Browsing by Author "Li, Haiyang"

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    Escaping Bear Hugs: A New Venture's Network Building and the Effects on Its Bargaining Power
    (2019-04-19) Li, Toby; Li, Haiyang; Hoskisson, Robert
    A new supplier having a more prominent client, while critical for its survival and growth, also results in weaker bargaining power to appropriate value through that client. Prior literature has focused primarily on the weaker supplier growing the number of network clients to strengthen its bargaining power, without distinguishing the types of clients needed. This paper proposes two network-based solutions for the weaker supplier that draw on resource dependence theory (RDT) and the resource-based view (RBV): 1) building a 'competing' network of multilaterally rival clients to reduce dependency on its focal client, or 2) developing a ‘learning’ network of diverse clients to enhance its value to its focal client, respectively. This paper also explores the challenges for the supplier in accessing each network type to draw dyadic-level bargaining power. A supplier accessing a 'competing' network - based on dependence reduction using similar resources - results in more immediate short-run bargaining advantage, but not in the long run due to limited diverse learning. Meanwhile, a supplier accessing a 'learning' network - based on enhancing value by acquiring more heterogeneous knowledge resources – this results in more sustainable long-run bargaining advantage, but it can sacrifice more immediate short-run gains due to initial integration adjustments needed for diverse learning. This paper thus reflects the inherent tradeoffs in pursuing either an RDT or RBV-based bargaining solution. We test and find support for these predictions using supplier driller – client operator partnerships in the oil-gas industry as our empirical context.
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    Essays on Innovation, Product Failures, and Technology Competition
    (2023-04-21) Zhu, Yiying; Li, Haiyang
    My dissertation studies innovation, technology failures and competition within the context of the U.S. medical device industry. The importance of innovation in establishing a sustainable competitive advantage is widely recognized in the management literature. However, the innovation decision-making process is complex and often involves multiple external stakeholders, including regulators, customers, and peer firms. Furthermore, innovation is frequently accompanied by uncertainty and risk of failure. My dissertation seeks to contribute additional insights to the existing innovation literature by addressing the following questions: How does product innovation create unintended competitive challenges for early-stage ventures in safeguarding their intellectual property assets? How do founders’ backgrounds influence ventures’ varying responses to product failures? How do firms interpret and leverage industry peers’ product failures to inform their own product innovation strategy?
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    Three Essays on CEO's Impression Management
    (2016-04-22) Jin, Jing; Hoskisson, Robert E; Li, Haiyang
    Impression management has been used by organizations, especially their top executives, in various situations so that they could influence the image of the organizations or top executives in the eyes of external audiences. An impression management process involves two parties, actors, who initiate impression management tactics, and targets, who give feedback to actors suggesting whether impression management is successful or not. My three essays intend to address different questions involved in this process. In particular, essay one addresses the question: how CEOs do impression management during mergers and acquisitions announcements? Given that acquirer firms tend to receive negative stock market reactions, I argue that CEOs have two different approaches to do impression management in this situation using strategic noise. More specifically, CEOs could either release positive strategic noise to offset potential negative effect, or release negative strategic noise to obscure the causal link between the acquisition announcements and negative stock market reactions. I find empirical support for my hypotheses based on zero-inflated negative binomial models. Essay two addresses the question: how impression management works when there are multiple target audiences? Does one target’s reaction influence another? To address these questions, I examine whether CEOs could adopt impression management tactics to influence analysts’ and investors’ reactions, and whether their reactions could ultimately affect boards’ decisions on CEO dismissal in the context of financial restatements. I find that CEOs tend to release more news after financial restatements that could improve investors’ and analysts’ reactions. Improved analysts’ reactions could reduce CEO dismissal likelihood after financial restatements. Essay three focuses on a different question: whether comparable firms’ situations affect the effectiveness of focal firm’s impression management? This question is especially critical when firms desire to engage in impression management in anticipation of negative news. I developed a theoretical model to address this question. In particular, I categorize all possible situations into four different scenarios based on the dimensions of consistency information and consensus information. I further discuss and compare different causal attribution strategies in each scenario. To achieve successful impression management, I suggest that firms provide explanations that are consistent with external audiences’ perceptions. In addition, beyond this objective information, external audiences’ reactions are also affected by their emotional and biased beliefs.
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    Who do you take to tango? Examining pairing mechanisms between underwriters and initial public offering firms in a nascent stock market
    (Wiley, 2022) Zhang, Yan Anthea; Chen, Jin; Li, Haiyang; Jin, Jing
    Previous studies on initial public offerings (IPOs) in mature stock markets have documented that high-reputation underwriters primarily work with high-quality firms and vice versa—that is, they are paired through a quality-matching mechanism. We propose that in a nascent stock market, a pricing mechanism may also play a role, through which pricing (the underwriting fee) sets the pairing. We examine these two mechanisms in the context of China's ChiNext stock exchange, which was launched in 2009 and experienced dramatic regulatory improvements in 2012–2013. With data on IPOs in 2009–2017, we find evidence to support the pricing mechanism's effect before the regulatory improvements and the quality-matching mechanism's effect after the improvements. We contribute to the literature by developing an evolutionary view on the pairing mechanisms between important capital market participants. Managerial Summary In a mature stock market, underwriter reputation signals the underlying quality of initial public offering (IPO) firms to external investors because high-reputation underwriters primarily work with high-quality IPO firms and vice versa. We find that in a nascent stock market before the market experiences regulatory improvements, underwriters and IPO firms are paired through a pricing mechanism. That is, underwriters with higher reputation charge higher underwriting fees, and IPO firms with lower quality pay higher fees. Since the pricing mechanism rather than the quality-matching mechanism sets the pairing, underwriter reputation does not have a signaling effect. Instead, we find that higher underwriting fees signal lower quality of IPO firms. Our findings shed important insights on how market participants are paired in other nascent markets, nascent technology fields and industries.