Browsing by Author "Slusher, Morgan Paul"

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    Collisions involving XE(nf) Rydberg atoms: mℓ [enclosed by vertical lines]--changing and the influence of an external electric field
    (1982) Slusher, Morgan Paul; Dunning, F. Barry; Stebbings, Ronald F.; Corcoran, Marjorie D.
    Thermal energy collisions between xenon Rydberg atoms in n = 31, l > 3 states and CO2 are reported. The rate constant is derived for those collisions that result in a change in m^l. The value so obtained is similar to that obtained previously for Xe(nf) - CO2 collisions that result in a change in l. It is argued that these observations imply that collisions result in simultaneous changes in l and m^l. In addition, the influence of an applied electric field on state-changing in collisions between laser-excited Xe(nf) atoms and xenon target gas is described. The presence of the field- results in marked changes in both the rate constant for collisional state-changing and in the final state distribution. The changes can be accounted for by use of energy transfer arguments based on the "essentially-free" electron model, although the degree of spatial overlap between wavefunctions associated with the initial and final states may also be important.
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    Differential impact of causal and statistical evidence in counteracting belief perseverance: Changing prior beliefs about Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
    (1989) Slusher, Morgan Paul; Anderson, C. A.
    Research on belief perseverance--the finding that people cling to initial beliefs to an unwarranted extent--has demonstrated that a belief persists to the extent that there are more explanations available to the believer to support the original belief than to support alternative beliefs. Thus, explanatory evidence that supports an alternative target belief may be more effective in changing prior beliefs than statistical evidence. In an experiment testing this hypothesis, subjects read explanatory (biological) information and/or statistical (epidemiological) information supporting the belief that Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) cannot be spread by casual contact. Subjects' beliefs on this issue were assessed before and after reading this information. Subjects also evaluated the evidence they read. Finally, the availability of explanations supporting the target belief was assessed. Results indicated that: (1) explanatory evidence produced significant belief change, whereas statistical evidence did not; (2) evaluations of evidence were biased in accord with subjects' initial beliefs; (3) information polarized attitudes, although attitudes changed in the appropriate direction; (4) final beliefs were more congruent with the target alternative belief after subjects read explanatory information than after they read statistical information. Evidence was mixed regarding whether explanatory evidence was less subject to evaluation bias and subsequent attitude polarization than statistical information. In addition, explanation availability mediated the effectiveness of information in determining final beliefs, and evaluations of the evidence mediated the effect of initial beliefs on attitude polarization. A motivational construct, attitudes toward gay men, was related to initial beliefs and belief change--those with negative attitudes had more inappropriate beliefs and displayed less change in beliefs than those with moderate attitudes. However, evaluations of evidence were better predicted by initial beliefs than by attitudes toward gay men. This study has clear implications for those attempting to change beliefs, including those responsible for AIDS education: explanatory evidence is more effective than statistical evidence in changing beliefs.
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    The role of imagination stereotype maintenance
    (1985) Slusher, Morgan Paul; Anderson, Craig A.; Howell, William C.; Carpenter, S. L.
    The present studies examine how failures in reality monitoring contribute to stereotype maintenance. In one study, subjects imagined members of occupational groups within specific contexts that could be relevant to a trait stereotypic of that group. Subjects tended to incorporate the stereotyped trait into the imagination. In another experiment, subjects read sentences that matched traits (stereotyped and nonstereotyped) with occupations with equal frequency. Subjects also imagined members of each occupation in situations relevant to particular stereotypic traits. In subsequent judgments of presentation frequency, subjects overestimated stereotypic occupation-trait combinations, replicating earlier studies. More importantly, subjects further overestimated the presentation frequency of imagined stereotypic combinations, indicating failure of subjects to distinguish between their imaginations and actual presentations. Thus, stereotype-based imaginings led to inflated association of groups with their stereotypic traits. The possible role this "imaginal confirmation" process may play in the maintenance of stereotypes is also discussed.