income profiles in a model of housing choices where households have options of renting, buying a house, and/or keeping the old house (if they already have one). While most lifecycle models of consumption and saving assume that individuals are ex-ante identical and face the same income process, we allow for the more realistic setting where each individual faces a different income process. We next investigate lifetime saving and investing behaviors of US households using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to detect changes in those behaviors due to retirement. Addressing heterogeneity in households’ saving and investing decision is essential in order to separate the aging effect from the household and cohort effect.
Group-Level Selection Increases Cooperation in the Public Goods Game
(Public Library of Science, 2016) Eckel, Catherine C.; Fatas, Enrique; Godoy, Sara; Wilson, Rick K.
When groups compete for resources, some groups will be more successful than others, forcing out less successful groups. Group-level selection is the most extreme form of group competition, where the weaker group ceases to exist, becoming extinct. We implement group-level selection in a controlled laboratory experiment in order to study its impact on human cooperation. The experiment uses variations on the standard linear public goods game. Group-level selection operates through competition for survival: the least successful, lowest-earning groups become extinct, in the sense that they no longer are able to play the game. Additional control treatments include group comparison without extinction, and extinction of the least successful individuals across groups. We find that group-level extinction produces very high contributions to the provision of the public good, while group comparison alone or individual extinction fail to cause higher contributions. Our results provide stark evidence that group-level selection enhances within-group cooperation.
Group-Level Selection Increases Cooperation in the Public Goods Game
(Public Library of Science, 2016) Eckel, Catherine C.; Fatas, Enrique; Godoy, Sara; Wilson, Rick K.
When groups compete for resources, some groups will be more successful than others, forcing out less successful groups. Group-level selection is the most extreme form of group competition, where the weaker group ceases to exist, becoming extinct. We implement group-level selection in a controlled laboratory experiment in order to study its impact on human cooperation. The experiment uses variations on the standard linear public goods game. Group-level selection operates through competition for survival: the least successful, lowest-earning groups become extinct, in the sense that they no longer are able to play the game. Additional control treatments include group comparison without extinction, and extinction of the least successful individuals across groups. We find that group-level extinction produces very high contributions to the provision of the public good, while group comparison alone or individual extinction fail to cause higher contributions. Our results provide stark evidence that group-level selection enhances within-group cooperation.
Information and leadership in laboratory and field
(1998) Rhodes, Carl Michael; Wilson, Rick K.
An explanation of leadership within a particular class of institutions is developed. The institutions of interest are non-hierarchical, endow their leaders with few formal powers, and are hampered by principal-agent problems. The explanation proceeds in two stages. First, game-theoretic models of leaders and followers engaged in two social dilemmas are developed. The models define leaders as the set of actors who can send cheap-talk signals to a group of followers. Leadership occurs when followers, recognizing that their chances of success without a leader are slim, choose to voluntarily accept a leader's advice. The models highlight the importance of the underlying social dilemma, either a coordination or collective action problem, as well as the leader's reputation for motive and competence. Second, hypotheses are derived from the models and are tested under laboratory and field conditions. The experimental results demonstrate that leaders are remarkably adept at solving simple coordination problems, provided that followers have sufficient confidence in the leaders' reputation for motive and competence. The effectiveness of leadership decreases, however, in collective action problems. In these settings, followers are often unwilling to take the risk that is inherent in following a leader's advice. Roll call data from the U.S. Senate are used to check if the experimental findings extend to a real-life setting. The data suggest that the models and laboratory evidence possess considerable levels of external validity.
Institutional change: The Mexican Chamber of Deputies
(1998) Teeters Reynolds, Holly Susanne; Wilson, Rick K.
This research investigates the linkage between political change and legislative institutional change in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies since 1970. A series of electoral reforms beginning in 1977 allowed the opposition parties to increase their Chamber representation. How were issues of internal organization resolved in the new political context of strengthened opposition conflict? How did these institutional changes affect the Chamber activity? In contrast to the efficiency and specialization perspective from Organization Theory, the theoretical approach to these questions directs attention to how members try to shape the legislative structure and rules to advantage themselves. In this research, I track the institutional and behavioral changes in the Chamber floor and committee system since 1970 with an interrupted time series design. These political and institutional changes reflect the power and strategic interaction between the opposition and ruling majority party, PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party). The majority party restricted the institutional rules and structures in the early post-reform legislatures until the opposition increased to an average of 41% of the seats in the 1988-97 legislatures. Then, the opposition parties were able to force some institutional changes to allow them more political space. Currently, the opposition holds a majority in the Chamber and has capitalized on the gradual changes that have been taking place since the late 1970s.
Legislative decision-making under multiple referral
(1994) Young, Garry; Wilson, Rick K.
A large proportion of the most important legislation considered by the U.S. House of Representatives is now referred to more than one committee. This study examines the impact that multiple referral has had on committee, party, and leadership relations in the House. Using spatial theory, legislative outcomes are compared under varying conditions including types of referrals, restrictions on floor amendments, and opportunities for obstruction and discharge. Central to the study is a consideration of the role of the majority party leadership. A model is developed that includes the Speaker who controls procedure. A number of empirical implications of the models are analyzed as well. These include a consideration of the relative obstructiveness of committees given referral conditions, the choice of restrictive versus non-restrictive amendment rules, and the choice of referral conditions by the Speaker.
Reaping gains through the organizational party: Delegation to party leaders of the United States House of Representatives
(1997) Posler, Brian David; Wilson, Rick K.
Why do House members delegate authority to party leaders? This dissertation provides a new theory to address this question. It explains why it is individually and collectively rational for congressional members to delegate authority to party leaders, when we ought to expect that delegation will occur, as well as what form of delegation provides maximum benefit with minimal risk to members. This dissertation provides a new principal-agent theory of variable leadership involvement, progressive in nature across the stages of legislation as the risks of defection diminish. Members minimize the risks of delegation though screening and selection mechanisms, as well as through institutional checks throughout the legislative process. This work empirically tests and finds support for the predictions derived from the agency theory at four distinct stages of the legislative process. Leadership selection, bill introduction and referral, party scheduling with the Rules Committee, and conference committees are all found to conform to the hypotheses generated by this framework. The powers of the leadership are cumulative in nature as one passes through the stages of legislation. By severely curtailing the powers of leaders at earlier stages, the risk of adverse results is greatly minimized, allowing the members to safely delegate more authority to save the exponentially increasing transaction costs borne by leaders in the later stages.
The Mechanisms of Proactive Interference and Their Relationship with Working Memory
(2012-09-05) Glaser, Yi; Martin, Randi C.; Byrne, Michael D.; Wilson, Rick K.; Basak, Chandramallika; Beauchamp, Michael S.
Working memory (WM) capacity – the capacity to maintain and manipulate information in mind – plays an essential role in high-level cognitive functions. An important determinant of WM capacity is the ability to resolve interference of previously encoded but no longer relevant information (proactive interference: PI). Four different mechanisms of PI resolution involving binding and inhibition have been proposed in the literature, although debate continues regarding their role. Braver et al. (2007) introduced an important distinction in the PI resolution literature, proposing two general types of PI control mechanisms that occur at different time points: proactive control (involves preparation in advance of the interference) and reactive control (occurs after interference occurs). This thesis proposed that among these four functions involving binding and inhibition, item inhibition and binding could be involved in proactive control, while familiarity inhibition and episodic inhibition could be involved in reactive control. The question is which mechanism in each pair is indeed involved in proactive control and reactive control respectively, and how these proactive control and reactive control mechanisms work together to resolve PI. In addition, do these mechanisms play a role in the relationship between PI resolution and WM? In an individual differences study, individuals’ ability to resolve PI was assessed in memory tasks, with two versions of each that encouraged the use of either proactive or reactive control. In addition, measures were obtained of individuals’ ability of binding and inhibition in tasks that had minimal memory demands. Regression analyses showed contributions of binding and inhibition to PI resolution and WM. Moreover, these functions are responsible for the correlation between PI resolution and WM. In a neuroimaging study, the neural basis of proactive control was examined by comparing two memory tasks that differed in their demand on binding and inhibition. In addition, the brain regions engaged in reactive control was examined by contrasting trials involving interference or not. The thesis showed that item inhibition carried out by the left inferior frontal cortex (IFC) is involved in proactive control while episodic inhibition carried out by the left IFC and the posterior parietal cortex is involved in reactive control.
The Nature and Ethical Significance of Manipulation
(2013-06-11) Gorin, Moti; Brody, Baruch; Sher, George; Wilson, Rick K.
What distinguishes manipulative interpersonal influence from non-manipulative influence? When is it wrong to manipulate a person and what makes it wrong? I articulate a novel account according to which interpersonal manipulation is a process of influence that deliberately fails to track reasons. To manipulate a reasons-responsive person is to render her detached from an important aspect of reality, namely, her reasons or the considerations that ought to govern her behavior. This is what makes manipulation pro tanto morally impermissible (when it is). My account of manipulation provides a helpful framework for thinking through some of the philosophically neglected ethical issues arising out the application of social scientific research on human decision making in the domains of health care and public policy.
Using social norms to explain giving behavior
(Springer Nature, 2023) Eckel, Catherine C.; Hoover, Hanna G.; Krupka, Erin L.; Sinha, Nishita; Wilson, Rick K.
Transfers of resources in dictator games vary significantly by the characteristics of recipients. We focus on social norms and demonstrate that variation in the recipient changes both giving and injunctive norms and may offer an explanation for differences in giving. We elicit generosity using dictator games, and social norms using incentivized coordination games, with two different recipient types: an anonymous student and a charitable organization. A within-subjects design ensures that other factors are held constant. Our results show that differences in giving behavior are closely related to differences in social norms of giving across contexts. Controlling for individual differences in beliefs about the norm, subjects do not weight compliance with the norms in the student recipient or charity recipient dictator game differently. These results suggest that the impact of context on giving co-occurs with an impact on social norms.

Browsing by Author "Wilson, Rick K."

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