Browsing by Author "Schroeder, Timothy"

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    The Causal Map and Moral Psychology
    (Oxford University Press, 2017) Schroeder, Timothy
    Some philosophers hold that the neuroscience of action is, in practice or in principle, incapable of touching debates in action theory and moral psychology. The role of desires in action, the existence of basic actions, and the like are topics that (they hold) must be sorted out by philosophers alone: at least at present, and perhaps by the very nature of the questions. This paper examines both philosophical and empirical arguments against the relevance of neuroscience to such questions and argues that neither succeeds. In practice, there is already a stable body of findings from neuroanatomy and neurophysiology that warrants attention. And as a matter of principle, the ‘causal map’ of action production derivable from these findings requires the study of action theorists and moral psychologists because every such philosopher has commitments (sometimes, deeply implicit) to the shape of this causal map: commitments that might be in conflict with reality.
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    Toward a Funcational Apporach to Normative Reasons
    (2021-04-12) Williams, Brandon; Sher, George; Schroeder, Timothy
    A satisfactory analysis of normative reasons has evaded the field of metaethics for a long time. I argue that this is because of confusion at the conceptual level. Beginning with the debate between Reasons Internalists and Reasons Externalists, I develop an account of our concept of normative reasons that gives place to the functional role that those reasons have played in our acquisition of the concept. Assuming realism about reasons, I argue that their functional role is that of eliciting the basic normative experience in well-functioning agents. I call this experience “”. From this experience, we acquire the concepts of [to-be-done-ness] and [normative reason]. If our concept of a normative reason tracks anything in the real world, it must track the things that give rise to the basic normative experience. In the process of making this argument, I offer some admittedly speculative suggestions about how this experience of should be characterized and categorized among the range of human experiences. I also defend a weak form of empiricism that allows our normative concepts to be derived from this experience. Finally, I suggest that there are numerous pay-offs to adopting my functional account of normative reasons. Epistemologically, it explains how it is that we are able to apprehend the normative world. Metaphysically, it answers some long-standing metaethical questions as well as dissolves long-standing debates, including the one between the Reasons Internalists and Reasons Externalists.
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    Wonderment: A Philosophical Analysis of Its Nature and Its Attending Virtue
    (2024-04-18) Smith, Joshua Tyler; Schroeder, Timothy; Bradford, Gwen; Fanger, Claire
    This dissertation delves into the emotion of wonderment and proposes that it serves as a foundation for a neglected virtue: openness to wonderment. I divide this work into two parts. In the initial part, Chapters 2 and 3, I present my account of wonderment and its close connection with the perception of a beautiful mystery. In order to motivate this account, I provide sketches of what beauty and mystery are and how responding to them constitutes wonderment. This account nicely captures the cognitive and emotional engagement that is recognizable in wonderment and how wonderment is both inviting and daunting. In the second part of this work, detailed in Chapters 4 and 5, I transition to consider the virtue of openness to wonderment. In this second part, I have two broad aims. First, to show that this neglected virtue is, in fact, a virtue. Second, to show that this virtue is valuable for human life. Openness to wonderment is characterized not simply by passive receptivity but also equally by active cultivation of our attention and appreciation for wonder-inducing experiences. I consider several features of familiar virtues, like being a dispositional state, involving emotion and deliberate choice, and orienting actions to a noble end and I show that openness to wonderment has all of these familiar features of virtues. I highlight that not only is this virtue’s value grounded in it being a virtue, but it is also valuable in that it enhances one's capacity for transformative contemplation of the world. I end by discussing further avenues for future research that explore its connection to contemplation and one's worldview.