R-3 Repository :: Browsing by Author "Kulstad, Mark A."

Browsing by Author "Kulstad, Mark A."

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All That is Possible Can Be Imagined: Leibniz's "Von der Allmacht"
(2011) Picone, Maria S.; Kulstad, Mark A.
Leibniz's 'Von der Allmacht and Allwissenheit Gottes and der Freiheit des Mensched is obscure and misunderstood. First I do a close reading of the work. Then I will discuss some scholarly interpretations, as well as VdA's place in Leibniz's thought. I challenge two scholarly assumptions--the first being that Leibniz rejected then accepted privation theory. I argue that there are two types of privation theories, using illustrative historical examples, and that Leibniz objected to one and adopted the other. Secondly, many scholars opine that the Confessio is a juvenile Theodicy. I take VdA to be an important predecessor to the Theodicy due to similarities in style, content and method. Finally, I link Leibniz's definition of possibility in VdA with an important connection between truth and existence. In this respect, Leibniz's ideas of possibility and conceivability are the forerunners of a current topic in philosophy.
Cartesian analysis in natural science as exposed through an investigation of his method in mathematics
(1992) Capistran, Michael D.; Kulstad, Mark A.
Aspects of Descartes' notion of analysis in his mathematics are looked at in detail with a view to relating this notion to Descartes' work in natural science. Descartes' method in his mathematics and science are subsumed beneath a more general method of analysis termed by Descartes 'indirect problem investigation'. The distinction between Cartesian analysis and synthesis is discussed. In terms of natural science a specific interaction of (1) metaphysically deduced results with (2) empirical data, involving an attendant conversion of secondary qualities to primary qualities for the solution of such problems, is advanced using the magnet as an illustration. A possible relationship with Descartes' methodology in his metaphysics is suggested.
Constructive skepticism and the philosophy of science of Gassendi and Locke (Pierre Gassendi, John Locke)
(1992) Fisher, Saul L.; Kulstad, Mark A.
In the sixteenth and seventeenth century, empiricists such as Pierre Gassendi and John Locke accounted for the human capacity to know about the world by emphasizing sensory access to information. These philosophers entertained skepticist doubts concerning reasoned knowledge and concluded that sure knowledge of the world is won primarily by empirical or sense-based studies. These views on our general knowledge and certainty support a variety of claims concerning scientific knowledge in particular. On the basis of their constructive skepticist stances, these two empiricists support arguments for the reality of scientific objects and a strongly empiricist methodology of gathering and organizing scientific knowledge. The hallmarks of their empiricist philosophies of science are a background essentialism which motivates the search for underlying causes, a probabilism about theory confirmation, and a ranking of knowledge-types by degrees of certainty. The similarities of their views illuminate the influence of Gassendi's writings on Locke. Their differences show us their varying conceptions of knowledge with certainty and of knowledge about the world.
Leibniz and the problem of evil: Suffering, voluntarism, and activism
(2001) Thomas, Mark L.; Kulstad, Mark A.
This work elucidates elements of Leibniz's theodicy which are non-teleological. Rather than ignoring the personal dimensions of suffering, as some have charged, Leibniz actually recognizes the threat that the problem of innocent suffering presents for a perfectly good God. His theodicy goes beyond the global greater-good defense of the best possible world argument in several ways. He appeals to personal greater-goods to justify some instances of suffering, but he also invokes deontological principles in his retributive justice arguments, his response to the author of sin problem, and his constraint against damnation of infants. However, an evidential version of the problem of horrible suffering of innocents would still threaten his theodicy. This problem persists due to Leibniz's rejection of theological voluntarism in favor of a unified system of ethics for God and rational creatures. Finally, Leibniz's rejection of quietism provides an important resource for a response to suffering. His theodicy thus implies a moral activism whereby the good for each rational creature is bound up with the general good of others in the amelioration of the world.
Leibniz on Modality
(2014-04-17) Mills, Jacob Shaw; Kulstad, Mark A.; Grandy, Richard E.; Zammito, John; Brown, Gregory
This dissertation is a systematic account of the concept of modality in Leibniz’s thought. In chapter 1 I will give a detailed account of the metaphysics of Leibnizian possible worlds and show how to link them up with the notion of a possible world as it functions in contemporary possible worlds semantics. I then conclude with some observations on what it means to have a possible worlds semantics and give my solution to a standard problem with Leibniz’s infinite analysis approach to modality. In chapter 2 I show the development of and eventual deep connection in Leibniz thought between the infinite analysis and possible worlds accounts. Possible worlds supply the reason for the infinity of the analysis involved in contingent predicates. Chapter 3 begins with a summary of attempts in the literature to avoid the scope of Leibniz’s essentialism. I then argue that Leibniz employed an intensional theory of reference and provide a model for it. I conclude with an account of Leibniz’s treatment of counterfactuals. Lastly, in chapter 4 I give a treatment of Leibniz’s per se and moral modality. I conclude by showing in what sense Leibniz thought all of an individual’s properties are intrinsic and in what sense he didn’t think all of an individual’s properties were essential.
Locke and Leibniz: The innateness debate
(1991) Goad, Candice Shelby; Kulstad, Mark A.
One fundamental difference between the epistemic views of Locke and Leibniz as represented in Leibniz's New Essays on Human Understanding concerns the issue of innate ideas and knowledge. In countering Locke's arguments that innate ideas and/or knowledge are neither necessary nor even possible, Leibniz offers a defense of the doctrine which evidently presumes that Locke's objections are the result of a misapprehension. Once properly understood, Leibniz suggests, the doctrine of innateness reveals itself to be not only reasonable but indeed absolutely necessary to accounting for our knowledge. Leibniz's arguments are not, however, as compelling as he would perhaps like; indeed, certain critics have argued that due to the manner in which he expresses his views--as separate responses to each of Locke's objections, rather than as straight treatise--Leibniz fails to display a coherent theory of his own. The complexity of Leibniz's views and their ties to his metaphysics render their case against him even stronger. Contrary to the views of these critics, there does exist in Leibniz's thought a coherent theory of innateness. Leibniz's innate speculative truths, with which critics have generally been concerned, are explicated in terms of reflection upon the enduring properties of the soul. There also exists in Leibniz's system an analogous realm of innate moral knowledge, which is also worked out in terms of reflection. This interpretation of Leibniz's theory makes possible a meaningful comparison between his views and those of Locke. The substantial differences between the two systems can be traced to differences in the epistemic questions with which they were concerned. While Locke is concerned with explaining the psychological apprehension of truth, Leibniz's focus is with truth's ontological structure.
Locke's scepticism concerning natural science
(1990) Goodin, Susanna Lee; Kulstad, Mark A.
Locke was a sceptic about the possibility of scientific knowledge of corporeal substance. Scientific knowledge is knowledge which is certain, universal, and instructive. According to Locke, to have certain and instructive knowledge of natural kinds (universal knowledge about species of corporeal substances) requires knowledge of the real essence of natural kinds. Since a real essence is the foundation for the properties a thing has, it must be known before a deduction of the properties can be done. Locke did not believe that it was possible for humans to know the real essence of corporeal substances. In my thesis, I provide an explanation for why he held these views. As my work shows, knowledge of the real essence of a natural kind is an involved process that requires first knowing the nominal essence of the natural kind, and then knowing the inner constitution of each member of the kind, knowing which aspect of the inner constitution of each member correlates to the overlap of properties used to delineate the natural kind, and finally, knowing how that aspect, which is the real essence of the natural kind, produces the properties it does. Without knowledge of the mechanics of how the physical real essence produces the mental ideas we cannot know whether the connection between the real essence and the properties is a necessary connection or a mere correlation. Unless we know why there is a connection, we cannot know, with certainty, that the connection will hold in the future or for other like configurations. Locke relies on the mind-body problem to explain why we cannot know the mechanics behind the connections. The mind-body problem has not been given appropriate emphasis in Lockean study. And yet it is uniquely capable of handling the two claims Locke makes about natural science: (1) our knowledge of corporeal bodies can never qualify as scientific knowledge and (2) our knowledge of corporeal bodies can be improved in ways that are useful to human life.
Locke's theory of personal identity: A causal interpretation
(2005) Fried, Edward; Kulstad, Mark A.
In this thesis I argue for a novel interpretation of Book II, Chapter xxvii of Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding according to which Locke's theory of identity is taken to be an Aristotelian four-causal theory. On this interpretation, we are the same person as anyone who efficiently causes us to remember being them. More particularly, two diachronically distinct persons x and y are the same person just in case either x causes y to remember being x or y causes x to remember being y; and two contemporaneous persons x and y are the same just in case for all diachronically prior persons z, z causes x to remember being z if and only if z causes y to remember being z. While this interpretation suffers from the drawbacks that Locke nowhere articulated such a view and had a well-known antipathy for scholastic notions generally, I argue that it has certain advantages. In addition to being at least consistent with Locke's dicta on causation, it is both formally and substantively adequate. Moreover, it reflects Locke's unconscious enmeshment in scholastic notions, and is useful as a heuristic; it sheds light on some of the more obscure aspects of the text (e.g., §12 and the concept of "man"). I conclude with the hope that future research will provide even more support for this novel interpretation.
Nagel's theory of the subjective and objective : implications for rationality in ethics
(1985) Goodin, Susanna Lee; Kulstad, Mark A.; Brody, Baruch A.; Grandy, Richard E.
In this thesis, I consider the consequences of applying Thomas Nagel's theory of the subjective and objective to rational decision-making in ethics. In chapter one, I am concerned with the notion of rationality. I discuss a common assumption man has about rationality and analyze the four necessary conditions for rationality. In chapter two, I present Nagel's theory. I draw out implications which are important in connection with rationality. In chapter three, I examine the implications of Nagel's theory for the notion of rationality. I focus on two problem cases which are designed to highlight a conflict between Nagel's theory and rationality. I use an analogy to Derek Parfit's work on prisoner's dilemmas to support my claim that the acceptance of Nagel's theory rules out the possibility of performing actions based on rational decisions. Finally, I argue that the type of rationality which is possible under Nagel's theory is deprived of any action-guiding force.
Natural order, causation, and justice: A variety of harmonies in Leibniz's metaphysics
(2000) Carlin, Laurence Davis; Kulstad, Mark A.
The first part of this dissertation focuses on Leibniz's very concept of harmony independently of its various applications. I argue that an examination of the relevant texts reveals that harmony is not merely an ontological notion, but that it is also epistemological. The key to understanding Leibniz's concept of harmony, I argue, is through his nominalist theory of relations, and its connection to his doctrine of distinct vs. confused cognition. In the second part of the dissertation, I examine Leibniz's theory of a harmony between the ideal realm of mathematics, and the concrete realm of nature. I argue that this harmony explains, according to Leibniz, the universal applicability of the principle of continuity, a principle which lies at the core of his account of the laws of motion, and his adoption of the Neoplatonic and Christian Aristotelian doctrine of a "Great Chain of Being." The third part turns to an examination of the harmony of efficient and final causation. Many commentators assume that for Leibniz final causation is applicable only to the metaphysical level of monads, while efficient causation is operative solely at the physical level of phenomenal bodies. I argue against this assumption that both types of causation are operative at each ontological level. In part four, I examine Leibniz's theory of the harmony of nature and grace, a harmony directly associated with his moral philosophy and his theory of natural retribution. I argue that while Leibniz's philosophy contains the metaphysical doctrines sufficient to account for how virtuous acts reward themselves naturally, it provides little support for the claim that vicious acts generate their own punishment. The dissertation concludes in part five with a discussion of the significance of the concept of harmony for the history of philosophy. I also argue that the previously examined pre-established harmonies are parts of a metaphysical system best understood, not as a series of harmonies operating in isolation from one another, but as a series of harmonies some of which are nested in others.
Species, ideas and idealism: The scholastic and Cartesian background of Berkeley's master argument
(2001) Clemenson, David Lee; Kulstad, Mark A.
This dissertation situates Berkeley's "master argument" for idealism (PHK I, 23 and DHP I, 200) in the context of Descartes' theory of ideas, and seeks to show that within that context the argument is convincing. In addition, the dissertation argues that Descartes' theory of ideas was not representationalist., as is often supposed, but a kind of direct realism; Cartesian ideas render intelligible individuals directly present to the intellect. In this respect Cartesian idea theory is very similar to a theory of species expounded by Antonio Rubio and other Jesuit philosophers at the turn of the seventeenth century; Jesuit writings of this period include several interesting anticipations of Cartesian doctrine. Finally, the dissertation discusses the relationship between Berkeley's master argument and the semantic paradoxes of Berry, Koenig and Richard, and suggests that all these arguments commit a fallacy of vicious circularity, related to but distinct from the fallacy signaled by Bertrand Russell.
The reluctant revolutionary: An essay on David Hume's account of necessary connection
(1988) Schwerin, Alan Kenneth; Kulstad, Mark A.
Through close critical analyses of Hume's texts I have attempted to develop a new interpretative framework that makes Hume's arguments and positions more accessible, if not more plausible. More positively, The Reluctant Revolutionary is an attempt to defend what may be called a subjectivist interpretation of Hume's views on necessary connection. My central thesis is the suggestion that Hume identifies necessary connection or power with a specific psychological disposition of the mind--as he puts it in the Treatise: necessary connection 'is a determination of the mind to carry our thoughts from one object to another.' (T 165) But why would Hume subscribe to this radical thesis, one may wonder? A large part of my discussion is an attempt to answer this vital question. The book consists of four components. In Chapter One (i) I begin with the argument that Hume views his discussion of necessary connection as central to the Treatise--if not as its centerpiece, and (ii) then go on to try to place this discussion in its immediate philosophical context which is the discussion on causality. After further deliberations on these two issues, in Chapter Three I proceed to outline, and critically evaluate the immediate arguments relied on by Hume to establish his view of necessary connection. For the most part, these do not strike me as convincing arguments. Finally, in Chapter Four I broaden my analysis of Hume's view of necessary connection, and try to develop an account of Hume's conception of the problem that motivates his radical view of necessary connection. As I try to point out, Hume is driven by an irrepressible urge for clarity and rigour in metaphysics--an urge that manifests itself, as I attempt to show, both in the radical nature of Hume's proposals, and in his depiction of the problem of necessary connection. For Hume depicts the problem of necessary connection as a dilemma, according to which metaphysicians either (a) concede that the term 'necessary connection' is meaningless (by virtue of the non-existence of a requisite impression) (b) or accept that this term actually refers to a particular subjective psychological disposition, and not, for instance, to some external phenomenon. This chapter closes with a consideration of this dilemma, and its role in Hume's postulation of a radical view of necessary connection. (Abstract shortened with permission of author.)

Browsing by Author "Kulstad, Mark A."

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