Browsing by Author "Morrison, Donald R."
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Item Aristotle's Ideals of Friendship and Virtue(2011) Carreras, Anthony Edward; Morrison, Donald R.Aristotle's eudaimonism commits him to holding that the virtuous agent chooses everything ultimately for the sake of his own eudaimonia. But within this eudaimonist framework, Aristotle claims that the agent must value his friend for the friend's sake, and that he must choose virtuous actions for themselves. How can we make sense of these claims wi thin Aristotle's eudaimonist framework? I argue that Aristotle holds that there is a necessary, conceptual connection between valuing a friend for the friend's sake and valuing a friend for the sake of one's own happiness, and likewise for virtue. In friendship, this view of Aristotle's is buttressed by his potent but inchoate view that true friends are a "single soul", a fact not recognized by most commentators. I develop this view at length and show that Aristotle thinks that through a friendship, the character and well-being of each friend is essentially shaped by, and defined by reference to, the other. This both explains and justifies friends in perceiving their relationship as a unit and being motivated by what I call "WeAttitudes". To the extent that friends are a single soul, it is not the case that I value my friend for my sake or that he values me for his sake. Rather, it is the single soul that values itself for its own sake. Concerning virtue, I argue that Aristotle holds that to choose a virtuous action for its own sake is to choose it for those features of it that make it a virtuous action. Since it is an essential feature of any virtuous action that it actualizes the agent's capacity for virtue - which is that in which eudaimonia primarily consists - it must be chosen for this feature of it. Anticipating the worry that Aristotle's virtuous agent does not have a proper regard for others, I show that there are at least some virtuous actions whose essential features refer plainly to the well-being of others. Therefore, these actions are chosen both for these features and for their eudaimonic features, without one set of features being valued for the sake of the other set.Item Law in Aristotle's ethical-political thought(1998) Weirnick, Darren; Morrison, Donald R.Proclaiming that man is a political animal, Aristotle overcame the Sophists' opposition between law and nature. My dissertation looks at whether the law successfully promotes the human good in Aristotle's political philosophy. Aristotle believes law should inculcate the virtues of character. In Chapter One, I argue habituation to virtue through laws does not unacceptably undermine citizens' autonomy. Aristotle intends the law to inculcate virtue in coordination with other parts of the social fabric, including the household and social customs. Yet Aristotle also believes laws, including laws about moral education, should conform to the goal of the constitution. Many constitutions do not aim at a life of virtue correctly conceived. In Chapter Two, I argue that by promoting the virtue of the citizen in deviant regimes, Aristotle's lawgiver risks inculcating moral vice. Chapter Three looks at the basis for the law's authority in the practical wisdom of the lawgiver. Aristotle identifies legislative wisdom as a form of practical wisdom, and speaks of the lawgiver as a sage. But just as absolute kingship is unlikely, so too is a lawgiver sage. Aristotle's more realistic account of legislative activity, as conducted by citizens who are often not practically wise, shows Aristotle still values the rule of law for the constraints it places on human bias. Chapter Four analyzes Aristotle's conception of equity. Because practical affairs are only 'for the most part,' dikasts deciding particular cases in court need to take into account exceptional circumstances. In the light of Athenian judicial procedure, equity is inconsistent with the rule of law. The tension between the two must be tolerated because of the nature of practical affairs. Chapters Five and Six revisit the question whether Aristotle is a natural law theorist. According to Nicomachean Ethics V.7, only the best constitution provides a standard of natural justice. Other passages usually thought to indicate Aristotle held a natural law view either are poor sources for Aristotle's view or have little to do with natural justice. Natural justice provides no specific guidance as is found in later natural law theorists, e.g., invalidation of or disobedience to positive law.Item Plato, Souls, and Motions(Rice University, 2011) Prince, Brian D.; Morrison, Donald R.Plato’s late works contain an unexpectedly consistent treatment of the physics and metaphysics of souls. In the course of showing this, I argue that: (1) the middle period dialogues Phaedo and Republic assume, but do not mention, a Form of Soul; (2) the Timaeus contains a physical theory according to which all changes of every kind are forms of spatial motion; (3) Plato’s view of souls as self-movers is identifiable in more of his late dialogues than is usually recognized (namely, in the Statesman as well as in the Phaedrus, Timaeus, and Laws); (4) in the definition of souls as self-movers, “motion” should be read as “spatial motion” rather than “change” in general, and (5) neither the Phaedrus nor the Timaeus contains the claim that human souls are immortal, while both dialogues contain a concept of “soul-stuff,” a material from which individual souls are manufactured.Item Plato, Souls, and Motions(2011) Prince, Brian D.; Morrison, Donald R.Plato's late works contain an unexpectedly consistent treatment of the physics and metaphysics of souls. In the course of showing this, I argue that: (1) the middle period dialogues Phaedo and Republic assume, but do not mention, a Form of Soul; (2) the Timaeus contains a physical theory according to which all changes of every kind are forms of spatial motion; (3) Plato's view of souls as self-movers is identifiable in more of his late dialogues than is usually recognized (namely, in the Statesman as well as in the Phaedrus, Timaeus, and Laws ); (9) in the definition of souls as self-movers, "motion" should be read as "spatial motion" rather than "change" in general, and (5) neither the Phaedrus nor the Timaeus contains the claim that human souls are immortal, while both dialogues contain a concept of "soul-stuff;" a material from which individual souls are manufactured.Item Socratic Influence on the Stoic Epictetus(2011) Mulvey, Brandon; Morrison, Donald R.The primary aim of this project is to examine the nature of Socrates' influence on the Stoic Epictetus. While Plato's Socrates certainly influenced Epictetus, the Socrates portrayed in Xenophon's Memorabilia plays an even larger role in shaping the Socrates Epictetus seeks to imitate. This claim will be substantiated by drawing close parallels between passages in Epictetus' Discourses and Handbook and Xenophon's Memorabilia . The discussion here demonstrates that Epictetus' methodology is a reflection of Xenophon's approach, characterized by committed doctrines and proscriptive advice giving, rather than the searching dialectical approach ending with negative results found in Plato's Socratic dialogues. I begin by examining A.A. Long's claim that it is Plato's Socrates that Epictetus emulates, and providing a critical analysis of this argument. I then argue that the methodology of Epicetetus' Discourses , as well as the content and subject matter, are inspired by Xenophon's Socrates.