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Browsing by Author "Rath, R. John"

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A study of British historical treatment of the origins of the First World War, 1918-1939
(1967) Best, Richard Albin; Rath, R. John
The connection between historical literature and public opinion relating to foreign policy is the primary concern of this thesis. It deals with British historiography on the origins of the First World War as it evolved in the years 1918-1939. Similarly it traces changing attitudes toward the conduct of foreign policy in the same period. By pointing to close analogies between these two situations, it is possible to suggest the crucial influence which the community of historians, had on the consensus underlying the foreign policy of the British, government in the interwar years. During the War and immediately thereafter the historians laid heavy emphasis on primary German responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities. There was also a contemporaneous desire to recover the costs of the War by forcing the Germans to make reparations payments for the damage they had inflicted on the Allies. From 1919 to 1922 historians were confronted with evidence demonstrating that the Germans had not intended to unleash a European war. This first wave of documentary revelation coincided with a period in which the hopes of peace were wrecked by the widespread turmoil and continuing warfare throughout Europe. Both the historians and the politicians suddenly came to realize the limitations of the positions they maintained at the time of the Paris conference. In the following decade historians and politicians both worked for international understanding and cooperation. The revisionist contention that all European powers shared responsibility for the outbreak of the War became the established historiographical position. Likewise, it was fondly hoped that by avoiding the practices of prewar diplomacy the nations of the world might escape war. This expectation was doomed by the rise of the militaristic fascist states. Nevertheless the politicians in power endeavored to continue the policies of the preceding decade, even though they now served only to strengthen the German position. Some of the historians did, however, come to realize at this time that the best way to deal with aggressive powers is by reliance on the ancient balance of power. Historians, therefore, prepared the way for the foreign policy of the interwar years, but in the end they were among the first to criticize its inherent weaknesses. They did this by demonstrating the essential validity of the approach taken by Sir Edward Grey during his tenure at the Foreign Office.
Charles Peguy: perpetual infidel
(1971) Derrick, June Elizabeth; Rath, R. John
Charles Peguy was a highly individualistic thinker. So personally tailor-made were many of his ideas that even his friends and supporters found him difficult to follow intellectually. However, Peguy's eccentricities were to a great extent shaped and colored by the political and social upheaval of his nation. This thesis attempted both to elucidate the uniqueness of this man and to use him as a window into fin de siccle Franse. Four major areas are analyzed in order to present this portrait of Peguy as a touchstone for his times: his socialism, his involvement in the Dreyfus Affair, his journalistic effort in the Cahiers de la Quinzaine, and his attitude towards French nationalism. Peguy's socialism certainly attracted no adherents and founded no movement. His utopian outlook was engendered by a disenchantment with the turmoil of French parliamentary politics, and produced in Peguy a sense of urgency shared by many of his countrymen. Peguy, the poet, is particularly important to the historian dealing with the Dreyfus Affair. Only a poet could articulate the transcendent qualities the fate of a lone army captain came to represent for the French Republic. Dreyfusism marked Peguy's life as surely as it changed the French body politic. Peguy's newspaper, the Cahiers de la Ouinzaine, gave concrete expression to many of his ideas. In addition, the Cahiers brought together the writings of many discordant thinkers, resulting in what was truly a potpourri of diverse elements of French intellectual life. Even in his distorted patriotism, Peguy reflected the stance of many Frenchmen. His hatred of positivism his distrust of intellectuals, and his fear for French security combined in a call for heroic action which found a ready response in the youth of France. As a socialist; Dreyfusist, fin de siecle writer, and militant chauvinist Peguy, despite his idiosyncrasies, truly lived the various phases of the history of his own time.
Engelbert Dollfuss and the destruction of Austrian democracy
(1967) Kondert, Reinhart Ditmar; Rath, R. John
When Engelbert Dollfuss became chancellor of Austria on May 10, 1932, he had no intention of destroying Austrian democracy. The idea of doing away with democracy never became an obsession with him; it was done more out of necessity than desire. Dollfuss' forced alignment with the Heimwehr, a right-wing organization motivated by fascist principles, was the first clear indication that Austrian politics were henceforth to move in an anti-democratic direction. The refusal of the Social Democrats to join his coalition in May, 1932, and their continuing obstructionist tactics in parliament discredited not only themselves but also the institution in which they were represented. By March, 1933, the chancellor had become thoroughly disgusted with the parliament of his day, and he became convinced that Austria could not long endure under the present system of government. The self-dissolution of parliament on March 4, 1933, provided Dollfuss with the opportunity he had been waiting for. Although not certain about the future fate of parliament, he decided that, at least for the time being, he would govern without that defunct body. He decided to rule by governmental decree, instead, and to legalize his actions he revived an old imperial law of 1917, the War Emergency Powers Act. The governmental decree which came on March 7, 1933, banning all further public meetings and processions and instituting a strict censorship of the press represented the first step in authoritarian rule which the government was from then on to follow. The repressive measures which followed brought the Dollfuss regime progressively closer to the full-fledged dictatorial regime which was proclaimed on May 1, 1934. On that date the chancellor announced the establishment of a Christian, German, authoritarian state organized on a corporative basis and modeled loosely on the fascist state of Italy. It must be brought out that much of the inspiration to organize Austria on an authoritarian basis came from Mussolini, who saw in a revitalized Austria the best weapon to use in countering Nazi designs on Austria. The Italian dictator agreed to come to Austria's support on condition that the Social Democratic Party be liquidated and that the Republic be converted into a fascist regime. Dollfuss unwillingly agreed to these demands, and the Heimwehr, which was in Mussolini's pay, began systematically to carry out the Duce's requirements. The activities of the Heimwehr leaders led ultimately to the civil war of February 12, 1934, in which the Social Democratic Party was eliminated as a political force in Austrian internal affairs. Its leaders were arrested, its funds were confiscated, and its trade unions were abolished. Austrian democracy was destroyed. With the promulgation of the new constitution on May 1, 1934, the trans formation from democracy to authoritarianism was complete.
Ernst Kaltenbrunner at the summit: a study of the last chief of the security police and security service
(1966) Houston, Wendell Robert; Rath, R. John
This thesis is a study of SS-(No Suggestions) Dr. Ernst Kaltenbrunner, who, from January 30, 1943, to May 8, 1945, served as chief of the Security Police and Security Service of National Socialist Germany. This post was one of the highest in the Nazi repressive machinery and one of the most important in the Reich as a whole. The first chapter of this study is devoted to Kaltenbrunner's life from the time of his birth on October 3, 1903, until his appointment as chief of the Security Police on January 30, 1943. During this forty year period Kaltenbrunner, the son of a bourgeois lawyer, rose from law student to higher SS and police leader in Vienna. It was during these four decades that the interaction of the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy, the impoverishment of his parents, the tumult of the twenties, the depression, and other factors molded his character. During these years he first displayed the "bully-slave" nature which was later to become the dominant element in his character. It was also during the later years of this period that he joined the National Socialist Party and the SS. In fact, from 1932 to 1935 he rose from SS recruit to commander of the SS in Austria and was twice imprisoned for his Nazi activities by the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime. In 1938 he aided in bringing about the Anschluss. From 1938 to 1943 he was one of the leading SS and police leaders in Germany. Then, in January, 1943, he went to Berlin as head of the Reich Security Head Office. Chapter II is concerned with Kaltenbrunner's activities after his appointment as chief of the Security Police. It deals with his involvement in the "White Rose" affair, the "bullet" decree, the repression of the July 20 plot, the attempted destruction of the concentration camps in 1945, and the "final solution of the Jewish problem." Finally, Kaltenbrunner1s life from early 1945 until his execution on October l6, 1946, is examined in the last chapter of this study. In this part his trial before the International Military Tribunal, the case against him, his defense, and his death are described in detail. Lastly, an attempt is made to fathom the character of the man, to show how typical he was of the higher echelons of the SS and police leadership as a whole, and to relate these factors to the problem of totalitarianism in general.
History Always a Science or Sometimes a Science of Propaganda? An Austrian Case Study
(Rice University, 1972-10) Rath, R. John; Electronic version made possible with funding from the Rice Historical Society and Thomas R. Williams, Ph.D., class of 2000.
Italy, Austria and the Anschluss: Italian involvement in Austrian political and diplomatic affairs, 1928-1938
(1973) Zuber, Frederick Raymond; Rath, R. John
Italy's involvement in Austrian political and diplomatic affairs during the interwar period generally has been studied in light of her acquiesence in the Austro-German Anschluss of March 15, 1938. Mussolini's acceptance of the union of these two German states is frequently interpreted as yet another manifestation of the growing cooperation between Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany which, beginning with their collaboration during the Spanish Civil War, eventually led to the events of Munich and the Second World War. While not without a degree of validity, this approach to Italy's involvement in the Anschluss tends to ignore the basic differences in policy and interests that existed between these two states. The resulting image, therefore, overemphasizes the closeness of the affinity between Rome and Berlin. This study seeks to present a balanced view of Italy's involvement in the Anschluss by tracing the rather complex course of Italian foreign policy in Austria during the period from 1928 to 1938. The examination of Austro-Italian relations is divided into three phases. The first, extending from the initial Italian contacts with various rightist groups in Austria in 1928 to the assassination of the Austrian chancellor, Engelbert Dollfuss, in July, 1931 marked the development of an Italian "protectorate" over Austria and the expansive phase of Italy's quest for hegemony in Central Europe. Following the assassination of Dollfuss, Italian policy entered a transitional phase dominated by Mussolini's efforts to create a British-French-Italian entente which would block German expansion in Austria and preserve Italy's position of influence in Central Europe. The failure of these efforts as a result of the events of the Abyssinian War obliged Italy to accept a compromise with Germany over Austria, culminating in the Austro-German "Gentlemen's Agreement" of July 11, 1936. Italy's foreign policy in Central Europe subsequently entered its final phase which witnessed the rapid erosion of her position in Austria. These events forced Mussolini to relinquish all remaining vestiges of his former protectorate over that country, thereby enabling Hitler to achieve his union of Austria and Germany on March 15, 1938.
Othmar Spann and the ideology of the Austrian corporate state
(1966) Haag, John Joseph; Rath, R. John
The Austrian scholar and social theorist Othmar Spann (1878-1950) was a major figure in the "conservative revolution" that fired the imagination of many Central European intellectuals after World War I. Born in the Habsburg monarchy as it was disintegrating under the pressures of nationalism and industrialization, Spann seemed destined for a conventional academic career until war, revolution, and economic collapse destroyed the social and ideological foundations of the old order in 1918. A series of lectures delivered at the University of Vienna soon after the war quickly made Spann a major spokesman for the "war generation"--young men whose rough-hewn idealism found few outlets in the grim world of postwar Central Europe. Published in Germany in 1921 under the title of Der wahre Staat (The True State), the ideas which Spann had previously outlined in articles and lectures soon became major ideological weapons for Rightist forces in Germany and Austria. A prolific writer and publicist as well as a gifted lecturer and teacher, Spann had by the late 1920's assembled a circle of dedicated disciples who enthusiastically spread his doctrines throughout German-speaking Central Europe. Spann's conservative view of society can be traced back to the ideas of the early nineteenth century German and Austrian political Romanticists who viewed man and his social destiny in essentially aesthetic and organic categories. In more technically philosophical terms, Spann owed much to Platonism and medieval Realism, both of which claimed that an ideal world of essences existed as such. Spann's ideal corporative society was to be based on autonomous social and economic units that would fuse to form a society infinitely more harmonious than the secular, urban, and industrialized chaos that confronted sensitive conservative intellectuals after 1918. The "true" society's ultimate rationale would be to provide meaningful social goals for both the broad masses of producers and the small elite of thinkers, planners, and dreamers who were to be the heart, mind, and soul of the new "organic" society. Particularly receptive to Spann's ideas were the disillusioned people who accepted neither the conservative and monarchist values of the past nor the Socialist, Bolshevik, or Nazi radicalism of the present. Spann's social philosophy of "universalism" was for them a viable amalgam of historicism and dynamism. Corporative ideas in general and Spann's thought in particular were popular during these years and found expression in such diverse manifestations as the political thought of Ignaz Seipel, the ambitions of Kurt von Schleicher, and the elitism of the Sudeten Germans who belonged to the Kameradschaftsbund. Denounced by the Nazis as "reactionary" and "theocratic" ideas by the Nazis in the 1930's, Spann's corporative doctrines failed to gain a foothold in prosperous and democratic post-1945 Western Europe. Above all, Spann represented the quest for social unity which had led many European intellectuals to abandon the values of knowledge for the values of action. Leaving the tranquil world of ideas, Spann came to grief in the often brutal world of political conflict.
Peace and reform: the attempts of the Meinl group to preserve the Habsburg Monarchy, 1917-1918
(1968) Straka, Donald Eugene; Rath, R. John
When Emperor Francis Joseph died in November, 1916, the new monarch Charles I ascended the throne to find the Austro-Hungarian empire in serious danger. Foodstuffs and raw materials were in short supply, dissident nationalities were clamoring for reform or outright secession, Germany was taking an overbearing attitude toward her ally, and a military victory appeared distant at best. Although Emperor Charles was untrained for the task before him and was often unable to decide on a firm course, he had a sincere desire to help his peoples. This desire encouraged the activities of Julius Meinl, Joseph Redlich, and Heinrich Lammasch. These men were loyal monarchists and believed that the only way to save the Habsburg empire was to make peace with the Entente and to reform the monarchy along more liberal lines. During the two years of Charles’ reign, they attempted to achieve their goals in several ways. Besides speeches in parliament or before private meetings, the first opportunity for the members of the Meinl group to achieve their aims came in the summer of 1917. Emperor Charles was looking for a new minister president to initiate peace and reform and considered both Lammasch and Redlich for the post. However, Lammasch refused the office and Redlich, although he accepted, was not appointed because of opposition from Germany. When this chance for political power was missed, the Meinl group was forced to turn to more unofficial efforts to attain their ends. In the winter of 1917-1918, Meinl and Lammasch conducted conversations with Allied contacts in Switzerland about prospects for peace. The discussions of both men produced certain effects in Allied countries, particularly the United States. President Wilson was especially interested in Lammasch's proposal since it indicated a chance for a separate Austrian peace. However, at this time Emperor Charles was hoping once again for a military victory and did not support the peace activities of the Meinl group. The emperor was influenced in his decision by his foreign minister Count Ottokar Czernin. Charles was committed to a militant course that within a few months produced ruinous results. In the fall of 1918, while the Habsburg armies disintegrated at the front, the Czechs and the South Slavs prepared to leave the monarchy. The emperor, desiring a peaceful transition to the new states and hopeful of retaining some unity in central Europe, appointed Lammasch as the head of the last imperial government, the ministry of liquidation. Lammasch held office for two weeks and his presence did ease the dissolution of the empire. The efforts of the Meinl group to save the monarchy ended in failure when the Austrian republic was declared on November 12, 1918.
The Austrian Sanierungswerk, 1922-1926
(1967) Pyle, Jerry Wayne; Rath, R. John
In May, 1922, Austria seemed to be on the verge of disintegration. Spiraling inflation had not only wrecked the country's economy but had also destroyed the Austrian people's desire to maintain their national identity. In fact, a union between Germany and Austria had been forestalled only by the bellicose attitude of the Allied Powers. In mid-May the Pan-Germans decided to risk war rather than endure the unbearable economic conditions any longer. In order to bring about the Anschluss, they announced their willingness to form a coalition with the Social Democrats. Ignaz Seipel, however, persuaded the German nationalists to abandon their dangerous Anschluss policy by proposing the establishment of a bank of issue. When he was unable to get financial backing from private sources, he unsuccessfully sought financial assistance from the Allied governments. He then resorted to diplomatic blackmail by pursuing a "vigorous foreign policy" that brought Europe to the brink of war. In order to prevent an armed conflict, the Allies agreed to loan Austria $125,000,000, provided that the Austrian government allow the League to exercise financial control over the country for two years. Although Seipel readily accepted these conditions, the Social Democrats rejected them outright. Although economic necessity eventually forced the socialists to accept the League's terms, they constantly attacked Seipel's administration. Consequently, when the French invasion of the Ruhr threatened the existence of his government, Seipel showed no hesitancy in using the Sanierungswerk as a means of strengthening his political base of power. Following his reelection as chancellor in October, 1923, Seipel decided to bring the Sanierungswerk to an end. He discovered, however, that the French wished to prolong League control as a safeguard against the Anschluss. To justify their unilateral extension of League control, the Allies resorted to the subterfuge of pretending the Austrian budget was not balanced on a sound basis. Seipel responded to this trickery by introducing a bill that would have given the federal government a' larger share of the provincial revenues. When his own party refused to support his proposal, Seipel resigned. He was succeeded by chancellor by Rudolf Ramek. Ramek's refusal to enact Seipel's revenue bill provided the Allies with a convenient excuse for maintaining their control over Austria. The League refused to even consider withdrawing its control until after Hindenburg's election to the German presidency in 1925. Since the French considered Hindenburg's victory an effective guarantee against the Anschluss, they recommended that the Sanierungswerk be terminated at once. Although the British and Italian governments opposed such a move, they yielded to French pressure and voted to abolish League control. On June' 30, 1926, the League's less than honorable relationship with Austria finally came to an end.
The Austrian State Treaty negotiations
(1966) Tobin, Ruth Helen; Rath, R. John
The signing of the Austrian State Treaty on May 15, 1955, concluded ten years of arduous negotiations among the Allied Powers. These negotiations illustrate the difficulties involved in dealing with the Soviet Union at the conference table. This study describes Allied efforts between 1945 and 1955 to persuade the Soviets to grant Austria its independence. In Chapter I Austrian political, economic, and social developments between 1918 and 1955 are reviewed to present the historical background of the negotiations. After the collapse of the Habsburg Empire in 1918, the First Austrian Republic struggled to establish itself as a viable independent state, only to be obliterated by the crushing machinery of the Third Reich. After liberation in 19^5, the legally constituted Austrian government worked with the occupying powers to put the shattered republic back on its feet. During ten years of Allied occupation the Austrian people resisted Soviet pressures and were steadfast in their determination to see their country free from foreign occupation. Chapter II deals with the course of the Allied negotiations from the first wartime pledges to Austria to 1950. In the Moscow Declaration of 1943 the Allied Powers agreed that Austria should be liberated from German domination and reestablished as a free and independent state. With this promise the Austrians expected to be granted their independence soon after the war. All early efforts made during numerous high-level conferences to bring the Soviets to agree to an Austrian State Treaty failed, however, and negotiations broke down completely in 1950. Chapter III is devoted to the years of stalemate between 1950 and 1953 and the resumption of negotiations at the Berlin Conference of Foreign Ministers early in 1954. The war in Korea and Stalin's sudden death in 1953 seemed to have little effect on the Austrian treaty negotiations. During this period the Western Allies tried by means of an exhaustive exchange of notes with the Soviet government to reopen negotiations on the Austrian question. When the new Soviet regime finally decided to send a delegation to the Berlin Conference, they refused to sign an Austrian treaty until a settlement on Germany had been reached. Chapter IV climaxes the negotiations with the sudden Soviet decision to conclude an Austrian treaty in 1955. The Soviets ostensibly decided to improve their post-Stalin image by granting Austria her independence. An Austrian delegation returned from Moscow with a Soviet promise to sign the treaty immediately and with very favorable terms on issues that had blocked settlement for ten years. The foreign ministers of the four occupying powers of Austria met in Vienna on May 15, 1955, to sign a treaty which recognized Austria as an independent state. The Austrian State Treaty was the first post-war European problem that the Soviets were willing to negotiate to a conclusion acceptable to the West.
The career of Artur Seyss-Inquart
(1968) Niebuhr, Richard William; Rath, R. John
This thesis is a study of Dr. Artur Seyss-Inquart, one of the key figures in the Nazi hierarchy who aided in the German takeover of Austria and ruled the Netherlands for the Nazis throughout most of World War II. The first chapter deals with Seyss-Inquart's early years, his first associations with politics, and the role he played in the Anschluss. During this time, Seyss-Inquart worked to accomplish his life long dream, the union of Austria and Germany. To this end, he began to associate with Austrian Nazis and achieved a position of importance in the cabinet of the Austrian government of Kurt von Schuschnigg, Using this post, he helped to undermine Schuschnigg's government from within. But throughout these early years, Seyss-Inquart thought himself a patriot, working for the glory of his native land. He was not yet a full-fledged member of the Nazi conspiracy. The second chapter is devoted to Seyss-Inquart's career from the Anschluss to his establishment of the government of occupation in the Netherlands. It was during this time that the first striking changes in his character occurred. No longer was he a patriotic Austrian, working for what he believed to be the good of his country, but a cog in the Nazi machine. After leaving Austria because of the subordination of his position as governor, he was made a Reich Minister without portfolio and a member of the German Reich cabinet. In the fall of 1939, Seyss-Inquart assumed new duties as Hans Prank's deputy governor of the coupled Polish territories. This post was of minor significance, however, and in May, 1940, Seyss-Inquart was appointed head of the civil government of the Netherlands, a position he held until the end of the war. The government he established in Holland was perhaps the smoothest running of any of the Nazi-occupied countries. The final chapter of the thesis discusses the last, years of Seyss-Inquart's career, from the first repressive measures that he decreed against the Jews to his death at Nuremberg. During this time, his personality came almost full circle. The mild-mannered Viennese lawyer had disappeared, and in its place was a man who brutally put down opposition by the Dutch people and railed against the Jews as the enemies of National Socialism. In spite of his often humane efforts towards the conquered people he governed, the Nuremberg tribunal found him guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Fully accepting the responsibility for what he had done, Seyss-Inquart was executed after being pronounced guilty by the tribunal.
The provisional government of Austria: April 27 to December 13, 1945
(1968) Anzelmo, Mary Ann Probus; Rath, R. John
Austria's future in the closing days of World War II was uncertain. The Allies had expected to find a political vacuum. Yet, like a phoenix rising from the ashes, an Austrian provisional government emerged from the postwar rubble within one-month after Allied liberation. This study examines the atmosphere which made possible such a rapid congealing of political forces, the initial formation of the government, the difficulties presented by the Soviets on the one hand and the western powers on the other, and the many factors which enabled the government to overcome these difficulties. The importance of the provisional government has frequently been underestimated. For its success in laying the foundation for viable Austrian independence, it deserves more credit than its achievements as an interim government suggest.
The revolt of Sigmund Freud (1856-1900)
(1968) Pace, Allen David; Rath, R. John
There are few men in the history of man who have so revolutionized man's view of himself as Sigmund Freud. The development of psychoanalysis represented a great intellectual revolution, which overthrew the most cherished concepts of Freud's age. Yet, Freud's personality seems, at least on the surface to contain very little which would impel himself towards such a massive assault on the culture of his times. Unlike so many of the intellectual innovators of the nineteenth century, he was not radically alienated from his society. He accepted the general mores and conventions of his time and seemed to be relatively satisfied with his position in society. Yet there were in his character elements which could give him the strength to rebel, if it became necessary. Freud's position of dominance in his family during his childhood helped to establish his stubborn and inner-directed personality. His enormous ambition found expression in his scientific research, but his hopes of becoming a great physiologist were thwarted by the anti-Semitism at the University of Vienna and by personal financial difficulties. These tendencies were intensified by Freud's belief in the ethnic superiority of the Jew. This combined with Freud's self-image as a pioneer of science made him impervious to social opposition. When his powerful speculative intellect led him to assert bizarre and unpopular theories, he was not inclined to back down before outside pressure. Such factors explain how Freud was able to develop and found it necessary to develop new methods. Under the influence of Jean Martin Charcot of Paris, he shifted the emphasis of his studies to the study of mental phenomena in themselves and began to abandon the attempt to reduce them to physical interactions. Also, he was brought by Charcot to recognize the importance of such phenomena as hypnotism, which had been ignored by the mechanistic psychologists. Once this shift of emphasis had been made, new aspects of psychology opened up for Freud. From his Viennese colleague Josef Breuer, he received the basis for the concepts of repression and the unconscious. Since he was now concerned with the content of consciousness, rather than with its physical basis, he became aware of the importance of sexual problems, which emerged frequently in his conversations with his patients. He became aware of infantile sexuality and of the Oedipus complex. His decision to abandon the search for a physical basis of mental problems opened the way for the breakdown of the clear division between abnormality and normality. Freud became aware that the differences between his neurotic patients and healthy individuals were ones of degree, not of kind. These views represented a sharp break with the western intellectual tradition, and Freud's brilliant intellect quickly expanded his initial insights into a major assault on western thought. This revolt may be seen as the dialectical negation of liberal-Enlightenment thought. Freud was so committed to the scientific ideals implicit in the liberal world-view, that he transcended its limits. He was so committed to the rationalization of human experience that he rationalized the irrational and destroyed the basis of rationality itself. Thus, Freud's lack of personal inclination to revolt was the dialectical basis for his revolution.

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