Browsing by Author "Sher, George"
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Item A Theory of Well-Being(2019-12-03) Zuk, Peter David; Sher, George; Siewert, CharlesI defend the view that the value of every contribution to individual well-being is explained by affective experience, suitably defined. In Chapter 1, I set out a methodological approach centered on Rawlsian wide reflective equilibrium and offer considerations in favor of affective experience as a uniquely powerful explanation of contributions to well-being. The remaining three chapters employ affective experience as an explanation of the goodness of the goods proposed by three leading theories of wellbeing: hedonism, desired-based views, and objective list views. In Chapter 2, I offer arguments against attitudinal conceptions of pleasure and defend instead an affective conception of pleasure that provides a plausible way of unifying two major phenomenological conceptions of pleasure. In Chapter 3, I defend an affective conception of desire and offer arguments against motivational and cognitivist conceptions of desire. In Chapter 4, I provide an account of reasons for affective states and apply this account to several purportedly objective goods: love, friendship, virtue, and self-respect. The goodness of these goods for individuals, I argue, can be explained by appeal to affective experience in a way that does not depart from what is most important in subjective approaches to well-being. Having offered a deeper explanation of the goodness of the various goods proposed by these three leading theories of well-being, I conclude that my theory is preferable to them.Item An examination of intrinsic value(2000) Doran, Brett Michael; Sher, GeorgeTwo conceptually distinct accounts of intrinsic value tend to dominate moral and value theory. One is the view, held prominently by J. S. Mill, in which intrinsic value is that which is valued as an end, rather than as a means to some further end. The other conception, advanced by G. E. Moore and W. D. Ross, holds intrinsic value to be the value something has in itself by virtue of its own intrinsic nature and independently of all other values and objects. In this essay, I present criticisms of each view and provide, in their place, an alternative conception of intrinsic value that avoids the failings of these prevailing accounts. This essay's account is independent of the particular valuations of persons, thus avoiding the criticism against the view represented by Mill, but remains relationally tied to persons, unlike the Moorean conception.Item Embargo Are There Unfulfillable Moral Obligations?(2024-04-19) Campsall, Jeanine; Sher, GeorgeIn my dissertation, I examine the question of whether or not there could exist moral obligations that would be impossible to fulfill, or unreasonable to expect someone to fulfill. I consider four different types of possible unfulfillable or infeasible obligations: genuine moral dilemmas; cases where someone acts from a position of ignorance; Frankfurt-type cases; and cases of culpable inability. In the first chapter, I argue that genuine moral dilemmas do not exist, and are therefore not examples of unfulfillable obligations. In the second chapter, I argue for a version of perspectivism where non-culpable ignorance of certain factual information can legitimately affect a person’s moral obligations. In cases where someone’s misleading factual evidence about the appropriate course of action leads to an instance of apparent blameless wrongdoing, I argue that they have not actually acted wrongly. I therefore argue that these are not cases of infeasible obligations. In the third chapter, I argue that in Frankfurt-type cases, where someone intuitively appears to have done something morally wrong, but where they lacked the ability to do what the apparent obligation seemed to require, and lacked awareness of their inability, that unfulfillable obligations are possible. In the fourth chapter, I show how certain cases of people making themselves unable to fulfill an apparent obligation are not examples of unfulfillable obligations, but instead are instances of failing to meet an obligation. There may, however, be certain possible cases of unfulfillable obligations due to culpable inability. A problem with the existence of unfulfillable moral obligations is that the idea of someone having an obligation to do something that they cannot do appears to be unfair. The types of unfulfillable obligations that I argue for, however, are ones where the moral agent is intuitively culpable, and where avoiding wrongdoing was at some point possible.Item Blame, Forgiveness, and Honor in Aristotle and Beyond(2017-08-10) Phillips-Garrett, Carissa; Morrison, Donald; Sher, GeorgeIn my dissertation, I defend an interpretation of Aristotle’s account of blame and moral responsibility as accountability. Through examining the neglected concept of sungnōmē, which forestalls blame, I conclude that Aristotelian blame is justified only on grounds of fairness. This conclusion is evidence that Aristotelian blame is not merely an instrumental or descriptive tool, but rather a way of holding agents morally accountable. Through examining the emphasis Aristotle places on the role of blame and its role in maintaining honor, I show that forgiveness is incompatible with Aristotle’s account because when the victim decides to forgive, she lets go of blame on grounds other than desert. For Aristotle, when she does so, she accepts less than she is worth, and so forgiving a wrongdoer undermines the victim’s honor. As a result, Aristotle rejects forgiveness as positively vicious. Contra Aristotle, I argue that cultivating the disposition to be forgiving is part of flourishing individual and communal life. The choice to let go what of one deserves, however, need not mean that honor is relinquished. Instead, I defend an alternative account of honor in which honor lies not in demanding what is deserved but instead in committing to the consistent pursuit of the good. On this account, honor is related to the ongoing commitment to a coherent and compelling identity rooted in seeing ethical values as central to the conception of one’s self, rather than outwardly-mediated Aristotelian honor. Honor is thus bound up in commitment to the good life generally, and does not rely on getting what one deserves. My account thus reconciles Aristotelian blame with forgiveness, demonstrates what is valuable about honor, and why it is still worth pursuing in our modern world.Item Building Reasons Without Authority(2011) Husi, Stan; Sher, GeorgeMy dissertation defends a comprehensive version of meta-nonnative skepticism which holds that no standard, norm, or principle has objective authority or normative force. The view does not deny either that there are norms, standards of correctness, and principles of various kinds or that it is possible both to succeed or fail in measuring up to their prerogatives. What it does deny is that any norm has the status of commanding with objective authority, the status of giving rise to objective normative reasons to take seriously and follow its demands. Many believe objective authority is required if we are to make sense of and explain the significance of our normative practices. Without authority, they fear, any critical standpoint vis-à-vis our practices would evaporate, even when we have reached a consensus regarding critical matters, which, without correctness, appears to reflect nothing but an ultimately arbitrary choice. I disagree, and argue that while authority cannot be accommodated within the world as we know it, we don't need it either. A chief goal of my dissertation is to propose a positive interpretation of our normative practices that dispenses with authoritative facts directing us what to do. The practical question of what to make of our practices and our involvement with them, I counter, retains significance only when pursued from an engaged rather than a detached perspective - one that we adopt when, driven by our concerns and commitments, we actively participate in the resolution of practical problems, including the selection and development of norms to live by, searching for common ground for how to coordinate our individual and joint endeavors. Even though there are no definitive answers, this deliberative enterprise is not unconstrained; it is carried out within a tight web of norms that we do already accept, a web we continuously spin and expand.Item Care and punishment: Imagining an integrated response to wrongdoing(2004) Rowland, Amy; Sher, GeorgeTraditional theories of state-sanctioned punishment, specifically retributivism and deterrence, are critiqued from a feminist ethic of care perspective. The argument is made that the integration of care-based reasoning into punishment theory is essential to the development and practice of punishment as a fair and just institution. The argument rests on the premise that the care and justice theories are best understood as complementary, each lending critical contributions to our understanding of fair and reasonable practices. Two sub-theses are developed: the ideal, in which it is argued that care theory gives us reason to re-conceptualize our responses to wrongdoing in ways that are not dependent on punitive measures, and the non-ideal, in which it is argued that care-based reasoning can address some of the shortcomings of traditional theories and practices, particularly those relating to concerns about human dignity and respect, and can provide justifications for improvements.Item Choice, manipulation and wellbeing: On the nature and ethical significance of nudging(2017-03-14) Vaughan, Kerry L; Sher, GeorgeRecent work in behavioral economics has led to startling conclusions about the limits of human rationality. Contrary to the rational maximizer of utility assumed by traditional economics, actual decision makers make choices that are inconsistent with their own ends and are powerfully influenced by the context in which decisions are presented. Recently, some writers have argued that we ought to use the power of decision making context to offset the inconsistent choice phenomenon. Positions of this kind go alternatively under the banners of “Libertarian Paternalism,” “Choice Architecture,” and “Nudging.” The central idea is that people who shape the context of choices (Choice Architects) should opt to frame choices so all choices remain available (Libertarianism), but should ensure that the choosers are more likely (Nudged) to make choices that make them better off (Paternalism). Despite an explosion in discussion of and use of nudges, philosophers and ethicists have in large part been missing from the conversation. The discussion that has taken place among philosophers has mostly been about whether there is something objectionable about nudges in general. However, as I will argue later in the dissertation, this discussion is of limited use because nudges vary widely in their ethical features. This dissertation advances in five chapters. In chapter 1, I discuss what precisely a nudge is and what it is not. In chapter two I outline a three-factor model for analyzing whether a nudge is morally acceptable. In chapter three I discuss the question of when a nudge makes a chooser better off. I finally defend a new version of the informed desire account which avoids difficulties with the standard informed desire account in the literature. In chapter four I discuss the question of when a nudge is the best available choice, comparing it to rational persuasion, libertarianism and paternalism as possible alternatives. Finally in chapter 5 I discuss two real world applications of the nudging and how the ideas developed elsewhere in the dissertation are used to evaluate these nudges.Item Democracy in the Real World: Empirical Breakdowns in the Justification of Democracy(2012) Wenner, Danielle Marie; Sher, GeorgeJustifications of democracy rest in large part on unacknowledged empirical assumptions regarding the cognitive, informational, and behavioral capacities of individuals and voting populations. The goal of this project was to identify those assumptions and examine them in light of data from the social sciences. To the extent that these assumptions are undermined by empirical evidence, the normative legitimacy of democracy as a system of rule is weakened. Theories of democracy were organized along a continuum from purely instrumental to purely intrinsic or procedural, and a representative sample of theories from along this spectrum were analyzed in order to identify their core empirical assumptions. Interest-based, deliberative, and egalitarian theories of democracy were each demonstrated to be predicated on substantive empirical assumptions which were contradicted by the available evidence. A sophisticated hybrid account incorporating aspects from along the spectrum of available theories was likewise demonstrated to be predicated on unsubstantiated assumptions regarding human capacities. A concluding analysis of the circumstances which undermine the assumptions of democratic theory demonstrated the limited tractability of these circumstances, leading to my assertion that a new conception of what democracy is and what purposes it should serve is warranted, and that in the interim, contemporary attempts to justify the dissemination of democracy are undermined.Item Empathetic Blame: Moral Evaluation in the Face of Luck(Rice University, 2020-05) Tugendstein, Gabriel; Sher, GeorgeIn this thesis I offer a new interpretation of blame and criticism rooted in P.F. Strawson's distinction between the subjective and objective points of view. In Part I, I use the problems presented by circumstantial moral luck to expose the inadequacy of standard intuitions about what's required to blame another. Proposed solutions to these issues, I argue, fall into the trap of viewing blame as the outgrowth of a metaphysical status instead of an action that cannot be detached from interpersonal relationships. In Part II I generate a novel interpretation based on the projects of Hume, Strawson, and Scanlon, which posits blame as an attitude forming out of self-reflection and empathy, and criticism as a belief forming out of comparison to a rigid standard. I then elaborate on the phenomenology of such a blame act and go over the consequences my interpretation would have, including a world with substantially less blaming that would eschew vague metaphysical questions and recognize the limitations of imposing moral standards on those who have faced different circumstances.Item Fighting a New Deal: Intellectual origins of the Reagan Revolution, 1932--1952(2007) Eow, Gregory Teddy; Haskell, Thomas L.; McCann, Samuel G.; Matusow, Allen J.; Twyman, William Gaines; Sher, George; Autrey, Herbert S.This dissertation locates the origins of the modern conservative movement in the intellectual history of the 1930s and 1940s. I argue that it was during the years of the Great Depression, when laissez-faire capitalism was most discredited, that a group of conservative academics and intellectuals began to lay the foundations for its postwar resurgence. Angered by the New Deal, those intellectual activists honed their free market ideology and began to develop a network through which to distribute it. As a result, they began to lay the intellectual and institutional foundation for the conservative movement. This dissertation recovers a number of narratives that reveal the rudimentary makings of a movement. It was during the 1930s and 1940s that economist Henry Simons worked to turn the University of Chicago's economics department into a bastion of free market sentiment; Leonard Read, after a decade of free market advocacy, created the first libertarian think tank, the Foundation for Economic Education, in 1946; legal scholar Roscoe Pound, worried by the spread of legal realism in the academy and growth of government in Washington, dramatically moved to the political right to make common cause with conservatives; Albert Jay Nock, his protégé Frank Chodorov and Felix Morley created a network of conservative writers and publications that paved the way for William F. Buckley's National Review ; and writers such as Rose Wilder Lane and Isabel Paterson made the case for laissez-faire in the pages of popular publications such as the Saturday Evening Post and the New York Herald Tribune . Historians have generally attributed the rise of the modern right to the conservative political mobilization in response to the civil rights movement, campus agitation of the 1960s, and the campaign for women's rights. As a result, historians tend to view the modern conservative movement as a distinctly postwar social and political phenomenon. This dissertation enriches that account by revealing the ties the modern conservative movement has to the years of the Great Depression and the debate over the government's role in the economy.Item Global Distributive Justice: A Structural Approach(2017-08-10) Hupfer, Elizabeth C; Sher, GeorgeHistorically the study of distributive justice—or who is owed fair distributions of benefits—focused on distributions to citizens within nations, but I analyze arguments in favor of distributive justice between nations. I begin by formulating a basic theory of distributive justice which I call “structuralism” in which existing structures in our nonideal world inform the scope of distributive justice. I take there to be two approaches to structuralism: the coercive and the cooperative approach. I reason that the coercive approach (which argues that the scope of distributive justice is determined by the extent of existing coercive systems) does not expand the scope of distributive justice outside of national borders. However, due to objections facing any version of a coercive approach, a cooperative approach (which argues that the scope of distributive justice is determined by the extent of existing economic cooperation) is a superior theory. I conclude that the existence of globalized trade extends the scope of distributive justice to include justice between nations. Finally, I argue that my theory of distributive justice must be supplemented by a humanitarian theory based on beneficence that encapsulates all individuals in need.Item Ignorance and Moral Responsibility: A Quality of Will Approach(2012-09-05) Robichaud, Philip; Sher, George; Brody, Baruch; Kaplan, Gergory; Sommers, TamlerMy central aim in the dissertation is to defend an account of the epistemic condition of moral responsibility that distinguishes culpable ignorance from non-culpable ignorance. The view that I defend is that ignorance is culpable just when an agent flouts or ignores moral reasons that underlie her epistemic norms or obligations. This view is a quality-of-will theory of moral responsibility that emphasizes the agent’s reasons-responsiveness. It holds that only relevant epistemic obligations are those that require acts of investigation or reflection. In the dissertation, I examine extant theories of culpable ignorance and suggest that they all fall short in some important respect. Then, I propose and defend an account in which epistemic norms play a leading role. I analyze the nature of epistemic norms and their normativity, and I argue that agents who ignore or flout actional investigative norms and then act on subsequent false beliefs are connected to the wrongness of their action in a way that establishes their blameworthiness. I also argue that epistemic norms that require agents to hold certain beliefs or make certain inferences are not relevant to culpable ignorance. Finally, I explore the implications of my view for certain interesting cases of moral ignorance. I discuss ignorance that results from an agent’s social or historical circumstances, ignorance that stems from pure moral deference, and ignorance that is explained by epistemic difficulty of getting certain moral facts right. There are two striking outcomes of my research. The first is that reflection on the epistemic condition shows that one cannot think deeply about moral responsibility without also engaging issues in epistemology relating to the nature and normativity of belief, and issues in normative ethics relating to what our moral obligations actually are. The second striking outcome is that bringing these rather disparate topics together, as I attempted to do, reveals that much of our ignorance is actually non-culpable, and that many of our beliefs about the blameworthiness of ignorant agents are unwarranted.Item In Defense of Sufficiency as the Distributive Ideal for Political Power(2013-09-16) Tune, Dustin; Sher, George; Brody, Baruch; Bradford, Gwen; Davidson, ChandlerMany people think that political equality is obviously a good thing, an ideal toward which any decent political system should strive. Despite this -- or perhaps because of it -- some basic questions about political equality remain unanswered. What is political equality? What is good about it? Could some other ideal(s) take its place? My aim here is to answer each of these questions. In regards to the first question, I argue that political equality obtains when political power is distributed equally. Two people are political equals if, and only if, they have the same amount of political power. By 'political power' I mean (roughly) the ability to get what one wants in the political arena. Conceiving of political equality in this way allows us to accommodate both the moral and amoral dimensions of politics. What is good about political equality, so conceived? Political equality is good insofar as it leads to the equal advancement of everyone's interests. There are several reasons to think that advancing everyone's interests is important. It may be a fundamental requirement of morality, a principle of social justice, or a necessary condition of political legitimacy. Of course, an equal distribution of political power is not unique in its ability to advance people's interests equally. Indeed, I argue that an unequal distribution of power will almost always lead to a moral equal advancement of everyone's interests. This is because different people have different interests, and, depending on the circumstances, different amounts of power may be needed in order to advance different sets of interests to the same degree. Thus, it is a mistake to assume that an equal distribution of power will lead to the equal advancement of everyone's interests. If the equal advancement of interests is our ultimate goal, then political power should be distributed in accordance with a principle of sufficiency, not equality. Everyone should have whatever amount of political power they need in order for their interests to be advanced to the same degree.Item Justice for children: The development of autonomy(2004) Adams, Harry William; Sher, GeorgeMost contemporary theories of justice pertain primarily to the world of adults, and so provide only implicit or vague suggestions as to how various ideals and norms of justice might apply to children. In this dissertation I attempt to remedy this gap or imbalance. To do so, I focus upon the norm of autonomy, and consider how social institutions might be arranged and resources might be distributed so as to allow for due respect---but also, at a prior stage, allow for the proper cultivation---of persons' autonomy. In other words, I systematically argue that it is misguided to be concerned with respecting the (already formed) autonomy of adults, if social arrangements have prevented many adults from developing their autonomy in the fast place, when they were children. Toward this end, I defend a conception of autonomy, in the first chapter, as the complex ability to effectively govern one's life according to one's own capacities and non-adapted preferences. I point out that this ability is one of degrees, whose development depends in large part upon the enjoyment of certain childhood conditions and resources. In the second chapter, I marshall evidence from the most recent empirical research (in burgeoning areas such as Population Health and Life Course Studies, psychoneurobiology, primate ethology, and Social Cognition Theory), to reveal what specific conditions seem to lead, in point of fact, to a greater or lesser development of autonomy. In the third chapter, I argue that children who have been deprived of these various pre-conditions of autonomy have been seriously and wrongfully harmed; and I defend the state as being morally justified, perhaps even obligated, to intervene to redress such harm. The final two chapters are devoted to the ethical evaluation of practical interventions that would feasibly protect children from such "arrested development harm," within their home and school environments, respectively. Accordingly, in chapter four, I provide a model of parental licensing (which includes an analysis of the merits but also risks of compulsory short-term contraception, for cases of extreme parental incompetence or abuse). In the fifth and final chapter, I advocate an Educational Sufficiency Standard that would mandate a certain set of minimally adequate grade school conditions, where these conditions, in turn, would support children's assimilation of essential building blocks (in the form of certain cognitive and self-efficacy skills) of autonomy. In these ways, I argue that any just society will insure that its children are provided with whatever is necessary for their development of at least minimal autonomy.Item Living Storied Lives(2016-11-07) Adams, Joseph Q; Sher, GeorgePhilosophy should help guide our lives. After all, the central question of ethics, one of philosophy’s central fields, is “How ought one to live?” Yet, philosophy’s answers are inadequate, not because they are illegitimate, but because they are incomplete, pressingly so. I believe that by and large philosophy's life-guiding prescriptions are correct—be moral, flourish, pursue goals and desires important to you, make room for pleasure. I also believe that they do not guide well enough, that they fail to reach a heightened yet still-meaningful level of specificity that agents rightly seek. A kaleidoscope of patently feasible yet clearly incompatible lives face any agent concerned to live as she ought, all of them perfectly permissible by the lights of philosophy’s standard norms. So, which ought I to pursue? How ought I to live? This dissertation aims to help alleviate this problem of incompleteness. I argue that, within the basic moral boundaries of respect toward others and prudential boundaries of your own well-being, one ought to live a storied life. By looking at certain aspects of your personal history as the basis of, or material for, an unfolding narrative of growth, redemption, overcoming—in short, of progress—you will find specific enough next steps. Besides providing heightened guidance, this new philosophical prescription will lend your life a higher degree of intelligibility. You will have a life with rich explanatory power, a life of which you can be proud to tell. In sum: while many lives available to you are fine by the lights of morality and prudence, only some bring forward the goodness of your particular past in a meaningful way, and these are worth your attention.Item Moral dilemmas and moral luck(2001) Dunn, Timothy John; Sher, GeorgeA moral dilemma is a situation in which a person cannot avoid acting wrongly. In the first part of the dissertation, I examine the two most important arguments for the possibility of moral dilemmas: the incommensurability argument and the argument from guilt. I argue that neither of these arguments is successful. In the second part of the dissertation, I show that moral dilemmas are a species of moral luck, or moral responsibility for factors beyond one's control. I argue that those who believe in the possibility of moral dilemmas must also accept the possibility of some kinds of moral luck. This result holds even for moral dilemmas secundum quid, or dilemmas that arise only as a result of prior wrongdoing. In the final part of the dissertation, I consider several arguments for the possibility of circumstantial moral luck. I argue that these arguments all fail; however, I acknowledge that there may be other, more compelling arguments for the possibility of moral luck. I conclude by suggesting that the most important objection to moral dilemmas and moral luck is rooted in a concern for justice.Item Political neutrality and the argument from personal autonomy(1993) Bifulco, Robert, Jr; Sher, GeorgeOne argument for political neutrality appeals to the value of autonomy. I consider three objections to this argument. First, it appears that this argument is self-defeating in drawing from a controversial conception of the good life. If we distinguish between theoretical and practical levels of political reasoning, however, the initial appearance of paradox disappears. Second, it is unclear whether autonomy plays an essential enough role in the good life to justify making it the goal of the state. Via, an expliction of Joseph Raz's work, I develop a sense in which it is plausible to say that autonomy is essential to the good life in some societies, and that the governments of such societies should pursue the conditions of autonomy. Third, it is unclear whether political neutrality is the best means of securing autonomy. I suggest a reason for believing that it is that draws on a connection between neutrality and the type of culture conducive to personal autonomy.Item Punishment by Agreement - A Contract-Based Argument for the Moral Permissibility of Punishment(2018-11-19) Burkett, Daniel; Sher, GeorgePunishment necessarily involves the infliction of harm, and therefore requires us to treat wrongdoers in ways that it would clearly be wrong to treat others. Traditionally, this harm is justified on the basis of either (1) the Consequentialist claim that punishment maximises the good for the wider community, or (2) the Retributivist claim that wrongdoers simply deserve the harm they receive. However, both theories are subject to well-known objections. Specifically, there are a variety of cases in which each theory either punishes the innocent, or fails to punish the guilty. This leads some authors to the controversial conclusion that punishment is never morally justified. I propose an alternative solution: I argue that the moral permissibility of punishment should instead be based on the fact that each wrongdoer has agreed to her punishment. Specifically, I argue that it will be morally permissible to punish an individual P under a particular punishment practice X so long as—at some prior point—P simultaneously (i) had good reason to agree to X, and (ii) gave some kind of agreement to X. I then argue that (i) will be met where an individual can expect to benefit from the implementation of a punishment practice, and—more controversially—that (ii) can be satisfied by the existence of hypothetical agreement. I reflect on the practical implications of this theory by applying it to a number of real-world crimes, and demonstrating how it can go about prescribing specific punishments for particular offences. I conclude by showing that the Contractarian theory is well-equipped to avoid the objections commonly levelled against traditional theories of punishment, and that—for this reason—it provides a promising solution to the problem of punishment.Item Subsidizing the arts: A democratic defense(1997) Schwartz, David T.; Sher, GeorgeThis dissertation defends state support of the arts as an educational public good. It begins with a critique of the traditional justification for subsidy, the appeal to cultural perfection. By challenging the perfectionist position from two distinct perspectives--political and aesthetic--this critique reveals the potential value of constructing a plausible, nonperfectionist alternative. The dissertation then works to develop such an alternative by appealing to the instrumental potential of art as an educational public good. Unlike the perfectionist approach based on the intrinsic value of art, this justification is founded on a general commitment to democratic self-rule. After defending a particular account of this commitment and its implications for educational policy, the dissertation works to show how art can serve as a valuable component in an overall scheme of democratic education. The positive argument for art's democratic value consists of three distinct elements. The first draws on Aristotle, Kant, and Hannah Arendt in explicating several structural similarities that exist between aesthetic and political judgments. The second element describes how interpretation is essential to both engaging art and participating in politics. Taken together, these first two elements of the argument describe how art and politics both engage--and thus practice--many of the same skills and abilities. The third element of the argument explores the potential political value (and political risks) of the state's encouraging citizens to engage a diversity of cultural expressions. The dissertation concludes by describing several policy implications of the democratically-based justification of subsidy (e.g., increased local control over subsidy decisions), and by evaluating the justification in light of the best arguments against subsidy. These include a libertarian argument from self-ownership, Joel Feinberg's argument based on the Benefit Principle, an objection from moral offense, and several objections from state neutrality.Item The Concept of Human Dignity in Bioethics(2015-08-26) Eddleman, Lisa McDonald; Brody, Baruch; Sher, George; Zammito, John H.The concept of human dignity has gained a great deal of traction in European bioethics, yet there remains in American bioethics a deep skepticism regarding the utility of the notion. I contend that the appeal to human dignity is not reducible to the traditional bioethical appeals of beneficence, autonomy or justice that comprise the predominant American approach to bioethics. Nevertheless, current accounts of human dignity in bioethics lack substance, and too often presume shared convictions grounded in either religious beliefs or some kind secular humanism; consequently, such versions of human dignity fail to do the philosophical work necessary to sustain either normative claims or bioethical policy grounded in the appeal. A philosophically satisfactory theory of human dignity must deliver both sufficiently universal justification and richness of content. To that end, I elaborate an original version of human dignity that balances the seemingly incompatible requirements of universality and content in a surprising way: by developing a richer notion of the Kantian rational valuer. I argue that, properly understood, the rational valuer is both normative and foundational: certain capacities and conditions are necessary to function as a rational valuer, and these can be defended as valuable to every human being. To respect human dignity, then, is to protect and promote these capacities and conditions. Utilizing this conception of human dignity, I revisit the list of European bioethical constraints that motivated my work to begin with. I conclude that, while my account of human dignity sustains few of the prohibitions, it enriches bioethical discourse by reconnecting bioethics to the deeper question of human flourishing. An important consequence of this is that my version of human dignity moves bioethics beyond constraints to entail substantial positive duties that have typically been overlooked in the field. Human dignity has previously been largely set to the side in American bioethics. It is time to bring it to the forefront.