Browsing by Author "Oxtoby, Donald"

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    How Rich is Perceptual Experience?
    (2022-04-12) Oxtoby, Donald; Siewert, Charles
    A question of recent interest in the philosophy of perception is, how rich is perceptual experience? While we can form beliefs or make judgments about almost any property, presumably the range of properties presented in perceptual experience is more limited. Are merely “thin properties” presented in perceptual experience, like simple color or shape properties, or are “rich properties” also presented in perceptual experience, like being a sunflower, or being a female voice? This dissertation argues that rich properties are not only ever accusatives of judgments we make, but are also presented in perceptual experience. Chapter 1 describes my approach to the above debate. The main challenge for rich views is to explain why one should think that perceptual recognition of rich properties cannot always be explained in terms of changes in merely thin properties presented in perceptual experience. My approach to answering this question is neutral toward content views and direct realist views of perceptual experience. In Chapter 2, I discuss how phenomenal contrast arguments should bear upon the richness debate. After perceptually learning to recognize certain rich properties, and the recognitional capacity is firmly in place, there is a phenomenal difference in perceptual experience which could not be constituted by any change in merely thin presented properties, so rich views are preferable. Chapter 3 discusses how studies on perceptual adaptation should bear upon the richness debate. I argue that rich views have an advantage over thin views in describing which properties subjects perceptually adapt to in a variety of studies cited in the literature. Supposing properties we perceptually adapt to are also presented in perceptual experience, this offers support for rich views. Chapter 4 argues that a proper understanding of perceptual learning gives reason to think that rich properties are presented in perceptual experience. No combination of merely thin presented properties is sufficient to explain what constitutes the phenomenal difference in perceptual experience in many cases where objects one has perceptually learned to recognize appear recognizable, and do not appear ambiguous with objects sharing the same thin properties.