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Browsing by Author "Vandiver, Frank E."

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A History of the Texas sugar cane industry with special reference to Brazoria County
(1969) Watts, Sandra Lee; Vandiver, Frank E.
Sugar cane was a well-known crop to planters in the Texas counties of Brazoria, Fort Bend, Matagorda, and Wharton. Introduced during the 1820's, sugar cane appealed to countless planters. For a crop that demanded large of amounts of capital and labor, sugar spread rapidly. Planters through trial and error perfected the processes of cultivation and manufacturing. By planning, Texas sugar growers eliminated the obstacles of markets, transportation, and credit. By 1850, sugar was well established as an important staple of Texas The decade of the fifties witnessed the gradual decline of the Texas sugar industry. Deflated prices reduced profits while bad weather reduced output. Natural disaster struck seven times during the decade. Planters eager to regain losses abandoned sugar for cotton. The Civil War nearly obliterated the Texas cane industry. Wartime conditions prevented profitable marketing of the crop, and emancipation produced a chronic shortage of labor. Although yields were low and profits nonexistent, the industry managed to survive the postwar period. The sugar industry of the 1880's established itself along new lines. The old plantations were incorporated into large business establishments, while the Negro laborer was replaced by the convict. Incorporation and the convict labor system stimulated renewed interest and growth in the industry. The State of Texas became one of the largest producers of cane during this period. Despite these developments, the sugar cane industry failed in Texas. Capital and labor played a key role in its disintegration, but in the final analysis weather was the most decisive cause of failure.
Allied associates: the relationship between Field-marshal Sir Douglas Haig and General John J. Pershing
(1979) Cavin, Deborah C.; Vandiver, Frank E.; Matusow, Allen J.; Drew, Katherine F.
Born less than a year apart, Douglas Haig and John J. Pershing were destined to command the armies of their respective nations during the largest conflict the world had yet witnessed. The American seemed an unlikely candidate for such a high position, since he was not the scion of a prestigious or wealthy family, and since he came to soldiering only that he might obtain a college education. Haig, on the other hand, as a younger son of wealthy parents, followed a typical British pattern in choosing the military as a career. Both men served with distinction as young officers in a number of posts throughout the world. They were promoted because of ability and hard work, but each one managed to make influential friends and a helpful marriage along the way. Upon assuming command of the American Expeditionary Forces, Pershing was troubled by jealousy among his rivals, particularly Generals Leonard Wood and Peyton March. But he was steadfastly supported by his superiors, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker and President Woodrow Wilson. They gave him the backing necessary to establish the American Army as a "separate entity" in France, when the Allies continually pleaded for the amalgamation of U. S. troops with British and French units. Replacing Sir John French as Commander-in-Chief as 1916 dawned, Haig also faced enemies at home. Lord French became friendly with Prime Minister David Lloyd George, Haig's bitterest critic, who would gladly have replaced him if he had felt it possible to do so. In George V, however, Sir Douglas had a loyal friend, and the Chief of Imperial General Staff Sir William Robertson was also a staunch ally who guarded Haig's interests against political backbiting. That Britain and the United States emerged closer than before from World War I was due in no small measure to the cordial relations that existed between their army commanders. The friendship which developed between Pershing and Haig was based on several factors: similar ideals about proper professional behavior, discipline, and duty; pride in a common Anglo-Saxon heritage; trust in one another and a joint distrust of the French. Each man thought the other sincere, if sometimes misguided, so that they were able to rise above disagreements concerning not only amalgamation, but also training methods, British shipping plans, supreme command, and the withdrawal of American troops from the British sector as the final offensive began. After the war, the two commanders continued their correspondence, and each worked to cement the friendship between their two nations. Haig, retired but busy with his work for veterans, died in 1928, while Pershing, as Chief of Staff, reorganized the American Army and even lived to see their war "re-fought." At the Great War's end, Pershing and Haig had said, respectively, that the Allies should either push for unconditional surrender or else construct a lenient peace that would not totally humiliate Germany. World War II was due partly to the shortsightedness of the politicians in ignoring the advice of the two commanders. Britain and the United States were not spared another war, but the efforts of the military men nevertheless bore fruit. Pershing had learned much about organization from his British mentor, and he incorporated that knowledge into the post-war U. S. Army structure. And unity of command was not a foreign concept in World War II, since the commanders had struggled with it twenty years earlier. Finally, the friendship between Haig and Pershing served as an example for the two democracies which needed all their joint resources to defeat an aggressive Germany once again.
Amalgamation: a critical issue in British-American command relations, 1917-1918
(1973) DeFrancisco, Joseph Emil; Vandiver, Frank E.
War is a function of autocracy. How, then does a democracy fight a war? In the final analysis each democratic government must find its own answer. World War I provides an example of how two democracies, fighting on the same side, chose different solutions. In Great Britain direction of the war initially was in the hands of the Cabinet. Acting on advice from political and military leaders, the Cabinet dictated military policy. When this system proved inadequate, Britain was forced through a series of governmental changes in order to find an effective instrument of war direction. The machinations of David Lloyd George provide a vehicle to study the evolution of the British Government throughout the war. His quest for control of strategic policy, both before and during his premiership, underlines the mutual distrust that existed between Britain's politicians and her generals. Only after a bitter struggle did Lloyd George succeed in wresting control of strategic policy from his military advisers. Circumstances in America were quite different. Under the constitution of the United States, policy and strategy are vested essentially in one man, the president. Determined to keep the political ends of the war distinct from its military prosecution, Woodrow Wilson delegated complete authority in military affairs to his Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker. Baker in turn delegated the same authority to General John J. Pershing. Hence, the direction of America's strategic efforts was placed squarely on the shoulders of the commander of the American Expeditionary Forces. Throughout the first fifteen months of America's participation in the war, no problem caused Pershing greater concern, or took up more of his time, than the controversy over the use of American troops. Pershing was determined to follow his orders to constitute an independent army. The British were convinced that before Pershing could form an army, the war would be lost. The basic problem was simple. To build an American Army Pershing needed British shipping; to defeat Germany Britain needed American manpower. Early in the debate Pershing learned that dealing with British generals was only a preliminary step. Though they might outrank Pershing, they did not have power commensurate with his authority from Washington. Consequently the American field commander had to negotiate with Britain's leading political officials as well as her leading generals. Tainted by his relationship with his own generals, Lloyd George resented and misunderstood Pershing's massive authority. The British Prime Minister continually appealed to Washington to overrule Pershing's decisions on the use of American troops. Pershing, meanwhile, with the full support of his Government, followed strictly his design to build an independent American Army. The controversy over amalgamation, therefore, becomes a prism through which to view the spectrum of British-American command relations.
Canada versus Guadeloupe in Britain's old colonial empire: a study of George Louis Beer's interpretation of the Peace of Paris of 1763
(1960) Bellot, Leland Joseph; Auten, John H.; Vandiver, Frank E.
Charleston: a city in rebellion, 1861-1865
(1966) Wakelyn, Catherine Carl; Vandiver, Frank E.
How does a wartime city react under stress? This thesis seeks to answer this question» using the city of Charleston» South Carolina, during the years of the Civil War, as a test case. Although Charleston was in no sense a "typical" Southern city, the ability of its citizens to progress from a naive to a sophisticated concept of resistance, as well as to relax antebellum class distinctions, exemplifies the changes wrought by the Civil War on a relatively static society. This history of Charleston is primarily a descriptive narrative, employing a topical method of discussion within a chronological frame¬ work. Its dual themes are those of action and reaction (with respect to both civil and military events), and of continuity and change within the social and institutional structure. The first chapter demonstrates the continuity of local sentiment from secession to civil war, while the remaining chapters illustrate the reinforcement of this original sentiment in both the resistance and the rhetoric of the war years. At the same time, they show how local military incidents compelled the citizens to understand and accept more mature ideas of warfare and, in some cases, to moderate and modify their original war aims. Above all, the thesis as a whole details the commonality of suffering in a war-torn city.
Coalition for total war: Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig and Entente military cooperation, 1916-1918
(1970) Griffiths, William Richard; Vandiver, Frank E.
Of the military and historical lessons presented by the Great War, the necessity for military cooperation between sovereign allies is paramount. Because of the universal distaste for this war and the suffering which it brought, historians have been slow in perceiving the true character of the cooperative military operations conducted by the Entente Powers in the period 1914-1918. Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, the commander of the British Armies in France, served with or under all four of France's high commanders during the war. Despite his understandable sensitivity to excessive French domination, he was more than cooperative with all of these men and, in many instances, submerged his personal desires in order to maintain a semblance of unity in joint military action on the Western Front. The immense influence -- both positive and negative -- which Haig exercised over the schemes for cooperative action has been largely overlooked or unappreciated by intervening analysts. There can be little doubt that Field-Marshal Haig was the single most important commander in the Allied coalition during the final two years of the war. His armies prevented the Germans from destroying the French at Verdun and distracted the German High Command from the utter helplessness of the French during the Army mutinies of 1917. In the final months of the war, while the fledgling American Army was being brought into the line, the British blunted the German last gamble offensives. Following this, Haig led his force to decisively defeat the principal enemy in the only theater of operations where final victory could be achieved, the Western Front. During his period of command, Haig accepted a subordinate role to Joffre and Nivelle. During Petain's tenure as Commander-in-Chief, he worked as an honest partner to relieve pressure from the hard-pressed French. Haig successfully thwarted the attempts of the Allied political leaders to impose direction by a committee upon the military commanders. When imminent disaster confronted the alliance, Haig finally accepted formal subordination under the Generalissimo, Foch. Although the results of Haig's cooperative efforts were appreciated by the Allies during the Second World War, the techniques used to achieve this goal were never fully understood.
Commander-In-Chief - Commander Relationships: Wilson and Pershing
(Rice University, 1971-01) Vandiver, Frank E.; Electronic version made possible with funding from the Rice Historical Society and Thomas R. Williams, Ph.D., class of 2000.
Dead-end at the crossroads: the battles of Mansfield (Sabine Crossroads) and Pleasant Hill, Louisiana, 8 and 9 April 1864
(1976) Kiper, Richard Leslie; Vandiver, Frank E.
On 8 April 1864 a Union army commanded by Major General Nathaniel P. Banks was defeated by a Confederate army commanded by Major General Richard Taylor at the small town of Mansfield, Louisiana. In Union records the engagement was recorded as the battle of Sabine Crossroads, and the defeat signaled the "high-water mark" for the Union advance toward Shreveport. General Banks, after repeated urging by Major General Henry Halleck, General-in-Chief of the Union Army, had launched a drive up the Red River through Alexandria and Natchitoches to capture Shreveport, the industrial hub of the Trans-Mississippi Department. From New Orleans and Berwick, Louisiana, and from Vicksburg, Mississippi, the Federals converged on Alexandria. From Little Rock, Arkansas, a Union column under Major General Frederick Steele was to join Banks at Shreveport. Three major infantry forces and the Union Navy under Admiral David D. Porter were to participate in the campaign, yet no one was given supreme authority to coordinate the forces. Halleck's orders were for the separate commands only to co-operate with Banks -- a clear violation of the principle of unity of command. Delays because of low water at Alexandria and Grand Ecore allowed General Taylor to concentrate his Confederates at Mansfield where he engaged the head of the Union column. A faulty march formation placed the separate infantry units where they could not adequately support each other. The result was that those units were defeated in detail before reinforcements could be brought forward to assist them. An excessively long wagon train, placed between the cavalry advance and the main body of infantry, effectively blocked both the advance guard from retreating and other infantry units from reinforcing. Because of a series of tactical mistakes, therefore, the Union forces were defeated. Banks withdrew his army to Pleasant Hill and established a defensive position, while sending those portions of his force which had been routed during the battle back to Grand Ecore. The Union position at Pleasant Hill was faulty. Several regiments were unsupported and the flanks of brigades were "in the air." Taylor's plan was to envelop the Union left with two fresh divisions while launching supporting attacks to fix the Federal front line in position. Taylor's flanking force destroyed one Federal brigade and a portion of another, but, having failed to reach the Union rear prior to the assault, soon found its own right flank exposed to attack. The Federals took advantage of the opportunity and drove the Confederates back. Taylor's army, however, camped near the battlefield, while Banks withdrew the remainder of his army to Grand Ecore about 2 a.m. General Ulysses Grant, appointed as General-in-Chief on 11 March 1864, ordered the expedition terminated so that Banks could prepare his army for an attack on Mobile. Delays again plagued the Union force, and the campaign was not concluded until 17 May. The attack on Mobile had to be postponed, and 1, troops who were to accompany General Sherman on his march through Georgia arrived at Vicksburg too late to join that advance. General E. R. S. Canby superseded Banks who returned to Washington. The Confederate Trans-Mississippi Department continued as a minor thorn in the Union flank and was the last Confederate department to surrender.
Delivering the goods: the development of an American logistical system in France, May 1917-March 1918
(1977) Ramsey, Robert Dewey; Vandiver, Frank E.
By a review of the documents and personal accounts of participants in the logistical system which supported the American Expeditionary Force in World War I, it is possible to trade the development of the system and to determine why changes were made. Entry into the war had caught the U.S. Army unprepared for war overseas. Its initial logistical system was based upon the pre-war Field Service Regulations. Once in France, it was necessary to modify these regulations in dealing with conditions overseas. Finally, in early 1918, the entire system was radically changed so that the American Expeditionary Force could be continuously supported. The story of this development is the subject of this thesis.
Experiment in redemption: the confederate invasion of Kentucky in 1862
(1961) Connelly, Thomas Lawrence; Vandiver, Frank E.
Forging the rapier among scythes: Lieutenant-General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien and the Aldershot Command 1907-1912
(1980) Seim, Richard Ray; Vandiver, Frank E.
When the Boer War ended in 1902, Great Britain began to analyze her extremely poor performance in that conflict. For decades, her army had accomplished its assigned missions on numerous colonial campaigns and expeditions. But the Boer War clearly demonstrated that her old military practices and attitudes were terribly outdated. In August 1914, when the First World War engulfed Europe, Britain fielded the best trained, equipped, and led army in the world. In the twelve years between the end of the Boer War and the start of the Great War, England had completely refurbished her army. Most of the credit for preparing the British Expeditionary Force belongs to Lieutenant-General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, General Officer Commanding- in-Chief, Aldershot Command, 1907-1912. He improved the living conditions of the soldiers; injected realism into marksmanship, training, and maneuvers; taught the cavalry to fight dismounted with rifles; developed the initiative and self-respect of the individual soldier; and most importantly, streamlined Britain's haphazard mobilization procedures. Although he played a key role in the early months of combat, his major contribution toward winning the war to end all wars was his farsighted and sound training programs and reforms during the four years that he was in command at Aldershot.
From the dark side of the moon: raiding by ground forces in the southwest Pacific during the second World War
(1970) Bradley, John H; Vandiver, Frank E.
A long and deep interest in the military history of the Second World War, especially the actions which liberated hundreds of prisoners of war and internees in the Philippines led me to the subject of. raiding in the Southwest Pacific Area While initially interested, in writing a history of three rescue operations in the Philippines I found that the raiding in the Southwest Pacific was so unique and interesting that more actions had to be covered to gain a broader perspective of raiding in the theater. As a result I began to investigate guerrilla raids; raids by Australians in the Markham Valley of New Guinea and on Timor; a magnificent espionage raid in Singapore Harbor; then raid patrols by American forces; actions by American units in New Guinea, New Britain, the Solomons, the Admiralties, and the Philippines; the many small raids by members of the Allied Intelligence Bureau; and finally, and briefly, raids by the Japanese. What started out as a rather limited history and study grew rapidly until many subjects had, to be trimmed to fit into a manageable thesis. This is the result of my interest and research: a broad narrative of many raids, primarily those which were made by American forces, which struck the Japanese during the war; and an evaluation of the raids, their side effects, and their impact on war in the Southwest Pacific.
Galvestonians and military reconstruction, 1865-1867
(1975) Shannon, Stephen Franklin; Vandiver, Frank E.
Traditional literature on reconstruction in Texas considers the period as one in which democratic institutions such as home rule are abused and pre-empted by a hostile military authority. By the citation of specific instances and by implication historians paint a tragic image in which local government is rendered feeble, local officeholders are removed without the consent of their constituents, civil courts are attacked, and Texans are left to the mercy of a vengeful conqueror. Such general statements cannot be applied to Galveston, the headquarters of the army of occupation from 1865 through 1867. At the outset of the period islanders found the army command to be extremely solicitous of the needs of whites in reference to the labor situation and of the maintenance of local government. Any official disputes that arose were based on jurisdictional conflicts that were speedily resolved. The army actually lent strength to local provisional government by incorporating it into the military regime. Wholesale removals of personnel did not occur, nor was the insular society upon which government rested disoriented in any way. Both army and local government cooperated to police freedmen and to keep them productive. The only Federal authority that consistently confronted local government in behalf of freedmen was the Freedmen*s Bureau. This agency realized only minimal success in aiding the island's blacks, for necessary support from the regular army was not always present and islanders were naturally hostile to any power that threatened to modify the labor situation. Islanders learned that divisions within the reconstructing powers might be exploited to their advantage. By late 1866 a renewed confidence to resist reconstruction policy had developed on the island so that an overt confrontation ensued after the appointment of a district commander dedicated to the impartial administration of justice. The difference in attitude between this commander and his predecessors appeared to give substance to a charge of "military despotism." Despite various conflicts with the local population, however, this district commander did not remove local officials at random nor did he seek to disfranchise as many white islanders as possible. Local government continued to exercise its usual powers. Galvestonians, therefore, were not deprived of control of their own local institutions nor were they denied participation in government more stringently than required by Congressional acts. They did, in fact, blend a remnant of Confederate authority into reconstruction government, re-establish their economic regime with free black labor, and develop a strong will to resist further reconstruction programs.
Haig, Nivelle, and Third Ypres
(Rice University, 1971-01) Vandiver, Frank E.; Electronic version made possible with funding from the Rice Historical Society and Thomas R. Williams, Ph.D., class of 2000.
Hood's Tennessee Campaign
(1981) Glatthaar, Joseph Thomas; Vandiver, Frank E.; Drew, Katherine F.; Higginbotham, S. W.
Houston, Texas, goes to war, 1861-1865
(1976) Baisley, Kathryn MacDonald; Vandiver, Frank E.
Confederate Houston offers a fascinating case study for students of Trans-Mississippi Texas. Despite its unique position as commercial center and military headquarters, the city shared many experiences with the rest of the state, and exhibited trends similar to those observed in other studies of the Rebel West. Like much of Texas and the Trans-Mississippi, Houston never suffered military occupation and its defenders were never defeated in battle. (In fact, when Federals invaded Galveston, the Rebels gave it up without firing a shot.) Economic conditions caused Houstonians more discomfort, but rarely equaled the misery of the East. Refugees, the poor, and those with fixed incomes did suffer. But families with more capital survived fairly comfortably, and those with plenty of money and good business sense made tremendous fortunes. Even during the darkest periods of 1863 and 1864, food was still available, while the continual round of auctions and benefits revealed that someone -- although it is not clear who -- had money to support those events. Buildings, and transportation and communication facilities grew increasingly threadbare as the war dragged on, but lack of capital rather than contending armies was the cause. When the conflict ended construction and commercial activity quickly revived, with Houstonians happily ignorant of the extensive war damage faced by cities back East. Increasing isolation from the rest of the Confederacy was probably Texas' key problem, and one that Houston deeply shared. Communication with the Rebel government in Richmond was always difficult, and became nearly impossible when Vicks burg fell. In addition Texans felt ignored by the East. Few armies of any size were stationed in Texas, and until E. Kirby Smith arrived, it seemed that the West's only generals were castoffs. More and more men were siphoned off to battle fields in Tennessee or Virginia, but money or equipment was rarely sent West. In short, the state — and Houstonians — began to feel that they were sacrificing everything for nothing, and morale crumbled. This thesis' prime objective is to describe the city of Houston as it was just prior to and during the Civil War. The study is arranged topically, and deals with Houston’s buildings, facilities and population just before the war; general events and the city's morale from 1861 to 1865; and the effects of the conflict on the economy, transportation and communication networks, and society in general.
In Quest of General Pershing
(Rice University, 1962-07) Vandiver, Frank E.; Electronic version made possible with funding from the Rice Historical Society and Thomas R. Williams, Ph.D., class of 2000.
Jefferson Davis and the Mississippi gubernatorial contest of 1851, with selected letters and speeches concerning the campaign
(1971) Davis, Kathleen Bailey; Vandiver, Frank E.
Traditional political parties in Mississippi fractured and re-formed during the struggle that climaxed in the passage of the Compromise of 1850. Convinced that these measures further marked the usurpation of southern constitutional rights, Jefferson Davis, a life-long Democrat, strove to unify his party, his state, and the South in order to register southern disapproval. The test of Mississippi's position on the Compromise came in the elections of 1851. After the Democratic State Rights party, led by gubernatorial candidate John A. Quitman, was defeated in the September election for state convention delegates, Quitman withdrew from the race. The Democratic party immediately turned for leadership to Jefferson Davis, who accepted the gubernatorial nomination as his duty and campaigned as vigorously as possible despite ill health in the six weeks remaining before the election. He lost the race, reducing the Unionist party margin of 7,500 votes in the September election to 999, but gained national respect for his political principles and party loyalty. The second part of the thesis consists of eleven selected letters and speeches concerning the campaign. They form a substantial portion of the primary source material on which the first part of the thesis is based. Clarifying footnotes follow each edited item.
Learning to live: tactical training for the AEF, 1917-1918
(1972) Almstrom, John Albin; Vandiver, Frank E.
America entered World War One almost totally unprepared. Her most urgent problem was the training of at least one million men. This thesis describes the content of tactical training in the United States Army, the development of an efficient system for producing qualified replacements for combat units, and the theoretical differences between Allies, American Expeditionary Forces and authorities at home. Because cavalry was employed on only the most minimal scale during the First World War, no attention has been paid to training for "l'arme blanche." Supporting forces such as aircraft, engineers or signals have been left out of this discussion in order to save space. An analysis of American tactical doctrine concludes this work. Ideas concerning methods of assaulting machine guns are the author's own, for which full responsibility is accepted. Because the war ended before the full weight of America's military force could be applied, analysis of her performance on the battlefield must be tempered with an awareness that the final sophistication of her training system occurred too late to be of assistance to Pershing's army. The excellence of tactical education as it evolved in World War One would remain unproven until America entered a vaster and more desperate struggle twenty-four years later.
Military operations in northern Luzon 1898-1901
(1973) Gilchrist, Malcolm Stanton; Vandiver, Frank E.
America entered the Spanish-American War totally unprepared. The quick victories achieved by the United States Army and Navy merely covered up the real plight of American military posture. Only after the peace treaty that would conclude the war between the Madrid Cortes and the Washington government had been signed did the "Splendid little war" grow ugly. As the Spaniards departed the Philippines the American Army of Occupation stationed in Manila faced a determined nationalist movement. This thesis described in part America's first major military effort in a distant country -- the Philippines. Because Major General Otis and his immediate subordinates directed their initial efforts against Emilio Aguinaldo's Army in northern Luzon, attention is focused to that region of the archipelago. Shortly after Manila ifeil to the Americans, Aguinaldo shifted his capital from Kawit, Cavite, south of Manila to Malolos, Bulacan, north of the Pasig River. Antonio Luna, the insurgents' senior military commander until June,1899, personally commanded the Filipino army north of Manila. After the fall of Malolos and each subsequent insurgent capital, the insurgent hierarchy retreated further north. And northern Luzon was the first area declared free of organized resistance. An analysis of American tactics, equipment, training and personnel is an integral part of the discussion of the campaigns in northern Luzon. The army gradually gained experience, for each campaign was a testing ground. When the insurgents finally realized that the survival of their cause rested in the use of guerrilla tactics, the Eighth Corps had to adjust to the new type of warfare. What began as a war of generals, brigades and divisions rapidly deteriorated to a war of second lieutenants, platoons and companies. The Americans had to contend with an insurrection in a distant land.

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