Browsing by Author "Morgan , T. Clifton"

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    Law and Conflict
    (2022-06-14) Reyes, Liana Eustacia; Morgan , T. Clifton
    This dissertation examines the effect formal legal institutions and preferences over those institutions have on civil war. The first chapter considers why power-sharing agreements often fail to bring lasting peace. I argue that if former rebels and incumbents have similar views regarding legal institutions being considered “legitimate,” power-sharing agreements can bring lasting peace. If, however, the former belligerents have different legal preferences, civil war is likely to recur because the legal system cannot provide a peaceful resolution of future conflicts that all parties accept. The second chapter focuses on why governments sometimes use civilian courts to try rebels rather than relying on military courts or battlefield summary justice. I argue that governments are more likely to rely on civilian courts when rebel groups heavily tax civilian populations. This is because the more a rebel group appears to be a de facto government, the more benefit the incumbent gains from delegitimizing rebels as “common” criminals. The final chapter examines why rebel groups differ in the extent to which they develop legal institutions and the effect of this variation. I argue that rebels with secessionist goals create extensive legal institutions to establish their ability to govern and that doing so lengthens the war. I conduct several large-N empirical analyses testing hypotheses drawn from these arguments, and, in each case, I find significant support for my claims.
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    The Effects of Foreign Audiences in International Dispute Settlements
    (2015-12-02) Matsumura, Naoko; Leeds, Brett Ashley; Morgan , T. Clifton; Fang, Songying; Boylan, Richard
    This dissertation addresses the question of why actors (i.e., states and non-state actors) use international organizations (IOs) to settle disputes when such institutions often do not have enforcement power of their own. I approach this question by looking at the influence of IO dispute settlement processes on the behavior of domestic and foreign audiences. In particular, I argue that actors use IOs in order to influence pro-compliance foreign audiences by providing two types of information: information about violations that have occurred and information about the willingness and ability of parties to comply with settlement obligations. Informed pro-compliance audiences can work as enforcers, which help facilitate a state’s compliance with an IO’s ruling. This dissertation is composed of three stand-alone essays. These essays empirically test the implications of my theoretical arguments on datasets of actors’ use of dispute settlement mechanisms in the areas of trade and foreign investment. This dissertation sheds new light on actors’ strategic use of IOs.